

Policing and Homeland Security in 2015

Richard A. Myers
Alberto Melis

In virtually all crises of national scale, the response of the federal government has been to make funds available rapidly and in large amounts. In the wake of the multiple attacks against American iconic targets on September 11, 2001, that pattern repeated itself. The phrase “Homeland Security” was introduced into the U.S. police lexicon in the waning days of September 2001, to describe both the goal and the rationale for government actions to prevent future attacks. It encompassed a combination of target hardening initiatives, laws and regulations increasing intelligence, and efforts to improve the distribution of information throughout law enforcement, all intended to increase and improve the response capacity of first responders. As part of this effort, the federal response quickly made money available to government units at all levels to invest in technologies, training, and coordination. Immediately, questions began to arise about what role local policing would play in improving homeland security.

History was further repeated when many local agencies within the public safety arena exploited the rapidly disbursed pool of money to acquire items that had been discarded from previous years’ budget processes. As with LEAA funds in the 1970s, millions of dollars have been spent on protective equipment and “toys” that are unlikely to ever see the light of day or have direct applications to the anti-terrorism effort.

Throughout the evolution of the contemporary dominant Community Oriented/ Problem Solving model of policing (Trojanowicz

and Bucqueroux, 1990; Goldstein, 1979, 1990), most police leaders have marketed the activities of their departments to closely match the idealized vision of the model. Such has been the case with homeland security. In fairness, such practices are driven by the financial incentives of (and the strings attached to) the federal money stream. Departments that five years ago were characterizing their proactive efforts and need for technology as COP/POP growth began characterizing many of the same activities in the name of homeland security.

Despite the fiscal motivation of homeland security as a growth industry in policing, there is no universal definition of what homeland security means. Does it contain elements of the old Crime Prevention movement (target hardening)? Is it a way to justify practices that profile suspicious persons? Is it about local law enforcement taking more direction from, and acting subserviently to, the federal terrorist experts? Does it include such daily garden-variety crimes as drug trafficking and domestic hate groups? Is it limited to international efforts to create chaos within the U.S?

While we cannot discern the answer to many of these questions yet—indeed, the answer may be “Yes” to all of them—such variables play into our examination of what the role of policing will be in the homeland security arena in 2015.

Predicting the future with any degree of certainty is difficult. Each action can best be seen as a straight line, and at the choice point it splits into two paths, each of which can split again and again as additional decisions and choices are made. As these lines stretch further and further into the future more and more splits are made which diffuses the end view. We call the events and actions that cause these choice points “wild cards,” and these will play a prominent view in our review.

Examination of Wild Cards:

- *Future Terrorist acts on U.S. soil*—September 11th's multiple-strike acts of terrorism had a profound impact on all of the U.S. society, from the economy to industry to the military, and also inside the schools and homes of all Americans. Support from the grass roots swelled as the president shaped the government's response, including initiating the entire investment into funding for homeland security and the military deployment and attacks against the believed bases of the Taliban and al Qaeda. The realignment of the multiple agencies into the Department of Homeland Security, which moved hallowed and storied organizations such as the Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization, and the U.S. Coast Guard under a single director, was the biggest and most complex federal reorganization since the end of World War II.

In the earliest days of post 9/11, partisanship was a mere whisper and unity was the theme being espoused from both sides of the political aisle in Washington. However, in the 2004 presidential election, rancor and divisiveness often centered around the war in Iraq and other strategies (or lack of strategy) to continually attack terrorism's roots. While the absence of additional terrorist acts on U.S. soil made it impossible to measure what impact that would have had on the nation's perspective during this political season, it is fair to say that many Americans have settled back into a daily routine that is more concerned about the state of the economy than risk of international terrorism. As the Iraq military deployment continues to yield additional U.S. casualties, Americans increasingly mourn the deaths with questions about the value of the continued deployment. Civil liberties are

defended more strenuously, particularly visceral reactions to military recruitment tactics and the creation of databases from transactions formerly considered private (airline travel, student enrollment information, library use, etc.).

This perspective could be profoundly altered if there were additional attacks that somehow could be linked to the region where military efforts are focused, or the terror networks linked to al Qaeda, the architects of the September 11 attacks. However, the reaction of U.S. citizens would depend on when, how and where the attacks came. The national reaction to the killing of almost 300 U.S. Marines at the bombing of the barracks in Beirut, and the death of 17 sailors in the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, were radically different from the reaction of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. All were viewed as tragedies, and evoked strong emotions, but neither of the two military triggered the coalescence of a "national will." The casualties of the al Qaeda-sponsored bombings of the American embassies in Africa barely registered; more concern was raised about the perceived tepid response of the Clinton administration. Even the reaction to the Oklahoma City tragedy, which initially was suspected to be the product of foreign terrorists—with civilian victims including infants at a day-care center—was muted compared to the deaths resulting from the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Flight 93 crashes.

Therefore, future acts of terrorism within the U.S. are significant choice points that will have a profound effect on the nature of policing's role in homeland security. Further refining this "wild cards" is the nature of potential future attacks. Major attacks such as the September 11th scenarios are large in scale and highly visible; nonetheless, they represent single failures of defense in an arena where the odds favor attack. Lesser attacks could be executed more frequently, with less planning and

coordination required, and could increase the sense of vulnerability across the U.S. even if the casualty numbers are smaller. Multiple small-scale attacks imply a widespread failure of the defensive network, symbolically elevate the capacity of the attackers, and increase the national unease. Few of us work in high-profile locations like the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or the United States Capitol building, and we can take comfort in our relative isolation. But if Smallsville and Anytown and the little houses on the prairie are attacked, then all of us are at risk. The nature of future attacks is itself somewhat of a “wild cards.”

Part of the homeland security initiative has been a fairly thorough examination of the strengths and weaknesses of America’s defense abilities. As this chapter is being written in summer 2005, the national headlines bear dismal reports. Almost four years after the 9/11 attacks, our intelligence communities remain mired in turf battles, and major agencies are taking political heat for inefficient response or retooling efforts. The much-ballyhooed technologies are nowhere near being deployed on a widespread basis, and only a few are at a stage of development where they can be considered useful. The contributions of private entities are being questioned, from Iraq to airport security, and we are acutely aware of the vulnerabilities of our seaport facilities to infiltration. The language of attack now includes a constellation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons: black-market nuclear weapons from the ill-guarded arsenal of the former Soviet Union; “dirty bombs” of conventional explosives that spread radioactivity from a growing catalog of missing nuclear material below weapons-grade quality; anthrax, ricin, ebola/Marburg, plagues of various, cyber attacks on the nation’s power grid and other infrastructure targets.

Each one of these dangers, set in the multiple possible high-profile targets where they could be

unleashed, taxes the capacity of first-response agencies. Each requires specialized equipment, contingency plans, articulated agreements among government agencies, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) and private providers, and an enormous amount of time devoted to planning and preparing for events which may not happen. “Readiness fatigue” is a constant danger, with each elevation of the national color code constituting a cry of “Wolf!” that Aesop surely would recognize, if glumly.

- *Traditional Street Crime:* Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. in general saw declines in street crime in most regions. Without addressing the potential reasons for the declines, such as the youth cohort in “prime crime years” or the impact of the federal COPS (which again, distributed large amounts of money to local agencies), the next decade *could* see increases in street crime that would adversely affect quality of life in American communities. With many local communities and states grappling in the mid 2000s with budget deficits and shrinking resources coupled with pressure to hold or reduce taxes, there are limits to local policing’s ability to hold the lid on street crime **and** become the front line of homeland security. The nature of the crime rate will likely affect the role of policing in homeland security in 2015.
- *Crimes of the Future:* The very nature of crime is a “wild card” for 2015. In the late 1990s, police had never heard of phishing and spoofing. Identity theft was in its infancy and largely consisted of stealing identification cards rather than the whole identity of the person. What will the new crimes of the late 2000s be? The resources needed to investigate future crimes that we

don't even know of today will likely shape the role of policing in homeland security in 2015. Many law enforcement agencies have added computer crimes to the specialized units that they have, and struggle with the cost of keeping up with those mandates. Those imperative and resulting costs in keeping up with the technology are continuing to change.

- *Nature of International Relations:* Could the next decade be another of the recurring Age of Reason periods of history? Historically, insurgencies don't last forever. People tire of constant killing and violence. In 2005, historic hotspots of violence and terrorism from the 20th century have calmed significantly, e.g. Northern Ireland, and there is a fragile but hopeful dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians. We are seeing this in Spain as every action by ETA is met with increasing public displays not against the government (itself not a well loved institution) but against ETA. The feared Baader-Meinhoff gang in Germany is extinct, as is the Brigatti Rossi in Italy, and the Red Army Faction in Japan. The Sendero Luminoso in Peru and surrounding countries is marginalized, and there are on-again, off-again negotiations in Colombia. There is no reason to believe that the same will not happen to other insurgent groups throughout the world.

The emergence of the World Court at The Hague as an international center for resolving local war crimes disputes (despite American refusal to approve the Court) provides promise even as local disputes continue to flare in Aceh, Darfur, the Ivory Coast, Nepal, and elsewhere. While the current adjudication of war crime allegations from Bosnia, Rwanda and Darfur do not hold the same fascination

as the Nürnberg prototype following World War II, there is a greater awareness of world standards that may be applied to new conflicts in more timely fashion. The Group of Eight and the World Trade Organization are dealing openly with the issues related to African poverty. Border-spanning issues such as AIDS, drug patents and government subsidies of airline industries are moderating the older fixation on the supremacy of the nation-state.

The resurgence in fundamentalism in the Islamic world is also reflected in the United States, but not in Europe. European attendance at churches is at an all time low (prompting the late Pope John Paul II to urge formal recognition of Europe's "Christian character and heritage" in the Constitution of the European Union). The fastest growth in Catholicism is occurring in Latin America and the African subcontinent; the greatest religious growth in the United States is evangelical in nature. These currents will change not only our understanding of world events, but how the world views us as well.

There is also an economic renaissance elsewhere in the world. The European Union is increasing in economic force by leaps and bounds, despite the constitutional crisis of the French and Dutch "no" votes. A resurgent China is becoming an enormous purchasing and manufacturing power, as is India—and they are expected to outspend and outuse the United States in terms of oil, thus driving the price up. This will have a profound impact in our economy and our sphere of influence.

- *U.S. Politics:* While the political system itself to some degree reacts to the above-mentioned "wild cards," it contributes to the uncertainties. Changes in the presidency and the overriding philosophy affect the role of federal government in relationship to locals. Typically, the pendulum swings to and fro. We are undergoing a period where politics

are less introspected and tend to be more concerned with our sphere of influence. This was exacerbated by the 9/11 attacks. Other administrations and parties have been more concerned with internal policies and less with external influence.

At this point in time, the administration's formerly solid support within the houses of government appears to be waning. Support for the foreseeable short to middle term will be affected by the wild cards outlined below. There will be another election in 2006, and in two years after that—and both those elections will be very much influenced by the public's perception of what goals have been met, and how deeply we are still involved in a war. In fact, the elections may very well be decided on just those two factors.

While the Supreme Court is generally thought of as above the rough-and-tumble of politics, its decisions also affect the actions of state and federal entities. In its most recent session, the Court has appeared to be more receptive to federal powers, reversing what had been a states' rights character for most of Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure. Whether that is a product of the climate of homeland security or merely a parallel phenomenon, the strengthening of federal power supports and may even encourage stronger centralization control. The resignation of Justice O'Connor and death of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 2005, and the subsequent confirmations of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will surely affect the balance within the Court on important issues.

- *Influence of the Media:* As the Internet becomes more ubiquitous; the role of the media may decline. Blogging is increasing, while the traditional major network television news departments are viewed with less importance. Dan Rather's

unceremonious departure from CBS News in 2005 reflects the consequences of competition-driven "fast news" instead of well-researched journalism of the past. The 2005 brouhaha over "video news releases" masking government positions under the guise of independent news, the direct federal sponsorship of particular stories (and at least one set of White House media credentials) further weakened the public confidence in the media, albeit from the other end of the spectrum.

Peer-review accountability of blogs may hold increasing appeal, and the availability of Internet access equals or exceeds global access to satellite fed television. With growing information and news the relevancy of traditional media is an unknown wild card, as is the influence of whatever may take its place. "Niche news," preaching a particular position to an already-agreeable audience, is a far cry from the iconic "free press" that questioned government with an independent mind. Nor is it clear that freelance blogging represents an improvement; history has yet to judge whether the bumper crop of political bloggers are the Benjamin Franklins and Horace Greeleys of the Internet, or mere poseurs with little more to contribute than the drunk in the corner bar.

From this examination of "wild cards," a continuum of paths models emerge on what policing in the role of homeland security could look like in 2015. At one extreme of the continuum is the environment of war; this model would look highly militaristic, authoritative, with little concern for civil rights. The other extreme represents an evolution of policing that reflects its path pre-9/11; this post-reform COP/POP would be a peacekeeper model, mostly focused on sustaining community quality of life, with high sensitivity to civil rights and social

concerns. In the middle, we envision an “adaptive” state of policing that is situationally driven; this might include a wide base of skills, training, and leadership modalities that allow police to shift between the extremes depending on demands from the environment.

The War Model-2015

A militaristic, low civil rights, high authority model

(War based Homeland Security model)

In the War Model of policing’s role in homeland security in 2015, police officers are mandated under federal law to verify identification from the national ID database. Street patrol officers carry the technology on foot and in patrol cars to verify instantly the information contained on the mandatory national identification card. If officers come in contact with someone without their ID, they obtain and submit the individual’s fingerprints into the national AFIS system, where full ten-fingerprint sets of all American citizens and legally admitted visitors are archived. They also submit a digital photo of the person’s face for image recognition software to verify from the national database.

Local police officers have been given federal authority to take unverified persons into custody. People whose identity cannot be ascertained on the street are taken into civil custody pending identification. Absence of a verifiable ID is a federal offense; however, local counties are required to make detention space available. The unfunded mandate places considerable strain on urban jurisdictions, and there are rumors of covert non-feasance in immigration enforcement by municipal agencies. Old-style cultivation of community-based intelligence continues unabated, with an occasional nudge and sly wink underneath the tough “homeland

security” rhetoric in public speeches.

Libertarian objections to “Seine papieren, bitte!”—a deliberate invocation of the Nazi occupation of Europe—were eviscerated by premature and over wrought comparisons of the Guantanamo detentions to the Nazis and Pol Pot regimes, and by a rash of nick-of-time apprehensions of false-document infiltrators seeking to plant explosives at sensitive points in the nation’s power grid. As the generation of Holocaust survivors and their liberators died out, the rhetoric of “protection” was joined with concern over the problem of identity theft to produce a pluralistic consensus in favor of mandatory national identification

Despite past protests of the nation’s chiefs of police and sheriffs, local law enforcement now manages about 60% of the enforcement of immigration laws. Local officers are also required to leave their jurisdiction to assist other agencies in the event of a terrorist act, as so declared by each State’s Office of Emergency Management and Terrorism Response.

Due to continued budget challenges following the nation’s ongoing military efforts globally, the Department of Homeland Security provides direction to the states’ Offices of EM and TR. Like the 75-50-25 funding of the COPS grants, the federal largesse faded in the wake of continued military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Nigeria, and the collapse of the medical insurance industry. DHS has shifted many of its duties to state, regional, and local agencies. In the major cities, local police conduct harbor searches, operate regional intelligence centers, and provide baggage and passenger screening at local airports. Initially funded by rounds of DHS grants, the expense was shifted equally to travelers and to local communities. Many of the staff are civilian employees who represent a much larger percentage of the policing workforce. Privatization has shifted

some of the tax burden, with local authorities retaining nominal control over private security actions. Nevertheless, the long-standing concerns about the quality of private security remain salient, and there are episodic scandals, commissions and reports that gather dust on the shelf.

The proliferation of public surveillance cameras has shifted from being exclusively urban to suburban to regional, having not yet penetrated rural areas in any systematic way. Dummy cameras have replaced faux alarm company stickers as the cheap crime-prevention ploy of choice in rural areas. All locations housing explosives, precursor chemicals, or potentially dangerous electronic equipment are under round-the-clock CCTV monitoring and access control, and many private farmers and ranchers use localized CCTV, monitored in their houses and from their PDAs.

Police no longer need search warrants or permission to simply tap into the streaming video feed and blend with public cameras. Software controlling the cameras identifies patterns of behavior thought to be “suspicious” or that pose a threat to the national security. When the software triggers such a pattern, police need no further justification to stop and demand identification. The ubiquitous police-monitored urban cameras are interfaced with the existing archipelago of private security surveillance cameras, creating an integrated real-time tracking network.

Similar software is integrated with the circulation software of all libraries, municipal or academic. Patterns of materials that are checked out that meet the “threat to national security” profile trigger identification through the national ID card used to check out materials and the video surveillance images. Internet surfing tracking software has been in place for a while, but the creativity of technology hobbyists makes it less reliable. Parental controls for cable channels have

been replaced by governmental filtering that cuts off programming of a subversive nature.

Basic police academy training has skyrocketed from the 8-15 weeks of a decade ago (2005) to more than 9 months. Recruits attend training in six-week increments, and then rotate through a series of “practicums” including security roles (airports, harbors, etc.), Emergency and Terrorism Response Teams (ETRTs), crime scene assessment (hazardous materials, secondary device awareness, etc.). Civilian police employees who handle most of the support and technical roles (intelligence, crime analysis, evidence processing, etc.) go through specialized training at regional and national sources e.g. the FBI Academy.

One contributing factor to the lengthy extension of training time is the need to prepare officers for instant “shoot-don’t shoot” decision-making. In the first decade of the 21st century, police were restricted by the requirement of imminent threat of death to the officer or another before authorized to use deadly force. With the growth of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), officers are now trained to closely observe behaviors and appearance that are indicative of an imminent terrorist act. Officers are under order to immediately send streaming playback video of what they observed for computer analysis, and can receive a “shoot to neutralize” order based upon this analysis. Officers working in high-risk areas (major cities and Standard Metropolitan Areas [SMAs], jurisdictions with high-profile infrastructure targets, and border assignments are under particular scrutiny in this regard) receive weekly training and assessment on their ability to apply the dual standards for use of deadly force.

Beyond local police officers and county sheriffs and state police, regional divisions of ETRTs are deployed strategically across the nation. They are available to be flown into a hot spot area, and

assume a heavy combat role in the event of major situations. These units are not under the command of the local chief or sheriff if deployed, but fall under the command of the quasi-military Department of Homeland Security structure within the federal government. They are virtually indistinguishable from the global U.S. military except for their uniforms, which are all black.

The ETRTs have a local and regional component, more closely aligned with local law enforcement, that provide the backbone for the major staffing of security at major events such as sports stadiums. What required 100 officers to police back in the early 2000s now requires almost 1000. Screening for dirty bombs, IEDs, and any other type of weapon is done through a blend of private security and heavily armed police.

The use of civil commitment has been expanded beyond its original application to the criminally insane and dangerous sex offenders. A right-wing attempt to repeal the 14th Amendment's provision of "nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" failed, and the internment center at Guantanamo Bay closed in the face of international opposition. In response, the United States Code was enhanced to allow for the indefinite civil commitment of persons meeting a certain evidentiary threshold of connection to terrorist groups defined by Congress. Under the Enterprise Theory of Crime, RICO statutes extended eligibility to groups otherwise classified as street criminals if their activities were linked to proscribed terror groups. Several street gangs, including one outlaw motorcycle club, were removed from the streets to the new Maximum 7 security prison on the outskirts of the former Area 51 research center in Nevada

The Peace Model:

A post-reform COP/POP Model (Peace based, more traditional police role)

With the remarkable absence of additional attacks by international terrorists on U.S. soil, the role of policing in homeland security in 2015 can be described as fine-tuned but not significantly changed from a decade earlier. Major cities and high-risk targets sustained a level of high vigilance, fiscally supported somewhat by the federal government. But at the local level, the degree of attention spent on homeland security is partly driven by the local political climate. Fiscally conservative communities accustomed to stable crime rates and high quality of life invest their tax dollars on core, basic services, keep the tax levy low, and provide a full range of social services. Urbanized areas that have long required a heavy police presence soften the burden of a significant police investment by linking the expenses to resource streams that support Homeland Security.

After the U.S. significantly reduced its military presence in Iraq and global insurrections seemed to calm, Congress engaged in lengthy debates on the original Patriot Act, examining the many concerns expressed throughout the 2000's. Some of the powers originally granted were kept, but required a higher level of judicial review and were severely limited in the scope of their applicability. Contrary to what some predicted might happen, massive consolidation of the thousands of police departments nation-wide didn't occur. The notion of "local control" remains, and local police activity reflects this philosophy.

Some communities, again usually those with higher crime rates, have mirrored the private sector's use of surveillance cameras with deployment of ubiquitous public cameras. Local police

accountability boards (PABs) closely scrutinize the police use of such “big brother eyes.” Likewise, the PABs review citizen complaints on excessive use of force and threats to civil rights, as the public dialogue on issues like racial profiling evolved into a reiteration of the U.S.’s foundational civil rights. Geographically defined Neighborhood Policing committees provide direction and priorities for neighborhood beat officers (Futures Working Group, 2005). In communities that demonstrated deep commitment to the 20th century construct known as Community Oriented/Problem Solving Policing, police leaders concluded that the best form of homeland security was a total partnership between the citizens and police, engaged in sustaining the local quality of life. High percentages of residents in such communities have been trained by their police on how to take ownership of their neighborhood’s problems and be part of the solution. Volunteerism is a key resource for local police departments, as the cost of providing sworn officers is high. Civilian support staff increasingly manages tasks formerly mastered only by officers.

While the federal government provides support funds on a very limited basis to local agencies, to qualify, policing must comply with the National Incident Management System that was promulgated in the mid-2000s. Police, fire, public health, public works, and most other municipal service workers are fully trained and can readily fall into an Incident Command scenario, with shifting Commanders depending on the current focus of the incident. Ultimately, the local unit of government maintains control of its resources and is “in charge” unless it hands-off control to a regional or state Emergency Management resource.

In the decade between 2005 and 2015, technology related crime increased exponentially. Identity theft became one of the most common criminal acts, but went largely unprosecuted because

of the challenges of the global jurisdictional issues. Interpol eventually assumed a coordinating role on all technology crimes that cross national boundaries, with world “computer courts” that would adjudicate global offenses. With the aging of the U.S., criminal behaviors were evident in older offenders; aging criminals who would forego street crimes in their twilight years found stealing through a keyboard an age-friendly practice. With women’s role in American society equaling men’s, an increase in women offenders required investment in women prison infrastructure. Prison populations in general dropped by the increasing use of monitoring technologies and restorative justice methods.

Police use of technology varied; well-funded communities with more substantial population density invested in emerging technologies and collaborated through regional or national efforts, such as AFIS and digital image databases. Analytical software and networking of police information systems with access to palm-size devices were standard in such communities. Small towns faced difficult decisions: either disband and be absorbed by regional departments that could provide such technologies, or continue in providing familiar services with severe economic constraints.

Whether small or large, local policing with local control does not preclude a networked infrastructure. A national grid of information system nodes is made available to any and all law enforcement. For fees based on community size and demand, analytical services and intelligence are provided by a consortium of government and the private sector. Security is high, but the notion of public/private partnerships is well established by 2015.

Over the last ten years, police training has changed with technology. The use of Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) have created extremely effective simulation training that better

prepares officers to apply the full range of police tactics, including use of force and rapid identification of criminal behavior patterns (Cowper and Buerger, 2003). Basic recruit school has lengthened to incorporate more scenario-based and simulation training, and in-service training has both state and federal mandates for minimum standards.

The Adaptive Model

In the middle, an Adaptive Model that is situational; wide base of skills, training, leadership modalities that allow police to shift between the extremes depending on the environment (might require flexible work-staffs, deployment of the warriors to augment the locally based peacekeepers).

By 2015, the U.S. had endured additional terrorist acts, but none were close to the magnitude of September 11th. IEDs occasionally went off in public places, but the American culture resisted their promulgation to the level seen in Israel in the 2000s. A dirty bomb attempt resulted in debilitating injury to the bomber, but only a handful of innocent victims received sufficient contamination to trigger health issues. Most common were acts of sabotage upon the country's critical infrastructure, which managed to inconvenience many people until corrective actions were taken. The role of the police, in turn, incorporated the vigilant protection of critical infrastructure and the rapid response to covert or overt threats, as they became known.

Under federal mandate, police nationwide were expected to be skilled and capable in Incident Command. The federal government subsidized statewide ETRTs, which were a blend of full-time state employees, augmented by specially trained local officers who were obligated to respond if the ETRTs deployed. A joint Incident Command system with local and state control applies whenever these teams are deployed.

The nationally standardized ID card is subject to mandatory carry laws under the terms of the "Patriot Law", a domestic version of martial law implemented under times of great threat of attack against U.S. soil. Provisions of the old "Patriot Act" were modified into actionable requirements that provide sweeping powers for police during periods of "Patriot Law". The president must obtain concurrence from the Congress to invoke "Patriot Law," and as of 2015, it has been used sparingly. Civil liberties that are restricted under such challenging times have been the subject of intense debate and protest. The Supreme Court has been weighted down with countless cases seeking what possible constitutional language can justify the extreme measures that many Americans support during times of duress.

States have adopted the national standards for driver's licenses and state issued ID cards, with a nationally accepted method of easily capturing data from the card for verification.

Publicly employed police officers, while fewer in number than their private sector counterparts, have become highly trained with a varied mission. During typical times, they continue to work with their communities to mutually solve problems and improve quality of life, but they also maintain a skill set of combat when needed. Special squads with exclusive combat methods are available to move into high-risk areas. This resource resembles the military, with whom the police share a training and deployment relationship. During "Patriot Law" times, the military is authorized to jointly operate with combat police units. Every police officer spends at least a year in training and rotates through the many special skill areas within departments.

One contributing factor to the lengthy extension of training time is the need to prepare officers for instant "shoot-don't shoot" decision—

making. In the first decade of the 21st century, police were restricted by the requirement of imminent threat of death to the officer or another before authorized to use deadly force. With the growth of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) officers are now trained to closely observe behaviors and appearance that are indicative of an imminent terrorist act. Officers are under order to immediately send streaming playback video of what they observed for computer analysis, and can receive a “shoot to neutralize” order based upon this analysis. Officers receive weekly training and assessment on their ability to apply the dual standards for use of deadly force.

There is significant staffing of security at major events such as sports stadiums. What required 100 officers to police back in the early 2000s now requires almost 1000. Screening for dirty bombs, IED’s, biological agents, and any other type of weapon is done through a blend of private security and heavily armed police.

The U.S. government distributes funding for major anti-terrorism police efforts and terrorism prevention in the communities that either have been identified as having the highest risk, or that have previously experienced a terrorist act. The practice of the early 2000’s to “share the wealth” among all communities proved inefficient, as many items purchased were never deployed or needed, while other communities suffered from basic protection. To correct the past efforts of local authorities to lump any and all criminal activity as “terrorism” to qualify for funds, the federal government has established clear parameters that require a direct link to either global or domestic terrorist groups before qualifying for funds or classifying as “terrorism.”


The military’s authorization to deploy with police is not strictly limited to “Patriot Law” situations. In 2015, local mayors have the ability to

request through their state’s governor deployment of both National Guard and regular military to augment local law enforcement. While the standards for such deployment remain extraordinary, the lines between policing and the military have become blurry.

In 2015, there are many more private police than publicly employed officers. Communities with resources have outsourced much of the service mission of policing to private enterprise, often in conjunction with gated entrances and walled neighborhoods. While standard patrol activities continue in many places, the amount of residential space for which the public police are responsible has shrunk, and responsibility delegated to private and special-jurisdiction forces. Wags refer to them as “the police reserves,” since many of the private officers still aspire to public police careers despite considerable evidence that wages and benefits are better in the private services. The subcultural consciousness still has not shed the mystique of “the real police” that attaches to those with broad rather than limited police jurisdiction.

While some described policing as a growth industry, it was well below the pace of private security moving into 2015. One of the new police powers allows for police takeover and command of private policing and security enterprises when Patriot Law is invoked. The first such attempt was widely acknowledged to be a disastrous circus of the absurd, with many parallels drawn to the Keystone Kops of old. The practical result of that first failure was a series of DHS-sponsored joint training activities similar to the old Incident Command process. Greater preparation for mobilization under national emergency has yielded a much greater degree of public-private coordination in standard crime control.

With fewer disposable federal dollars, but increasing demands on local agencies, regional



efforts to consolidate police departments have had mixed results. In some areas, one large agency evolved from several smaller. In other areas, the decentralized delivery of police services was possible through centralizing the support services that are transparent to customers. Most communities have recognized the need to sustain local control over typical police operations, but also understand that the times of “Patriot Law” call for diverting some control over to a more centralized authority. As has been true throughout police history over the past 100 years, the burden is ultimately placed

on the neighborhood beat officers to develop the relationships needed to balance freedom and law.

References

- Cowper, Thomas J., and Michael E. Buerger, 2003. “Improving Our View of the World: Police and Augmented Reality Technology,” Monograph published by the Behavioral Sciences Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the Futures Working Group collaboration, Quantico, VA. February 2003. Also available at: < <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/realitytech/realitytech.pdf>.>
- Futures Working Group, 2005. “Neighborhood-Driven Policing. Proceedings of the Futures Working Group, Vol. 1,” Monograph published by the Behavioral Sciences Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the Futures Working Group collaboration. Quantico, VA. January 2005.
- Goldstein, Herman, 1979. “Improving the Police: A Problem-Oriented Approach,” *Crime & Delinquency* 25, 236-258.
- Problem-Oriented Policing*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.