

# Homeland Security in 2015

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## What Does/Will Homeland Security Mean

Reflecting upon the meaning of “homeland security” brings to mind Justice Stewart’s memorable pronouncement on obscenity:

*“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced... but I know it when I see it...”*<sup>iv</sup>

Most of us have an idea of what we mean when we refer to “homeland security.” The mission statement of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides a benchmark:

*“We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.”*<sup>v</sup>

We suggest that both the definition and boundaries of that term will evolve as we approach the year 2015. Until a workable, universal definition emerges, however, we will find ourselves mired in confusion, generally allowing whatever tail happens to come along to wag an increasingly massive dog.

To be sure, terrorism is, and will likely continue to be, a major component of homeland security.

Nonetheless, as time goes on, we suspect that the definition will expand, especially if the United States is fortunate enough to be spared from

another major event similar to 9\11: the multiple attacks against targets in New York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. The DHS mission statement cited above, even if it remains unchanged, is broad enough to include a wide range of threats: economic espionage, pandemics, natural disasters, environmental meltdown, crime (of both the sophisticated and street variety), and just about everything else even remotely connected to the stability of the United States.<sup>vi</sup>

What is and what is not defined as being a component of “homeland security” will have a major impact on the police. For example, if street crime rises to the level of a threat to national security (and we suspect that the bar for defining something that way will decrease), don’t be surprised to see the military on the front lines (*see Scenario 1*).<sup>vii</sup> In addition, resource allocation, particularly at the federal level, increasingly will be tied to the extent to which something serves to bolster the perceived security of the homeland.<sup>viii</sup>

The police will be caught in the middle, constantly redefining their mission to “follow the money” or trying to take up the slack when federal agencies are deployed in other missions.

## The Need for Change

The world of 2015 has the potential to be very different from the world of today. Futurists note that the rate of technological change is accelerating (Kurzweil, 1999) even as social change stagnates (Smart, 2003). One futurist has opined that by the year 2020, the amount of information in the world will double every 73 days (Schwartz 1999).

The following possible trends are provided, not as predictions, but as suggestions to promote thought. Readers are encouraged to consider how each may affect his/her agency:

- 1) The rise of states like China and India, who will challenge the United States and the West in terms of technical know-how, and who will demand an increasing share of the world's resources.
- 2) Migration to China, the United States, Europe, and Russia of individuals to meet the needs of the workforce in aging societies. Unless societies work hard not to make these folks feel marginalized, the migrants will be ripe for radicalization.<sup>xi</sup>
- 3) Youth bulges in the Middle East & Africa (comparable to the "baby boom" in America), providing foot soldiers for terrorist and criminal groups. When combined with trend #2, this could prove to be a great challenge for policing.
- 4) Ubiquitous information technology (IT), allowing for true virtual communities rather than physical groups. Computers and chips will be small, inexpensive, and everywhere. There will be no such thing as computer crime: all crime with few exceptions, will involve some use of computers.
- 5) In a world where physical boundaries are becoming less important, people will increasingly define themselves by ethnicity, religion, economic class and belief-system as opposed to nationality. Smart (2005) notes that the drivers of change in the near future will be, in order of importance: technology, economics, and politics. The nation-state is not dead, but its stature continues to decline.
- 6) Groups with diverging interests (organized crime, terrorists) will work together in temporary alliances or "one-shot deals" when it suits their purpose.
- 7) Sadly, absent a paradigm shift, outlaw groups will negotiate the information age far more adroitly than the groups sworn to stop them.
- 8) Weapons of mass destruction will proliferate, even at the individual level. This will come about primarily as a result of increased access to information via the Internet (biological, chemical, and radiological devices are the most likely to emerge, nuclear less so).

One of the central themes of the Information Age is the empowerment of the individual and the small group. To that end, and given the above, one thing seems abundantly clear: the action is going to be at the street level. That means that, in terms of homeland security, local law enforcement will either be on the cutting edge or will become relegated to second-class citizenship.

### **Terrorism in 2015<sup>xii</sup>**

*The groundhog is like most other prophets;  
it delivers its prediction and then disappears.*

Bill Vaughn

*It's the end of the world as we know it.*

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It is with some trepidation that we discuss what terrorism (or anything else, for that matter) will resemble in 2015. Nevertheless, there are certain themes that will infuse the next several years; these, in turn, will affect trends.<sup>xiii</sup>

One element that ties many terrorist organizations together today is a general reaction against globalization. Each group would describe its concerns somewhat differently: al Qaeda decries the decadent influences of the West, the white supremacists rail against the internationalist/Jewish conspiracy, and the environmentalists deplore what they see as the borderless, economically-driven military-industrial complex. Each of these is a reaction against various elements of our increasingly tied-together world.

It is doubtful that globalization is going to go away; indeed, some describe it as the most pervasive influence on the first part of the 21st century (see, for example, Friedman (2000)). To that end, much like the Luddites of the 18th century, it is likely that extreme reactions against the "new world" will spawn many who see it as their duty to violently oppose ever-accelerating change.

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Added to this, it is doubtful that the economic benefits of the Information Age will be evenly distributed (National Intelligence Council, 2004). A wide gap between the haves and have-nots, combined with a shrinking middle class, does not bode well for stability (Gurr, 1970).

Increasingly, it is likely that terrorist and criminal groups will develop temporary alliances when it suits their purpose. This is not a new phenomenon—in the 1970s and 1980s radical left-wing groups recruited felons to assist them in robbing banks. Likewise, in the 1980s the Libyan government contracted with the Japanese Red Army to carry out bombings in the United States.

Today, groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia engage in both terrorist and criminal activities. According to the U.S. Department of State:

The FARC has well-documented ties to the full range of narcotics trafficking activities, including taxation, cultivation, and distribution (U. S. Department of State, 2004).

Further, some future alliances may prove quite strange; consider the words of Aryan Nation's leader August Kreis, offering his support for al Qaeda:

You say they're terrorists, I say they're freedom fighters. And I want to instill the same jihadist feeling in our peoples' heart, in the Aryan race, that they have for their father, who they call Allah (Shuster, 2005)

Individual actors and small groups will be able to inflict greater levels of harm than in the past. Increased access to information combined with a "cyber sense of group" <sup>xiv</sup> translates to a very small investment needed for a very large effect (e.g., while not directly on point, consider the enormous psychological and economic impact the snipers of

2003 had on the Washington, D.C. environs).

Put succinctly, the potential for ever-increasing acts of terrorist violence seems more rather than less as we approach 2015. Former National Security Council (NSC) member Richard Clarke (2005) described several possible al Qaeda attack scenarios in a piece that he recently wrote for *The Atlantic Monthly*. His outline of potential targets in the United States included schools, shopping malls, and airliners; perhaps most alarming, each was based on intelligence Clarke had received while in office at the NSC.

As noted above, youth bulges in poor countries will likely drive migration to more affluent areas, including the United States. Some areas have lately noted an almost quantum leap in the number of recently arrived immigrants, many of whom do not speak English and do not understand U.S. culture. Police agencies, through outreach and training, can go a long way toward helping individuals and groups feel less marginalized (one step on the road to becoming a solid citizen rather than a criminal/terrorist). As well, good relations with a particular community make it more likely that members of that community will trust the police enough to provide information about possible terrorist or criminal enterprises in their midst.

## Possible Specific Trends

*Radical Islamic Movement:* Since its ouster from Afghanistan, al Qaeda has become quite decentralized, with its leadership seemingly less involved in directing operations. Several smaller organizations may emerge, with figures like bin Laden looked to for spiritual and political inspiration. The nature of the Radical Islamic Movement in 2015 will depend to a great extent on political actions currently unfolding. For example, the manner in which the United States is perceived in predominantly Islamic countries (democratizing

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force or occupier) will drive opinion.<sup>xv</sup> As well, whether governments in the Middle East and Africa can effectively meet the needs (educational, economic, political, and religious) of the expected youth bulges will have a significant effect on this movement. That said, it is difficult to imagine that the Radical Islamic Movement will not be with us for some time to come; instead, a best-case scenario might be that it can be contained, with only sporadic and ineffective acts of violence.

*Radical Animal Rights/Anarchist/Environmental Movements:* At least four areas of concern to the animal rights/anarchist/environmental movement(s) are advancing, in some cases exponentially, to form a “perfect storm” for criminal activism: globalization, energy consumption, technology, and reports of environmental degradation.<sup>xvi</sup> As well, the economic gap between the rich and the poor, predicted to widen, has always been a touchstone issue for these groups, especially as it is perceived to disproportionately affect indigenous peoples. To date, the tactics of the enviro/animal/anarchist movement(s) have not significantly advanced their interests; to that end, it is quite possible that we will witness more frequent and lethal attacks, primarily against property but increasingly against individual targets of interest (police, government/corporate officials, research facilities, etc.).

*Hate Groups/Single Interest Groups/the New Luddites:* Although some well-known groups have been in decline for years, individual arrests indicate that those who engage in criminal activity to advance supremacist ideologies still exist.<sup>xvii</sup> Like other information age entities, the supremacy and hate movements have made the move from hierarchies to networks. Indeed, supremacist movements and hate groups may witness a renaissance, particularly if immigration levels rise as expected. Already, citizen vigilante groups patrol the

U.S.-Mexican border, often using more sophisticated tools than those available to the authorities. It is expected that new single interest groups will emerge as well. Concern about new technologies (e.g., nanotechnology and artificial intelligence) has provoked debate among scientists and engineers and has spawned Armageddon-like scenarios. It is not unforeseeable that a new Neo-Luddite,<sup>xviii</sup> anti-technology movement may come to the fore; their interests, while more narrowly-focused, could easily overlap with those of the animal rights/anarchist/environmental movements.

In general, and of particular interest to the local police, the structures of each of the above may look quite similar—small, autonomous, flexible units that seek to fly under the radar of the authorities. Depending on their level of operational security, terrorists may be quite difficult to locate. And yet, complete invisibility will likely be impossible. All groups leak information from time to time. So one very important role for those involved in homeland security will be that of “leak detector.” The cop on the beat, with his/her intimate knowledge of the community, is in a prime position to do just that.

## **Crime in 2015**

Because that’s where the money is.

*Line allegedly spoken by Willie Sutton when asked why he robbed banks.*

The world is shrinking. The legal system that most of us understand was developed at a time of specific jurisdictions, defined by articulated boundaries. That world is disappearing.

Increasingly, criminals are realizing that the real money is contained online, in ones and zeros. The more sophisticated ones will continually take advantage of that and will steal electronically rather than physically. And yet, bank robberies, burglaries

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and the like will not disappear. Rather, they will be committed by those who lack the skills to hack, crack, and maraud.

The category termed “computer crime” may begin to vanish—it seems likely that most crimes, with some exceptions, will involve the use of computers. The rather crude cyber-scams of today will likely increasingly become replaced by ever more sophisticated operations. The authors envision a high-speed cat-and-mouse game, in which criminals attempt to stay one step ahead of authorities, evading and plundering as the police ratchet up detection and target hardening (see *Scenario 2* for one possible future of cyber-crime fighting).

Policing is at a crossroads—it will always have to go after the low hanging fruit (the “dumb” criminals who engage in high profile events and who are relatively easy to catch). The tricky part will be the extent to which agencies, particularly local agencies, engage those involved in serious, sophisticated (but somewhat less publicized) crime. Only doing the former means to retain, for the most part, the status quo. To pursue the latter requires an investment in personnel and training, and a re-evaluation of the meaning of “policing.” If the police are unwilling or unable to confront sophisticated criminals, that void will be filled by someone else (e.g., the private sector).

### **Defining Homeland Security: The Maintenance of Multi-System Stability**

In order to better understand what homeland security in the year 2015 **should** mean, we note that its current understanding is fundamentally incompatible with the information age, specifically

with regard to virtual life and permeable borders. Instead, we propose that homeland security be viewed as the maintenance of multi-system stability.

The systems we believe to be significant components of homeland security include:

**Physical Infrastructure** (e.g., water and sewage, energy, roads, waste management)

**Virtual Infrastructure** (e.g., communication networking, including but not limited to the Internet, cable, cellular, satellite and more traditional telephony)

**Social Infrastructure** (relationships between social groups as well as between social groups and government)

In each case, security translates as system stability, and thus predictability of the environment in which we operate. It may seem that this definition is not without weaknesses. For example, some may feel that it implies or endorses resistance to change. However, the contrary is true. It is the existing construct of homeland security that implies—indeed, requires—resistance to change.

The new definition focuses not only on government, but also on individuals, social groups, and private sector players as process drivers. While stability of governmental services—especially infrastructure—is necessary, the key points of mensuration are at the level of the individual service recipient.

Is the distinction we are trying to draw merely straining at a gnat or drawing a distinction without a difference? No. By buying into the proposed definition, we can abandon the industrial-age trappings of the current model. “Border Patrol” yields to “Systems Evolution and Applications Protection” (SEAP). The former implies that we must play defensive ball. The proposed definition implies active, dynamic, and recipient-focused



activities.

An analogy is that of two approaches to reducing damage done by hackers. One general approach develops a list of signatures against which to check incoming files. That approach is historical and defensive. It results in “acceptable” losses. It cannot anticipate. The other general approach looks at stabilizing files and file behavior. In this latter approach one sees terms such as “immunizing” and “self-repairing.”

If we take a SEAP approach, we can look toward future needs rather than historical threats. We can foment system evolution rather than simply respond to breaches and system failures. The primary reason SEAP will be able to do so and the present system cannot is that the center of SEAP is the end user.

Implications of this change in process are significant. For example, discussions of system down-time, outcomes assessment, reliability, and goodness of fit become possible. Instead of our present focus on boundaries, where we assume that somehow we can make the boundaries impermeable, we focus on the stability of systems and services provided to citizens and other eligible individuals and groups. The focus becomes predictability, rather than boundaries.

## **Does Homeland Security Differ from Crime Prevention?**

Construed as SEAP, homeland security becomes a superset of crime prevention. Traditional crime prevention suffers from an unavoidable problem—the inability to measure that which did

not happen. One cannot measure negative events. SEAP, on the other hand, is an approach that does not require separate treatment of crime and allows positive measurement of outcomes. Consider, e.g., re-thinking safety as “days since a lost-time injury” versus “number of crashes so far this year.” The distinction is non-trivial.

There are distinct advantages to constructing both the current homeland security and traditional crime measures under a common rubric with a common set of procedures and common outcome measures. Efficiencies abound because redundant hierarchies become irrelevant. Effectiveness may also increase. For example, by use of a common rubric, barriers to information flow may be removed. “Special” processes for homeland security and crime prevention would become harder to defend.

The focus of SEAP on outcomes also has the advantage of fomenting transparency. Transparency lives best when the measures do not require special knowledge to understand. The general public will understand when “system up-time” is used across many dimensions. That concept remains the same across multiple dimensions, multiple systems, and multiple contexts. Crime prevention, on the other hand, has never been presented (and probably cannot be presented) in a way that leads the average citizen to understand whether it works or not. Consider how difficult it is to get across even the simple notions that larcenies are more frequent than violent crimes, and that for most purposes random patrol accomplishes little and what makes headlines is rarely what kills us. If we cannot get these notions across, then we cannot successfully communicate with those we serve and we wind up with built-in inefficiencies. In effect, through poor design we create resource-poor systems, systems designed to fail.

## **External/Homeland Security**

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## threats metamorphose faster than other crime?

Perceived rates of change depend on perceptions of scale and on contexts. Crime appears to change slowly because the rules that create crime (law) change only annually or biennially or via case law—very slow processes indeed. Homeland security threats appear to metamorphose quickly because we perceive the whole problem as relatively new, we are still exploring its dimensions, the definition is unstable, and consensus is lacking on some of what we call homeland security. However, these perceived differences in rate of change are illusory.

Both homeland security and crime are characterized by deviations from prescribed behavior. In both domains, part is of concern to the general public (e.g., street crime and employment of illegal immigrants) while part is of little or no concern to the general public (e.g., insider trading and intellectual property smuggling). The general public sees street crime and is unhappy. Most homeland security issues are not visible to the general public and, except for perceived threats to safety and jobs, there is little intrinsic interest in it. The general public can accurately describe the injury created by street crime. The general public cannot accurately describe the injury created by an overstayed visa or by violation of a software license. More important, how can we coherently and persuasively argue which category contains industrial espionage? Street-corner drug sales? Identity theft? The fact of the matter is that crime overlaps significantly with homeland security, that crime is one means to breach homeland security, and that breaches of homeland security may foment crime (cf. MS-13 players moving between Salvador and the U.S. depending on which government is most diligently looking for them at the moment). The separation of the two constructs in our globalized world impedes success in both. Thus, system stability serves as both a goal and a

common means of understanding homeland security and crime.

## Industrial Age Bureaucracies & SEAP

Governments have, as their *raison d'être*, the protection of their citizens from threat. Yet the manner in which this plays out can vary considerably from government to government. Consider an extreme example from the industrial age, the factory town: In addition to the factory itself, the company ran stores, schools, hospitals and other services from the cradle to the grave (or, at least, the cradle-to-retirement). The factory billed itself as a benevolent patriarch, capable and willing to support its employees in all facets of their lives. Implicit in this was the notion that, not only was the company able to care for its employees, it was **better** able to care for them than the employees themselves. Think benevolent caretaker vs. individual actor.

Industrial age bureaucracies act similarly to factory towns, setting themselves up as wise and capable patriarchs. As the protector of the people, it is in the interest of a bureaucratic government to increase threat—or at least the perception of threat—so that citizens fear more and thus are willing to give up more of their resources, both in terms of finances and freedoms. The performance of bureaucratic institutions is often resistant to mensuration, both because the patriarch often does not willingly invite oversight and because measurement in areas such as “prevention” can be plain difficult. Holding government accountable, under the current conceptualizations of both crime and homeland security, therefore, is hopeless, a figment.

Information age networks alter substantially the role of the individual actor—unlike hierarchies; there is an implicit and active role for each member of the network. Responsibility and accountability

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shift from the top of the pyramid and are dispersed throughout the corporate body. This is a concept that is hinted at in community policing and made explicit in its neighborhood-driven variant (see Jensen and Levin, 2005).

SEAP translates easily to the world of individual responsibility by increasing transparency. It gives Joe Sixpack some relatively simple indices to the delivery of reliable services.

Once he has been presented concepts in a digestible manner, Joe will have the means of holding his public servants accountable. Criminologists may deride the FBI's crime clock (see Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002), but it has the virtue of being easily understood by the end consumer. The crime clock created transparency—imperfect, to be sure, but effectively communicating what previously was opaque. The primary weakness of the crime clock for the current purpose is that it records system failures rather than system up-time. System up-time is what we need when it comes to both homeland security and crime.

Isn't the difference between system up-time and system reliability really just a matter of how one looks at it rather than of substance? No. First, reliability is simpler for the user than is failure rate. It is easier to understand how often something works than how often it does not work. Second, system up-time creates hope, opportunity, and an expectation of improvement. Third, measures of system reliability are harder to mold into scare headlines. This last is a non-trivial concern, given the pervasiveness of media and the marketability of deviant frightening events.

## **Survival in the Information Age: Hardiness and Resilience**

As the name implies, the power of terrorism is largely psychological—otherwise, how does one explain our obsession with it beyond other more demonstrable threats to our personal safety (e.g., automotive crashes)? The stress of dealing with a terrorist event, coupled with unrelenting media images, can be unsettling for many and overwhelming for some. Consider what will happen in the near future: given the rapid expansion of all types of media, images of violence and carnage will be ubiquitous. If terrorism is not the source of our anxiety, something else will emerge. We literally risk scaring ourselves to death amidst a sea of comparatively unlikely but highly evocative pandemics, terrorist events, cyber Pearl Harbors, car chases, shoot-outs, and the like.

In any environment, there are some who thrive and some who become stress puppies. It is in our interest as a society to encourage the former and help the latter. What is it that differentiates them? There is immense literature on hardiness (a personality construct) and resilience (stability of behavior under assault).

Most recently, two approaches for dealing with the psychological (i.e., most significant) effects of terrorism have emerged. Everly and Castellano (2005) have proposed what they term “psychological counterterrorism,” which they define as “efforts to prevent or counteract the adverse psychological effects of terrorism.” (Ibid: 113).

The goals of psychological counterterrorism are (Ibid.: 41-42):

- 1) to reduce the likelihood that terrorism will be used as a weapon,
- 2) to bolster the psychological resistance of the targets of terrorism (military, emergency responders, civilian),



- 3) to bolster the psychological resilience of the targets of terrorism (military, emergency responders, civilian),
  - 4) to facilitate the treatment of those significantly impaired by terrorism
- (Ibid.: 41-42.)

Everly and Castellano maintain that, in addition to law enforcement and the military, the public health sector is responsible for ameliorating and thwarting terrorism. They recommend a series of steps to strengthen the courage and resolve of the citizenry.

Levin (2005) takes a more direct, and individual, approach. Like Everly and Castellano, he agrees that the strength of terrorism lies in its ability to frighten and thereby coerce. He summarizes his proposed counterterrorism strategy in four words: “Terrorized? Get over it.” (Levin, 2003:75).

How should we “get over it?” Levin adapts Michael Useem’s business model approach, which he says applies equally to terrorism:

- 1) Focus on what’s working,
- 2) Instill confidence,
- 3) Ensure team camaraderie, and
- 4) Invest in a courageous culture

In short, in World War II, Americans were called upon to sacrifice for the war effort. This included rationing and volunteerism (e.g., victory gardens). The war on terrorism is a different type of war. It requires a different type of sacrifice, more akin to that of the citizens of London during the Nazi V2 attacks. Terrorism will not work unless we allow it to succeed—to prevent that from happening, we would be well advised to follow another of Churchill’s admonitions:

*Remember, we shall never stop, never weary, and never give in.* (Churchill in Everly and Castellano, 2005: 124).

## **Taking Control: Neighborhood-Driven Policing**

It is axiomatic in psychology that anxiety is reduced when individuals feel they have control over their lives and environment. Indeed, in many ways, the SEAP concept is all about individual rather than government control.

Recently, Levin and Myers proposed a model of policing for the information age which they dubbed “Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP).” The premise of NDP is that the police should no longer hold a monopoly on providing safety. Rather, they and the citizenry work as equal partners in promoting homeland and community (Levin and Myers, 2005).

NDP and SEAP are complementary. They share many of the same assumptions and suggest many of the same solutions. **Scenario 3** presents an idealized version of SEAP/NDP. It suggests what could be in the information age.

## **Conclusion**

Homeland security is an evolving process. The information age will no doubt bring much change, at a very rapid rate. To that end, to predict what “will be” is at best a crapshoot and, at worst, a prescription for wasting resources on a future that will never be. In order to deal with a myriad of futures, the authors have proposed a generalized model for homeland security, which combines expected trends with flexibility. This seems to us the best way to traverse an uncertain future.



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### **Scenario 1: Military Policing World**

*The headline in the Washington Post told the story: “Elite Army Unit Battles Gang in the Streets of Arlington.” Fortunately, thanks to precise planning, crisp intelligence, and the latest non-lethal technologies, no one died. And importantly, what was once considered an intractable scourge in northern Virginia was dealt an apparent deathblow.*

*The gang itself was impressive: the remnants of MS-13, the R Street Crew, and “professional” freelancers from South America had gotten together in 2008 to form a loose confederation in an attempt to dominate the highly lucrative vice trade and cyber black markets. And, up to this point, they had been highly successful. Thanks to their ability to “purchase” the skills of former operators, engineers, and computer heavies, as well as their understanding of what works in the information age, they didn’t look much like a traditional gang: rather, their somewhat informal, but highly effective structure resembled what many thought an intelligence service should look like in 2015—networked but decentralized and flexible, making and breaking alliances as the need arose. In a nod to Osama bin Laden, whose tactics they emulated, the gang called itself “the Base.”*

*The Base wasn’t the first or only criminal enterprise to organize itself along these lines. By 2010, the most successful criminal groups employed technologies that had once been the exclusive domain of the CIA. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies were flummoxed. Conventional law enforcement tactics had little effect: given the gang’s use of ultra-encryption, conventional wiretapping was useless. As well, their employment of “truth technologies” made infiltration next to impossible. And, given their ruthless nature and sophisticated intelligence networks, few citizens were willing to come forward*

*and even report crimes to the police. Those who did soon wished they hadn’t.*

*In spite of the rapidly changing nature of the threat, law enforcement was slow to change its tactics. Truly believing that more resources would handle the problem, policing agencies kept getting bigger rather than smarter. And while traditional problems of information sharing, turf, and hubris had steadily improved since 9/11, the profession wasn’t able to transform itself in time. Three trends converged in the late 2000s, outraging the citizenry. Crime rates began to rise dramatically. If this wasn’t bad enough, police leaders blamed the rise on external factors, such as demographics and economics. Unfortunately for them, citizens and the media remembered the 1990s, when many inside and outside policing had proudly pointed to falling rates of crime, especially violent crime, as proof of law enforcement agencies’ effectiveness. Charges of political cowardice & ineffectual leadership abounded.*

*In addition, several high profile law enforcement disasters occurred in 2008 and 2009. One involved the high profile kidnapping of a famous actress. At first, the investigation had gone well—the police and the feds, working together, had discovered where the kidnappers had taken her. Unfortunately, a highly risky rescue attempt ended disastrously, with the actress and several law enforcement officers killed. Of course, all of this unfolded under the watchful eye of the ubiquitous media, which broadcast it live for the world to see.*

*Finally, the threat of terrorism was never far from the public consciousness. While nothing of the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks occurred, many smaller events convinced the citizenry that they were not safe. A radical Islamic group had managed a coordinated attack on two shopping malls in 2007 in which 187 people died. As well, animal rights and environmental groups, whose tactics became*

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*increasingly violent as the decade progressed, succeeded in killing four research scientists and seven corporate executives in separate incidents.*

*Public confidence in law enforcement all but evaporated. Politicians got the message in the 2008 Congressional elections when several incumbents were defeated by a new generation of ultra neocons who called for an expanded use of the military for domestic matters. While debate about Posse Comitatus raged in Congress, it turned out that the President had already moved on the situation. In the wake of the 2007 attacks, she had authorized a classified directive that the military could do “whatever was necessary” to address terrorism domestically. The Northern Command immediately began commando and intelligence operations within the United States. Utilizing the very latest in technology and psyops, and unconstrained by laws that regulated law enforcement agencies, the military proved effective in reducing terrorist attacks. Buoyed by their success, the Pentagon put forth a two-pronged argument that the military should have an expanded role in police activities.*

*Both arguments ultimately revolved around homeland security. The first concerned the fact that many terrorist entities utilized criminal activity to fund their activities. Hence, the most effective way to proceed against such groups might be in the criminal arena. Second, they argued that “homeland security” as currently understood was too narrowly defined. Such things as international organized crime, identity theft, economic espionage, drug trafficking and even street gang activity, were direct threats to national security, according to the military. Their arguments proved persuasive. And it didn’t hurt that law enforcement had been largely ineffective in addressing these areas. One military commander put it this way: “Give us the authority and we’ll give you a REAL war on drugs!” Senior law enforcement officials privately anguished*

*that they had ever used the phrase “war on...” to describe anything.*

*As the deployment of the military gradually expanded within the United States, civil libertarian groups and law enforcement agencies became unlikely allies. In one memorable event, the head of the ACLU and the Director of the FBI issued a joint press release decrying the decline of civil liberties in America.*

*But it did little good. In fact, the train had already left the station. The public was willing, even eager, to surrender civil and privacy rights if it led to enhanced safety, or at least the perception of enhanced safety. With every domestic military success, the public cheered and demanded that the Defense Department be given greater responsibility for traditional criminal matters. By now, military checkpoints and random vehicle stops were commonplace. Title III authority, which had governed law enforcement’s use of wiretaps, was considered a quaint anachronism. By 2012, the NSA was listening in on more domestic phone calls than international ones. The lack of legal barriers regarding the use of the military was especially seductive—why bother with “pesky” legal restrictions if you didn’t have to?*

*The military had even been successful in arguing that some especially notorious criminals were “enemy combatants.” To that end, they began sharing residence in Gitmo with al Qaeda remnants who had been there since the early part of the century.*

*As the military’s influence in domestic criminal matters increased, law enforcement’s responsibilities, and resources, declined. By 2015, most police agencies found themselves enforcing traffic laws and handling misdemeanor and minor felony offenses. As the century progressed, the gap between law enforcement’s capabilities and those of its adversaries continued to widen. Fewer*

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*people wanted to go into policing; those that did generally did not possess the routinely outstanding qualities found in those who chose military careers. Progressive programs like evidence-based policing and restorative justice were but a memory. With their aging fleet of vehicles, substandard computer systems, and lack of qualified personnel, most police agencies could barely keep up with even answering basic 9-1-1 calls.*

*While some in the public waxed nostalgic about the good old days of the “cop on the beat,” most barely noticed. Perhaps most telling, the highest rated on-demand 3-D television show was titled “SEAL Patrol.” Its premise: televising a real SEAL team on patrol...in Los Angeles.*

## **Scenario 2: Private Policing World**

*It began in 1997 as a company that sold credit data to the insurance industry. But over the next seven years, as it acquired dozens of other companies, Alpharetta, GA-based Choice Point Inc. became an all-purpose commercial source of personal information about Americans, with billions of details about their homes, cars, relatives, criminal records and other aspects of their lives. As its dossier grew, so did the number of Choice Point’s government and corporate clients, jumping from 1,000 to more than 50,000 today. Company stock once worth about \$500 million ballooned to \$4.1 billion.<sup>1</sup>*

*February 22, 2015: Special Agent Christine Allen initiated the tele-conference from her squad’s secure commo-room. Her case review was in two days, and if she didn’t have her act together, her supervisor would have her for breakfast. Some years ago, the FBI had adopted a modified version of the old New York COMPSTAT model to demonstrate its seriousness concerning accountability.*

*Christine needed to gain a full update on the cases she was supervising: her interactive Blackberry XII helped her out here, organizing and managing the information and intelligence she needed to demonstrate to her superiors that she was managing her resources appropriately.*

*The first one to sign in was Elliot from Universal Business Affiliates (UBA). Christine’s squad handled mostly fraud cases—in the old days, there was a bifurcation between “fraud” and “cyber” investigations. Today, that distinction was meaningless, as almost every crime involved the use of a computer. Indeed, the notion of a separate “cyber” category was a curious artifact of a time when computers were little understood by the policing community*



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Elliot reported that the recent upgrade to UBA's tracking software had proven effective in tracking the latest cyber-scam to an ISP in Sumatra. Of course, the scammers had sensed the oncoming approach of the authorities and had remained one step ahead. But the good guys were catching up. Among other things, cyber signatures and other identifying data had been obtained. As soon as Jolene from MegaInfo signed on, Christine asked her for a full work-up on the data. Almost instantaneously, Jolene came back with suspected names, identifying data, and likely next moves of the group.

Once supplied, Christine relayed the information to the "Quantam Commandos," a 24/7 FBI response group that would set up a digital and, as necessary, physical surveillance to nab the perps.

Christine, Elliot, and Jolene were all part of the FBI's Sacramento Fraud Task Force. Each had sworn powers. And while Christine was an FBI agent, Elliot and Jolene were DOJ contractors.

The Sacramento Task Force might have seemed odd to a law enforcement officer of the late 20th century. At that time, task force members were generally all sworn members of policing agencies. By the early days of the 21st century, however, it had become abundantly clear that the information age had rendered obsolete any notion that policing, in and of itself, could remain effective against an elusive, dynamic, and techno-savvy adversary.

A large part of the problem was fiscal; the notion that an agency had to decide two or three years out what its major challenges would be was ludicrous in an age of exponential change and growth. Instead, Congress had been forced to conclude that only by allocating large sums for discretionary spending and allowing the purchase of off-the-shelf technologies and services could any law enforcement organization hope to retain relevance.

Cracks in the public policing foundation had begun to emerge in the late 1990s, when progressive local agencies began to outsource various functions, such as the guarding of crime scenes and the transporting of prisoners, to private agencies that were able to perform these functions at a much reduced cost.

At the same time, in the interest of economics, some agencies began to consolidate; others regionalized particular functions, such as jails, communications systems, and evidence collection facilities. While this saved money, it conspired to undermine local citizen control.

Affluent communities struck back: gated developments and private security forces proliferated in record numbers. The typical private security force of 2015 resembled a police department much more than it did a collection of security guards. Indeed, most members were sworn and performed both patrol and investigative functions. This resulted in no small degree from various Criminological studies dating from the 1970s that showed that the duties performed by those officers who initially responded to a situation were the ones most likely to solve the case. As a result, private security firms successfully argued that, since they generally beat the police to crime scenes, they should initiate logical investigative tasks. These included securing the scene, interviewing witnesses, and conducting neighborhood canvasses. Many public-policing agencies soon realized that they couldn't beat the private sector: like their federal brethren, they decided to work with them instead. Perhaps the biggest problem the public sector had was private poaching. In the late 1990s, small agencies bemoaned the fact that many of their most talented folks were recruited by the better-paying feds and larger agencies. By 2015, poaching had shifted to the private sector, which could afford better

salaries, benefits, and equipment.

*If the news was good for the rich, it wasn't so good for the poor. Since the wealthy had "gotten theirs," they were less inclined to fund public policing agencies. To that end, the lean budgetary years of the early 21st century were recalled fondly by police administrators as a time of downright largess. By 2015, even 9-1-1 response in some large cities was threatened. Publicly, police chiefs expressed concern over the burgeoning Citizen Vigilante Movement that was gaining momentum in many of the country's worst neighborhoods. Privately, most conceded that citizens needed to do something to protect themselves if the police couldn't.*

*In sum, the private policing movement of 2015 was a mixed bag: for those agencies and communities that could afford it, the private sector provided resources and expertise that could not be easily duplicated in the public sector. Not everyone was comfortable with placing so much power in the hands of the private sector, however. Indeed, privacy advocates found themselves in a strange position, championing those very agencies they had steadfastly criticized over the years. As well, what had once been a profession that had as its goal "equal protection under the law" was characterized by wildly differing standards, objectives, and results.*

*Back on the Sacramento Task Force, success was at hand. Thanks to UBA's state-of-the-art tracking software, the scammers were located in a small suburb outside Philadelphia. The cyber-SWAT team had successfully apprehended them and was able to gather a treasure trove of evidence.*

*As so often happened, one of the members of the Task Force represented a private company that had been a victim of the scam. As Christine prepared her case for submission to the U. S. Attorney's Office, the private company rep quietly*

*conferred with his superiors about how to best preserve the interests of the company. Sometimes these conflicts proved acrimonious; occasionally, they were insurmountable. Christine, however, was hopeful. And regardless, a couple more bad guys were off the street. There were only several thousand more to go.*

#### **Endnote:**

1Robert O'Harrow Jr. "Choice Point Quietly Finds Wealth in Information: In Age of Security, Firm Mines Wealth Of Personal Data" *The Washington Post*, January 20, 2005.

### ***Scenario 3: Neighborhood-Driven Policing World (NDP) in the context of Systems Evolution and Applications Protection (SEAP):***

*By early in 2012 it had become apparent even to the media that the system of governance in the U.S. was failing terribly. Representative democracy had become so hierarchical that even its staunchest defenders believed that its expense and its ineffectiveness at the local level had become as bad as the “problems” it was trying to fix. Worse, government programs had nearly destroyed the sense of community in most lower and middle class communities. A radical plan was hatched—decentralization of both resources and forces.*

*What did the plan call for? Taking its key from “government of the people, by the people, and for the people”, the plan was marketed as people taking control of their own fate. While there had been initial worries of vigilantism, it turned out that when reasonable people were given a choice, they chose peaceful resolution of conflict. This outcome was not unlike the social process seen in what is misunderstood as the “wild” west of the U.S. in the 19th century. For example, Tierney (2005) wrote, ““Pure bilge,” Dr. Parker told me. “There wasn’t an awful lot of violence in Deadwood except for the crooks and drunks killing each other. When everybody has a gun on his hip, they tend to avoid confrontation.” Unwittingly following the Deadwood model, many communities in the U.S. of 2012 quickly adapted to their new-found empowerment.*

*Fortunately, Jensen and Levin (2005) had edited a volume providing a variety of choices that might enable communities to adapt to the new world they are facing in the 2015 of today. Smallsville residents, knowing that they must chose their style of governance anew, had studied Jensen and Levin but also had articulated their own values—which*

*turned out to be consistent with SEAP. What they wanted was stability, responsiveness, and ability to adapt to changing needs and contexts. They chose an NDP/SEAP model and have been running with it for several years at this point.*

*The citizens still gripe a bit because they are expected to spend more time with their neighbors and less time with their VideoScreen Lenses® and Ubiquitous Communicators® and other optical/electronic distracters. Particularly the younger (teenangel) males whined until the older generations asserted themselves, teaching the importance of duty to others. That latter value, seemingly moribund for decades, turned out to be pivotal in the survival of the community, as we shall see shortly.*

*As the governmental hierarchy weakened, opportunistic threats became manifest. Terrorists, gangsters, traditional organized criminals, and even geopolitical invaders became significant threats to the peace and tranquility of the lives of citizens in many localities. As the hierarchy’s vulnerabilities increased, we saw demonstrated again that nature abhors a vacuum. Perps of all descriptions stepped into the organizational flaws and cracks. Citizen safety plummeted in most places, while anxiety levels climbed and productivity dropped like a rock.*

*Smallsville, however, was an odd exception. Smallsville was an island of tranquility in a sea of chaos. No gangs, no terrorists, and no street criminals stayed for very long. Why?*

*To the social anthropologists who have been studying Smallsville for a few years now, the answer became obvious. Smallsville’s outcome was very different because its choices had been very different from those taken by most localities. Instead of putting lipstick on the hierarchical pig, Smallsville had taken a comprehensive approach to solidifying its social structure, and even a casual walk down Main Street made the results obvious.*

*People in Smallville actually talk to one another, instead of merely passing one another on the sidewalk. More important, residents embrace the Deadwood/Peel ethos—each takes an active role in the protection of the community. For some, this takes the Deadwood model literally: citizens armed with the latest in lethal and non-lethal weaponry provide support for Heinlein’s contention that “an armed society is a polite society” (Heinlein, 1997). Still others of a less physical bent use their communicators to maintain real-time audio and visual communication with the police. And citizen involvement in such arenas as restorative justice, mediation, and mentoring has never been higher. If nothing else, the Smallville experiment contradicts the industrial age notion that a single model of policing is desirable. Indeed, like everything else in the information age, each citizen’s unique talents and views of the world are important in contributing to the safety of the community. While “law and order” may have once been considered a conservative value, “community safety” is universal, cutting across the entire political spectrum*

*The most significant aspect of Smallville’s version of homeland security is its adoption of a systems approach to neighborhood-driven policing. Because law enforcement now had few calls for violence of any sort and because citizens embraced enhanced responsibility for themselves and their neighbors, police were free to evolve—and have evolved—into social and security advisors.*

*The advice of police is now actively sought when every building permit is issued, when every landscaping plan is approved, and when changes in social institutions (schools, hospitals, etc.) are discussed. The police have become active and valued professional partners rather than blue (or no) collar, combat-capable, garbage collectors.*

*As a result, Smallville now has fewer*

*police (although it pays much higher salaries than previously), and far higher levels of safety and security. Business and industry is thriving in Smallville, and innovation incubators abound. Neighboring communities and even towns in foreign countries find themselves drawn to Smallville, hoping to adopt the Smallville approach to homeland security, and to life.*

## Endnotes

- i. The authors may be contacted at levinb@brcc.edu.
- ii. Dr. Levin is a Professor at Blue Ridge Community College, a Reserve Major in the Waynesboro, VA Police Department, and the Vice Chairman of the Futures Working Group.
- iii. Dr. Jensen is a Supervisory Special Agent in the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit and the Chairman of the Futures Working Group.
- iv. *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
- v. Department of Homeland Security (2004) at URL <[http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial\\_0413.xml](http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0413.xml)> accessed 03/09/2005
- vi. We base our conclusion on a rephrasing of Parkinson’s famous law: “Work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion” [Parkinson, Cyril (1958). *Parkinson’s Law: The Pursuit of Progress*. London: John Murray.] In a bureaucracy, the size of an agency’s turf and its level of resources generally expand to the extent it successfully defines its mission in line with the cause du jour.
- vii. In futures research, it is considered limiting to talk about the future. Instead, most futurists discuss possible alternative futures, oft-times by utilizing scenarios, as we have chosen to do here (see Schwartz (1999) for an in-depth explication of scenario construction and use.)
- viii. Homeland security grants will be the early 21st century’s equivalent of the COPS grants of the 1990s.
- ix. See, for example, “PERF Asks FBI to Focus on Terrorism.” (March 9, 2005) *Police Magazine* at URL <<http://www.policeone.com/policeone/frontend/parser.cfm?object=Columnists&tmpl=article&id=77187>> accessed 03/09/2005.
- x. Many of these were taken from the National Intelligence Council’s *Mapping the Global Future* (2004) at <[http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC\\_globaltrend2020.html](http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html)> accessed 03/09/2005.
- xi. In his analysis of al Qaeda members, Sageman (2004) notes that most did not fit the stereotype of the young, disaffected, terrorist. Most were well-educated, married, and had been raised in a secular household. The common thread that Sageman noted was that most had drifted into radical Islam after they had left their native countries in search of better-paying jobs. Many had ended up in Europe and had drifted into radical mosques after feeling lonely and isolated in the non-Muslim society.
- xii. In this and the following sections, we are interested only in those groups engaged in criminal behavior. The First Amendment of the U.S.



Constitution guarantees protection for those individuals who participated in free speech and legitimate protest activities.xiii. Smart (2005) differentiates “developmental” change from “evolutionary” change as follows: evolutionary relates to sudden, abrupt, difficult to predict change while “developmental” refers to the steady, predictable changes that one can foresee (e.g., the increasing importance of the Internet is developmental; an asteroid striking the earth is evolutionary). Readers should employ both in considering possible futures; the authors have found that a scenario-based approach is generally the preferred method for accomplishing this.

xiv. Virtual groups providing the same rewards and emulating the same dynamics that physical groups historically have.

xv. For example, successful, unbiased elections may force heretofore terrorist groups to attempt to become more involved in the political process.

xvi. “... team of international experts concluded that the world is at risk on a variety of fronts, including a skyrocketing runoff of nutrient-rich farm waste that’s killing swaths of the world’s oceans, a massive wave of animal and plant extinctions and a planet that’s growing warmer.” (Borenstein, 2005)

xvii. See Kessler (2004) for the story of William Krar, an alleged white supremacist, who was discovered in possession of fully automatic machine guns, remote-controlled explosive devices disguised as briefcases, 60 pipe bombs, nearly 500,000 rounds of ammunition and enough pure sodium cyanide “to kill everyone inside a 30,000 square foot building, according to federal authorities.” (Ibid., pg.1)

xviii. Ned Ludd was a legendary (perhaps apochryphal) figure in 19th century England who destroyed two power looms, thus inspiring weavers (who were displaced by the looms) to form a guerilla army of sorts. A “Luddite” is one who eschews technology <“What is a Luddite?” (undated)>.

xix. Sir Robert Peel authored his famous nine principles for policing in 1829. One of these held that “Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence (Peel, 1829).”

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