

Police Functions During Expeditionary Military Operations

Kurt E. Müller

The Expansion of Peacekeeping

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the evaporation of the ideological East–West conflict, peacekeeping for the United Nations became a growth industry. Local belligerents lost access to superpower sponsors, who now shared an interest in the stability of states neighboring regional powers. As an example, the Balkans threaten social and economic unrest across Europe, and both Russia and the U.S. have a mutual interest in containing Balkan conflicts. Nations have contributed peacekeeping troops for various reasons. Some found they could maintain a larger military force if the U.N. were footing part of the bill; others, particularly smaller European members of NATO, found that supporting an agenda for peace made good domestic policy while maintaining a military capability.

Peacekeeping is commonly thought to be an innovation in international affairs that dates to the early years of the United Nations. In an article for *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, for example, Ambassador Robert Oakley (1998) writes of the “history of 50 years of peacekeeping,” a history whose “record is mixed but, on balance, positive.” Multilateral intervention actually dates back about a century longer. Rostow (1994) points out the century-long period of relative peace emerging from the 1815 Treaty of Vienna. That circumstance was managed by containing conflict. In two papers on peacekeeping, Schmidl (1997, 1998)

delineates two interventions by the Concert of Europe: the first in 1897 on Crete, the second in 1913–14. As Montenegro sought to wrest part of Albania from the Ottomans, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy sent land and maritime forces to frustrate the Montenegrin plan. Their peacekeeping mission, which included nation-building, continued through the Second Balkan War (1913) until the outbreak of World War I ended their collaboration. Prior to that multilateral deployment, Austria-Hungary had threatened unilateral intervention for humanitarian reasons, though the dual monarchy had clear political objectives in mind on which its public diplomacy was silent (Schmidl, 1997).

The United States has engaged in numerous interventions, primarily in the Western Hemisphere and often with mixed objectives, such as preventing refugee flows by supporting stability in the home country. A prime example of the latter is evident in multiple interventions in Haïti. Despite unilateral interventions and those undertaken by alliances and coalitions as wide-ranging as NATO and ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), however, the most common interventions undertaken for humanitarian purposes are those conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. A number of observers have commented on the growth of U.N. peacekeeping, particularly since the end of the Cold War. As a representative example, McClure and Orlov (1999) note that the U.N. conducted 13 peace operations between 1948 and 1988 and 36 such operations between 1988 and 1999. The earliest U.N. peacekeeping operation was conducted in the desert of the Sinai, and that environment limited the need for police, but the second operation, in the Republic of the Congo (1960–64), included a police detachment

from Ghana. That Ghanaian unit became embroiled in local confrontations and was relieved by a deployment of Nigerian police, who stayed for a year beyond the U.N. military peacekeeping mission (Schmidl, 1998).

Circumstances of Intra-State Conflicts and Their Resolution

It is useful to review patterns of conflict to uncover the circumstances in which deployed police forces may have to operate and the areas in which post-conflict reconciliation benefits from a significant police presence. Regardless of the source of conflict, such as sectarianism, race/tribe membership, nationality, or ideology, there has often been a pattern of repression by one group of another, of counter-repression, and of post-conflict intervention.

The concept of U.N. Civil Police originates with the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), deployed in 1964. Ten years prior to the Turkish intervention of 1974, UNFICYP deployed to prevent the re-emergence of previous civil unrest between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In that operation, the military commander is credited with proposing the deployment of a police component to facilitate confidence building among the populace (Schmidl, 1998). To distinguish these international police from constabulary military forces, they were originally called U.N. Civilian Police (CivPol).

The characterization of civil unrest between ethnic groups when one represses the other with police power and administrative discrimination recurs over time and space. Readers may recall that the Sudetenland Crisis was the pretext for Germany to invade Czechoslovakia. Although the Hitler regime abused the Munich Agreement, an intervention was warranted because

the crisis was real. Because the victorious Allies of WW I had applied the “principle of self-determination” only to the defeated Central Powers (and not permitted plebiscites in several territories they had promised as spoils), they effectively reversed certain patterns of discrimination. The Czech example is instructive as a baseline. The Czechs were one of many groups of minorities in Austria-Hungary, whose two ruling ethnic groups, in order, are reflected in the name of the dual monarchy. Creating the new state without changing the Austro-Czech-German-Hungarian borders to account for ethnic distribution thereby drew a new state in which the German- and Hungarian-speaking populations were now minorities in a Czech-dominated state, and the Beneš regime egregiously violated minority rights.¹ Although the common memory of the Munich agreement is as an aggressive step by the Third Reich, in fact it resolved a violation of human rights. The situation was compounded after World War II by the atrocity of expelling the German and Hungarian minorities, one of several precursors of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslav republics in the 1990s.² Such reversals of power blocs often facilitate retribution; these historical examples are unfortunately repeated across the history of U.N. peacekeeping.

¹ For a concise discussion of the crisis, see Library of Congress, “Sudetenland.” [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+cs0036\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+cs0036)) retrieved 6 June 2007. For more detailed information, see Arnold Toynbee’s article in the *Economist* (10 July 1937) 72; Lord Runciman’s report in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*, 2.3, 50; and the report to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull by U.S. Ambassador to France William Bullitt in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938*, 1: 595.

² On the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, see Kopper (2003) and Brunstetter (2003). On the expulsion of Hungarians, see Jeszensky (2003). See also de Zayas (2003).

To prevent or ameliorate repression of out-of-power groups by the new power structure, international police contingents are deployed to provide a non-partisan public-safety force. For example:

- In 1964, UNFICYP created a CivPol contingent with 173 police officers from 5 contributing nations. CivPol elements patrolled jointly with Cypriot police to reassure the local populace that policing was evenhanded between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. To bolster confidence, CivPol investigated cross-ethnic allegations of infractions by Greeks against Turks and vice versa (Schmidl, 1998). That operation continues and as of April 2007 has 9 nations contributing 65 police and 11 nations contributing 856 military personnel (www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unficyfacts.html).
- In 1991, after a tortuous journey through the totalitarian rule of the Khmer rouge, a subsequent invasion by VietNam, and a struggle for supremacy among competing groups for power in Cambodia, a peace agreement facilitated the deployment of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia. In February 1992, UNTAC was authorized a component of 3,600 police monitors (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr1.html)(Doyle, 1994). The task of reconciliation was central to the mission of peace-building, and within a 5-month period, UNTAC noted 242 occurrences of “human rights abuses, [...] summary executions of suspected offenders,” and “immunity from justice commonly enjoyed by the perpetrators” (Plunkett, 1994). International monitors determined “that the main human rights breaches were murders

being perpetrated by elements of the police and military of the factions” (Plunkett, 1994). As may be expected under these circumstances, police sponsored by the various factions would not investigate or prosecute offenders allied with their faction (Plunkett, 1994, p. 68).

- Under Tito, Yugoslavia was a federation of republics held together by deliberately building interdependencies and promoting integration. A decade after his death, this precarious structure unraveled, and republics began seceding. Fueled by partisans from Croatia and Serbia, the worst of the conflicts occurred 1992–95 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republic with the most intermarriages. With acceptance of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, the belligerents in the Bosnian conflict accepted the deployment of an International Police Task Force, whose members soon noted the extent to which Yugoslavia had been a police state by comparing the density of police in Bosnia to the norms in Western states. As in Cambodia, factions in Bosnia routinely set up police check points to limit the freedom of movement of targeted groups. The IPTF, to which 38 countries contributed, was authorized 2,015 personnel (Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg, 1998). In 2003, the IPTF was succeeded by a European Union Police Mission.
- In 1999, a secret ballot held in East Timor (now known as Timor Leste) revealed the inhabitants’ wish for independence from Indonesia. East Timor had been a Portuguese territory, in which different parties contended either for independence or for integration with Indonesia. When the 1999 ballot revealed a 4:1 margin

in favor of independence, pro-Indonesian militias unleashed a campaign of violence. Indonesian armed forces and police withdrew, and the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor deployed a civilian police component of up to 1,640 members to train and establish an East Timor Police Service; national security was to be supported by creating an East Timor Defense Force.

(www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm)

- Kosovo's recent history is one of alternating repression of one group by another. Milošević's rise to power in Serbia came about by ending Kosovar Albanians' abuse of Kosovar Serbs. The elimination of autonomy for Serbia's provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina saw instruments of Yugoslavia's Ministry of the Interior Police (Ministarstvo Unutarnjih Poslova, or MUP) engage in repression of the Albanian majority. Following the Kosovar Albanian revolt and a NATO intervention, the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was faced with the difficulty of preventing "Albanian revenge acts against Serbs and minorities, which began as soon as Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo hard on the heels of entering KFOR troops [...]." (Sage, 2005; see also Honzak, 2006; International Crisis Group, 1999; Mockaitis, 2004; Seybolt, 2007)
- The current conflict in Iraq demonstrates the pattern once again. Under the Baathist regime, the minority Sunni populace repressed the majority Shia. The current regime reflects the Shia majority, and a major challenge is evident in attempts to ensure minority participation throughout government agencies. Police and military units

are recruiting from various segments of Iraqi society in an attempt to achieve public support for representative, evenhanded policing.

The police monitoring function is by no means restricted to situations in which there is a reversal of dominant factions that spurs reprisals against the group that had been oppressive and is suddenly subject to revenge. Additional social maladies create the need for inserting international police monitors, perhaps creating entirely new police systems, and overhauling rule-of-law institutions.

At the end of World War II, the liberation of France was accompanied by a new lawlessness as some French citizens directed widespread reprisals at other French citizens who had collaborated with either the German occupation forces or the Vichy government. Thirty years later, the British forces serving in Ulster frequently reported IRA retribution on locals who interacted with British forces or who failed to maintain strict separation from Irish Protestants. On the other side of that conflict, the Catholic population in Northern Ireland had no reason to trust the police force, which was overwhelmingly Protestant.

In consequence of the outside agitation by Croatian and Serbian partisans that tore apart the social fabric of Bosnia-Herzegovina, much of the populace became polarized. In seeking to establish post-conflict democracy, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) may have rushed hastily to elections before building confidence that justice would be forthcoming. Results of early elections simply reflected the polarization that had taken place.

Elsewhere, the cause of conflict between segments of the populace has been based on other distinctions. Both

the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–76, by some calculations) and the Khmer rouge regime of Pol Pot (1975–79) targeted the middle class, certain occupations, or simply urbanites. Still other conflicts, such as those in Angola, El Salvador, and Mozambique, emerged from clashes between Marxist parties and their opponents.

Some of these societies had long histories of government repression of the populace by means of their security structures: El Salvador, Haïti, and Panamá come to mind. In Somalia, a clear distinction could be made that the military had been used for political repression, but the police were well respected by the populace for evenhandedness. Unfortunately, the competition among “warlords” drove the police out of service, complicating the attempt of UNOSOM peacekeepers to restore community policing.

Police Functions in Peacekeeping

Both military forces and police contingents deploy to establish security. The nature of that concept differs significantly between these sectors, but it requires close coordination. The military task of providing a secure environment addresses freedom of noncombatants from attacks by organized fighting formations, particularly attacks with weapons that exceed small-caliber firearms. The police portion of the task to provide security addresses freedom from revenge attacks, from individual assault by authorities and other individuals, and the right to seek justice. In practice, the security task has multiple aspects, and military and police tasks overlap with the potential that the lead agency may alternate as circumstances improve or deteriorate.

Just as the circumstances surrounding each peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building mission differ, the specified and inherent police tasks differ across missions.³ Although the tasks may be broad and numerous, they fall into several major categories, of which Broer and Emery (1998) list six:

- Monitoring local law and order forces to ensure that they perform their duties in a manner consistent with the [peace] agreement
- Training local police forces
- Ensuring free and fair elections
- Supporting programs for the reform of local law and order forces or for creation of a new police force
- Investigating alleged violations of human rights either in the context of their monitoring function or in support of the human rights component (p. 370)
- Assisting nations in institution building, specifically law-enforcement institutions.

The primary police function has been to monitor the conduct of indigenous police to ensure they conduct themselves in accord with expected standards of human rights. Next comes support to reform an existing law-enforcement structure or to create a substitute agency, to assist in building the capacity (and character) of local law-enforcement institutions, and to train local police. A police contingent supporting peacekeeping may be tasked with investigations in some operations, but this task may be excluded from the mandate of others. Finally, CivPol are likely to be involved in ensuring that the conduct of elections is free and fair. Insofar as indigenous security elements (military, police, militia) may have a

³ For a description of distinctions among peace operations, see Boutros-Ghali (1992).

history of repressing members of minority groups, the CivPol contingent is often expected to demonstrate the commitment of the international community to ensuring access to the ballot box by all segments of society.

Monitoring and Other Tasks

The conflicts characterized above demonstrate control of portions of the populace by state-sponsored organizations, such as the police or military. Oppression may also be exercised by militias, that is, paramilitary units that emerge from the populace or from a prematurely demobilized military. Peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter often come about when the belligerents are exhausted or there is simply no prospect of achieving either belligerent's goals, and they turn to mediation. A peacekeeping agreement may well delineate a power-sharing arrangement, which demands cooperation, if not reconciliation, between the parties. Considering that a great degree of mistrust is probably rampant, freedom from home intrusion, personal safety, and the like will demand a police force that treats the populace with dignity and that shows no favoritism to either side of a disagreement. Consequently, part of the task of establishing public safety is to remove the likelihood of crimes against persons and property perpetrated by one faction against another (often identified in the U.S. as "bias crimes"). If the police force or the military is part of a state's machinery of oppression, it will be necessary to monitor this force for compliance with acceptable standards of human rights. This task often requires the CivPol contingent to remove individual police agents or their leadership, recruit a police force that reflects the population being served, and undertake a training program to ensure

policing based on even-handed protection of persons and property.

Where because of their group affiliation, families and individuals have been subject to murder, rape, loss of limb and property, arson, forced labor, and other such predations, victims and survivors will call for justice. Tasks for CivPol contingents may include gathering or safeguarding evidence or facilitating others in doing so. Certainly, the police contingent will want to establish a climate that distinguishes between justice and retribution, a challenging task, particularly if the indigenous populace has endured prolonged exposure to brutality.

Representative calls for such guard duty have included guarding the site of mass graves (e.g., in Bosnia) and protecting institutions (e.g., the National Museum in Baghdad). Even when security forces decline such missions—for lack of personnel, perhaps—the security character of these issues dictates that the leadership (civilian, military, and police) should be able to suggest solutions to such capability gaps.

The Scandinavian countries have been particularly active in U.N. peacekeeping, supplying both military and police contingents. In June 1997, a Swedish Commission on International Police Activities issued a report to support Sweden's contribution to various peacekeeping and peace-building missions. The report looks at the wider context in which previous conflicts had taken place as well as at the functions peacekeepers need to address to establish good prospects for continued peace. In addition to the primary tasks of monitoring the local police system, educating the local police forces, and establishing or restructuring the local police establishment, the commission enumerated a number of tasks that various sectors—from diplomats to the intervening military force to members of

government and relief agencies—undertake when they aim to reconstruct a society based on humane principles of democratic interaction.

The commission noted a particular category of tasks that it considered a gray zone as to which agency should undertake them to restore security and order.⁴ The category contains eight tasks:

- To control riots and disturbances
- To intervene against armed "gangs"
- To maintain civil law and order
- To discover and prevent crimes (e.g., plundering)
- To maintain order and security during election preparations
- To monitor and assist in disarming civilians
- To escort civilians in violence-prone areas
- To protect refugees in refugee camps from armed elements (Billinger, 1998).

The logical considerations behind choosing military or police to take the lead with these tasks will probably address the organization of the perpetrators, the weapons they may employ, and the mission specified for each component. However, one inescapable consideration will be the personnel available to each element of a peacekeeping mission. Many discussions of military intervention indicate reluctance on the part of military planners to address policing issues, but in the face of the deployment gap that typically pertains to establishing a police contingent for a peacekeeping operation, we need to recognize that if a military

force does not address these issues, they are likely to escalate to a point that they threaten the success of the mission. We can define this threat and its treatment more sharply if we also consider police functions in combat operations.

Police Functions during Combat Operations

In May 1989, Panamanians elected Guillermo Endara as president and Arias Calderón and Billy Ford as vice presidents. The sitting head of state, Manuel Noriega, attempted to nullify the election. In December 1989, after several additional factors contributed to a *casus belli*, the XVIIIth (U.S.) Airborne Corps spearheaded an invasion of Panama to unseat Noriega and facilitate the installation of the Endara government. Initially policy makers hoped that Panamanians would unseat Noriega and turn the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) against him. Gradually, emphasis changed to invasion plans that included rendering the PDF ineffective (Lord et al., 1993). An October coup attempt might have achieved the goal of separating Noriega from his military support, but the U.S. failed to support the coup (Gray & Manwaring, 1998). As the situation worsened, the U.S. Southern Command gave the XVIIIth Airborne Corps the responsibility of executing Operation Just Cause. Before its execution, the operations plan had a civil-military annex that was removed, erroneously divorcing the battle plan from its political purpose. The Southcom commander focused on the military tasks, and, to preserve operational security, his staff did not consult other government agencies, including the U.S. ambassador to Panama (Gray & Manwaring, 1998; Lord et al., 1993). Military proclivities are to focus on military adversaries, and the

⁴ An English translation of the report is incorporated into Billinger's (1998), "Report of the Special Swedish Commission on International Police Activities."

deliberate exclusion of planners whose concern is the civil sector resulted in a lack of appreciation for the security gap that developed when the PDF was removed.

In Panama, the PDF functioned as both a military and police force. Consequently, when the PDF was incapacitated at the invasion sites, the intervention created a police gap, and Panamanians were free to vent their frustrations with Noriega by looting in Panama City and Colón.⁵ In rural areas, the PDF continued policing. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs Corps has the expertise to advise commanders and staff planners about the civil-sector influences on mission accomplishment, but for planning Just Cause, they were denied access. Because civil affairs operators routinely address all elements of national power, they frequently work directly with the “country team” that supports the U.S. ambassador. The ambassador was not on site during the operation, and Southcom had no political advisor on station, so the two functionaries who could have broken the planning logjam were absent (Gray & Manwaring, 1998). The looting stopped when sufficient military police and infantry deployed to fulfill the police function.

Some lessons are easier for corporate bodies to learn than others. The size of the military bureaucracy is such that shifting perceptions is akin to turning an aircraft carrier: the process requires time and space. With the rise of Serbian police abuse of Kosovar Albanians, the international community began to look at solutions to the human-rights crisis. The U.N. Security Council,

NATO, and the Partnership for Peace all looked into the situation with a view toward a peacekeeping mission. Responsible at the time for civil-military operations planning at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, I cautioned my fellow staff principals in the Joint Operations Center that any military activity in Kosovo to remove the Serbian police would have to address the resulting police gap. Only 1 of the 8 other principals affirmed this concern when it was raised initially; by the time NATO sent in its Kosovo Force (KFOR), the framework documents had addressed the need pointedly, though inadequately.

When KFOR deployed under provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement (MTA), it had the task of “ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task” (UN, S/Res/1244 [1999] 3). Moreover, in contrast to previously identified police tasks, in this instance KFOR had a specific mandate to transfer police tasks to the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in essence to its police force (UNMIK-P), which would then “carry out normal police duties and will have executive law enforcement authority.” Such executive authority has been rare in U.N. police deployments, which have concentrated on monitoring the activities of local police. International CivPol mandates that emphasize monitoring (as distinct from executive authority) accord the recipient state significant recognition of its sovereignty. In accord with fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter, sovereignty can only be curtailed under restricted circumstances. Hence, recognizing the need for U.N. executive police authority is a significant intrusion in

⁵ Similarly, there are indications that the looting of the Iraqi National Museum in 2003 was in part motivated by anti-Baathist resentment. See Col. Bogdanos’ (2007), “Iraq Museum Investigation.”

defense of human rights.⁶ The enumeration of this task for Kosovo exceeded the language of the proposed, predecessor Rambouillet Accords. Very much like the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg proposals that were attempts at a ceasefire in Bosnia, Rambouillet was an attempt to end hostilities in Kosovo that was swept aside by changes in the situation on the ground. Both Rambouillet and the MTA called for deployment of an international CivPol force, but the circumstances and missions differed. Rambouillet would have allowed Serbian police to continue conducting police functions. The MTA provided an intrusive regimen to replace police functions in Kosovo, requiring a complete withdrawal of MUP forces within 11 days of signing the agreement (Gwaltney, 2002). Distinguishing between local police and MUP forces, the MTA allowed the local police to remain (Sage, 2005), but in practice KFOR needed to address police functions immediately.

The current campaign in Iraq should be examined for military–police interface once some time has elapsed, and researchers can derive lessons from a sufficient stock of after-action reports. An early, notable instance helps frame our larger inquiry into public-security issues. Readers are likely to remember the news reports during the spring of 2003 detailing the looting of the Iraqi National Museum, mentioned briefly above. It is generally accepted that General Eric Shinsecki retired as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, because his projections for the size of the occupation force needed for

Iraq exceeded substantially the numbers Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was willing to deploy. International conventions require an occupation force to provide for the security of the populace, including preservation of cultural heritage. As Australian legal officer, Colonel Kelly (1997) points out, an occupation authority cannot escape responsibilities under international conventions by not providing sufficient troops with the appropriate skills; the responsibility remains. The Iraqi looting example differs substantially from its Panamanian predecessor along two dimensions: 1) the booty--cultural artifacts from a 10,000-year-old civilization; and 2) the international outcry that arose in response. Moreover, the thefts quickly became an interagency matter. The U.S. Department of State's Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau established a Cultural Heritage Program, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Art Theft Program became linked to attempts to recover 170,000 items from the museum's collection. In addressing the U.S. intervention in Panama, Kelly makes the case that any exemption from international humanitarian law is based only on whether a military force is passing through or if it is engaged in continuing combat. If it is the sole authority in the area capable of exercising control, it has inherent responsibilities to do so. Otherwise, a claim of insufficient forces or of an absence of military government amounts only to an abrogation of responsibility under the law (Kelly, 1999).

Choosing Appropriate Police Formations

Should police functions be undertaken by military police, constabulary forces, or national or municipal police seconded to an international police force? Field and

⁶ Schmidl (1998) writes that U.N.CivPol have "occasionally" taken on executive functions (p. 39); Schear and Farris (1998) write that in Cambodia, U.N.CivPol did not initially have executive functions; Broer and Emery (1998) note that "in most cases" CivPol is unarmed and does not do community policing (p. 380).

Perito (2003) point out benefits of deploying constabulary forces rather than individual police or military units, including the advantage of organic transport, communications, and logistical support. Based on U.N. experiences in Cambodia, Eaton (1994) calls for community police rather than MPs. On the other hand, Dziedzic (1999) and Oakley (1998) conclude their volume of proceedings with the observation that military forces “will need to perform constabulary functions on an interim basis [...] during the earliest stages of most peace missions” (518). A number of national militaries have constabulary forces: the Argentine and French *gendarmes*, Chilean *carabineros*, Dutch *marechaussee*, Italian *carabinieri*, Spanish *guardia civil*, and Turkish *jendarma* come to mind. According to comments at a 1997 National Defense University conference by BG David Foley, then commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School, the MP corps has an appropriate capability for this purpose as well. A conference participant, Colonel Howard O’Brien noted a similar planning shortcoming for MPs as mentioned earlier for civil affairs. In response to a question at the conference, he noted the image of an infantryman standing by while civilian violence took place in Haiti, causing the President of the United States to call for deploying 1,000 MPs. MPs were in fact scheduled for deployment, but the planners apparently did not accord them very high priority on the force-deployment list (Oakley, Dziedzic, & Goldberg, 1998).

As Colonel Kelly writes, simply scheduling too few troops for a deployment does not exempt an invasion force from its responsibilities under international humanitarian law to provide an environment that keeps

noncombatants safe.⁷ In peacekeeping operations, these responsibilities are more difficult to ascribe to a lead nation of a multinational force or to nations contributing troops to that force. Individual nations volunteer to deploy troops for peacekeeping, and the force commander usually can accept or decline the organizations offered. Small units with special capabilities may be welcomed (e.g., a Czech company-sized element with a snow-clearing capability used in Bosnia), and a diversity of nationalities is often welcome to indicate broad support for an operation. But, the force commander is also likely to match troop contributions with similar military cultures and language combinations and may establish a certification process to ensure compatibility and adequacy of support (as General George Joulwan insisted for non-NATO troop contingents before they were accepted in the Implementation Force [IFOR]). Thus, if Morocco offers a battalion and France has offered a brigade, the Moroccan battalion is likely to be paired with the French brigade, just as Pakistani and British organizations might be paired. Despite the observation that military police should be part of peacekeeping contingents (Oakley, Dziedzic, & Goldberg, 1998), they are often absent from the deployment packages nations offer.

Inasmuch as there is frequently a requirement to build a capacity for “community policing” as an inherent part of a peacekeeping mission or post-conflict transition, there will be a role for police monitors and trainers, and their skills will need to include investigation and community relations. Consequently,

⁷ The doctrine of “noncombatant immunity” under international customs comprising the law of land warfare seeks to protect the civilian populace from the ravages of war. This practice is widely followed, and its transgression is the domain of the International Criminal Court at the Hague.

even when a military deployment includes constabulary forces, a police contingent is likely to be a key part of the transition to local control.

Donor nations may draw a CivPol contingent from any level, local to national, depending on the donor's circumstances. Others have addressed the qualities needed for CivPol assignments and consistent failure to meet the qualifications specified, leading the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (1997) to publish a pamphlet on *Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for UNCIVPOL*. This paper will not address such issues as inability to communicate in either the mission language or the local language, but will comment on both mission sensitivity and interoperability with partnered police and with the military force.

Usually smaller than the military force, police contingents often display a diversity of nationalities to that of the military. Police commanders will also attempt to construct compatible combinations of cultures in building teams to monitor and train local police. A review of literature has not yielded a description of a police commander who had an opportunity to ascertain the acceptability to the mission at hand. Rather, the literature indicates efforts to replace problematic contingents or to mitigate deficiencies. Considering the "deployment gap"—the delay between assigning the mission and achieving full operational capacity of the police contingent—this opportunity to ensure appropriate assignments is likely to remain a challenge in the near term.

In some instances, the CivPol commander may pair police officers less to facilitate cultural compatibility than to ensure that patrol teams will address the core and supporting issues for their deployment successfully. Prior to the creation of the IPTF in Bosnia, there was

a previous police monitoring mission that accompanied UNPROFOR in Croatia. Broer and Emery (1998) write of a Finnish police monitor appalled at Serbian militia members in Croatia beating a detainee while his partner, from another nation, apparently accepted such treatment as a routine part of interrogation.

Such differences among police cultures need to be addressed as part of orienting the contingent to the mission. Not only is mistreatment a human-rights issue, it also undermines the purpose of deploying the police on these missions. From a comparison with counter-insurgency doctrine, we recognize that support of the populace is key to ensuring stability in a contested region. When the populace is terrorized by government agencies, it will seek relief by supporting insurgents or others who oppose the government. In Latin America, the complicity of U.S. agencies in human-rights violations led to legislation terminating the USAID Office of Public Safety and prohibiting the training of foreign police except in limited circumstances (Section 660, Foreign Assistance Act).⁸ Because proper policing contributes to stability and public security, police capacity must be addressed in any comprehensive attempt to rebuild post-conflict societies. But, the potential for abuse also requires appropriate oversight. Consequently, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the Department of Justice receives funding through USAID and policy guidance from the Department of State, and its authority, as with other programs, is by explicit exception to the ban on training foreign police (Call, 1994).

⁸ For criticism of U.S. programs in Brazil that were seen to support repressive policing, see Huggins (1998) as well as Cottam and Marenin (1989).

Benefits to the Donor Departments

Inappropriate police officers for CivPol missions are found not only among those from the developing world, as one might expect. Broer and Emery (1998) indicate that retired New York City police supplied by a contracting firm to the IPTF had the highest rate of absence without leave of any IPTF contingent. This circumstance points out two issues: (1) filling these positions must become a matter of selection, rather than recruiting along an industrial model (the “warm body” syndrome) and (2) proper recruiting should also address a longer-term benefit to the police department or agency supplying its officers. The first issue is fairly straightforward. The second may require some attention to recognize the benefits the department will derive.

Domestic police investigations have had an international component at least since the 19th century. This market niche facilitated the establishment of the Pinkerton agency. More recently, American anti-narcotics investigations demonstrate perhaps the most visible growth overseas: in 1967, 12 drug-enforcement agents were stationed in 8 foreign cities; by 1991, the number grew to 300 in 70 locations. In the same period, the number of attorneys in the Justice’s Office of International Affairs increased tenfold; and the U.S. central bureau of Interpol increased staff from 6 to 110 (Nadelmann, 1993). The FBI investigation of Libyan involvement in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, involved “dozens” of agents, working with English, Scottish, and German police “in tracking down leads in over forty countries from Sweden and Malta to the Far East” (Nadelmann, 1993). Moreover, the U.S. Postal Service, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau of the

Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service, and the Department of Commerce all benefit from international police connections.

Local police departments also benefit from having officers with international experience. Police intelligence contributes to combating crime syndicates, of course. But, even when detectives look into the foreign connections of individual persons of interest, they need an understanding of differences among legal systems to obtain evidence in a form admissible in an American court. Professional experience in a foreign environment sensitizes them to the types of issues they will encounter in seeking international police cooperation.

Police–Military Coordination

Sharing information subject to security restrictions has been a long-standing challenge among agencies within the same government as well as between parallel organizations of different governments. With the recognition that military operations are highly multilateral and likely to remain so, futures-oriented thought on security matters is currently engaged in trying to shift security culture from a “need to know” to a “need to share.” Within the military, as within the police, similar professional cultures acknowledge the structures to safeguard information to provide operational security. The expectation of confidentiality and the procedures for sharing information—as well as the trust factor—differ significantly in crossing these groups. In dealing with the local police being monitored or trained, it is nonexistent (see “Sharing Intelligence,” below). Because new police hires in the culture being monitored are likely to demonstrate loyalties and values that may be at odds with the international CivPol or military element that is

supporting them, there may be operations to which the indigenous police will not be privy, but building trust for safeguarding information will remain a milestone to be achieved in the transition to local control.

Delayed sharing of a common operational picture should not be true of the coordination between the CivPol and the international military, but it often is. Writing for the National Institute of Justice, Berkow (1997) opines of military and police cultures that “We do not speak each other’s languages; nor have we created the necessary interface between our senior military command and our policing institutions” (p. 15). But, in peacekeeping operations we work together on the same problems. Berkow believes the military sees a transfer of responsibilities to CivPol as part of its exit strategy. If so, that attitude integrates military and CivPol tasks more closely than may often have been true. When a peace agreement calls for disarming factions, storing weapons, and the like, both the military and CivPol will need to share information to determine whether a faction is trying to find a loophole in the agreement or to deliberately violate its provisions. During the ONUMOZ mission in Mozambique, for example, the Mozambican government claimed that the Presidential Guard was neither a military nor a police force and therefore outside the monitoring responsibilities of either the military peacekeepers or the CivPol operation. CivPol became aware that the government was transferring equipment to the Presidential Guard, but was denied access to verify the activity (Woods, 1994).

In Bosnia, SFOR⁹ elements found practical means to share information with

the IPTF, but such descriptions of work-arounds indicate the absence of a written policy facilitating such information sharing. If the security situation deteriorates, CivPol will likely need to call the military, which will usually designate a quick-reaction force. Particularly, when CivPol are unarmed, a rapid security deterioration puts them suddenly at risk. Similar situations pertain regarding indigenous police. Thomas and Spataro (1994) note regarding the Auxiliary Security Forces in Somalia (ASF) that:

UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia) did not have any CIVPOL on its staff to manage the ASF and had no funds to pay them. Military personnel were removed from the ASF stations and joint patrolling ceased just as factions brought weapons out of hiding into Mogadishu and resumed escalating violence. Outgunned by the militia and organized bandits and demoralized by the loss of military support, the ASF became incapable of performing viable missions except in the Bay Region where they received strong Australian support (p. 202).

There have been examples of a need to deploy a quick-reaction force to quell a disturbance in which the operation injured newly recruited indigenous police because there was no coordination between the military and police. Czech Army Lieutenant Colonel Honzak (2006) relates an incident in Kosovo in which a Kosovar Albanian mob targeted a Serbian Orthodox church, and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was unable to stop their approach. The international force responded with tear gas but failed to warn

initial year, it was called the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Subsequent phases of the campaign did not rename the force; among the reasons for keeping the name was the simple observation that repainting the insignia alone would have cost \$1,000,000.

⁹ The initial military force deployed to Bosnia was known as the Implementation Force (IFOR); after the

the KPS, whose members were more affected by the tear gas than was the mob. Moreover, the lack of coordination between UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) riot police and KPS contributed to a significant incident: an Italian policeman was shot in the leg, possibly by a KPS member, and a KPS officer was shot three times by an Italian (Honzak 14). The potential for fratricide demands substantial procedures to avoid killing or injuring friendly forces who may stray into the field of fire. Air operations in particular pose significant dangers and devote attention to means that identify other aircraft as friend or foe (IFF devices) or connect “blue-force trackers” to identify friendly troops. From this one incident alone, the risk of military–police confrontation requires liaison between the two contingents.

Sharing Intelligence

Contributing to the incident between KPS and UNMIK-P was an inability to share intelligence information among security organizations. Honzak writes of “problems with the synchronization of actions between KFOR and police (both UNMIK-P and KPS),” which he characterizes as the “most significant cases of local failures” (p.13). The lack of coordination was no accident, however, and this circumstance underscores one of the challenges in the transition to local forces of responsibility for security. In the Kosovo circumstances, Honzak points out, the screening for eligibility for a position with KPS was poor. Many applicants had “an unclear past” for various reasons. UNMIK did not accord much recognition to Serbian documents, official records had either been destroyed or were otherwise unavailable, and applicants with criminal records or whose conduct during the Kosovo conflict was questionable were hired as

KPS police (Honzak, 2006). Given these circumstances, their loyalty to the policing values UNMIK needed to promote was often doubtful. Honzak (2006) writes that any “joint KFOR-KPS operation became a public secret after initial planning,” UNMIK-P agents investigating serious crimes could trust very few KPS members, and “KFOR units planning search operations could not declare the place of the operation in advance.” Because KPS members had to participate and “actually lead the search,” KFOR units [...] had to pick them up, ask them to turn off their mobile phones, and took them to KFOR vehicles without telling them where the units were going to operate” (pp.14–15).

This U.N. CivPol experience in launching an indigenous police force was by no means new in Kosovo. Plunkett (1994) reported similar concerns in Cambodia. While we all find the plight of refugees and displaced persons such that we want the international community to alleviate their suffering, reality demands we also recognize that the fluid nature of a concentration of refugees also facilitates militants’ hiding among noncombatants until they find an opportunity to attack their enemies. These circumstances provide both the base to recruit future leaders of an emerging society and the danger that unfulfilled expectations will just as easily become the impetus for joining an insurgent group. And although there is often a call to “stop the killing,” the international community must recognize that peacekeepers cannot disarm only one faction to a conflict. Thus, the commander of the U.N. mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) recognized that disarming the Rwandan Patriotic Army faction would have disabled the counteroffensive that ended the genocide perpetrated by the radical Hutu militias.

From Kosovo we also draw an example in the opposite direction: of coordination that facilitated police patrolling. UNMIK-P was able to call on the artillery of Task Force Falcon to fire illumination rounds to enable night police patrols. Moreover, the police and military security concerns were so intertwined at times that soldiers detained civilians for infractions that could easily be recognized as crimes and engaged in basic criminal investigations. Military legal personnel (JAGs) created vignettes for basic law enforcement and investigative training, and civil affairs and psychological operations elements disseminated information to the populace on KFOR policing policies (Gwaltney, 2002).

For Haïti, mission objectives for the military and police contingents were so sufficiently intertwined that close coordination was self-evident. The 10th (U.S.) Mountain Division was the lead element of a multinational force, and it was to hand off responsibility to the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) once the security situation permitted a transfer. The division was supported by a MP brigade of two battalions, supplemented by a Caribbean Command battalion and 326 International Police Monitors (IPM). The IPM was to be relieved by U.N. CivPol, which would be subordinate to UNMIH. By its 1987 constitution, the local police force was supposed to work under authority of the Ministry of Justice, but the military regime had not allowed a transfer from military control to take place. Consequently, the police would have to be reorganized, using as many of its members as could be screened for appropriate retention. This construct would be called an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), to be replaced eventually by a new Haitian National Police (HNP) force (Bailey, Maguire, & Pouliot, 1994).

Joint patrols were common, both under the multinational force and under UNMIH. During the military phase, MPs conducted an average of 160 patrols per day with the IPMs and the IPSF (Bailey et al., 1994). But, that was just the beginning of military–police collaboration. Military information support teams shaped public perception of the multinational force and produced materials to recruit for the IPSF and test applicants for positions. Special Forces teams were dispersed across 27 locations, conducted patrols in 866 towns and villages, and initiated public-health and community-development projects supported by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. SF teams were supported by civil affairs and psychological operations troops. The IPMs were led by former New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly, who reported to the multinational force commander. The military commander supported the IPMs with a staff to coordinate logistics, communications, and operations (Bailey et al., 1994).

The Larger Context of Public Security: The Triad

Finally, we need to consider the coordination among police, judiciary, and penal institutions, which may be facilitated by military forces as well. Of the experience of U.N. CivPol in Cambodia, Eaton (1994), of the Australian Federal Police, writes that U.N. CivPol were:

sent into an anarchic nation without law and even the most rudimentary of justice systems, let alone a general public appreciation of the need for it. It was a task that was not only poorly articulated but also one set in a structural vacuum. U.N. police in Cambodia had none of the tools that underpin their role in their domestic country: no laws, no

justice administration, no courts and no jails (p. 61).

Schear and Farris (1998) agree, attributing to CivPol Commissioner Klaas Roos the observation that decades of strife had destroyed the criminal-justice system, with its courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and prisons. Of the situation there, Plunkett (1994), who served as UNTAC Human Rights Officer and later as U.N. Special Prosecutor, writes of the great irony that:

given the recent tragic history of Cambodia, one of the greatest human rights needs was the building of prisons. Many foreign governments had difficulties in accepting requests for funds to build prisons in Cambodia after all the tyranny the Khmer people had endured in such places (p. 62).

Moreover, as with the example cited earlier of the constraint UNMIK-P faced concerning the need to collaborate with the KPS, whose sieve-like security procedures undermined police operations, U.N. CivPol in Cambodia had to “rely on the Cambodian police forces, which were significantly politicized and not covered by the detailed provisions of the Paris Agreements, as were the armed forces of the parties” (70).

Politicization of police and the judiciary is a common problem in post-conflict reconstruction and should be a routine concern in planning a transition to peace. The police cannot function for long in the absence of the other two legs of the security triad: the judiciary and the penal institutions. Miscreants can be detained, but detention is supposed to be a temporary measure. Justice demands they be held accountable for any crimes or released in a timely fashion, but to do so requires the judiciary and a prison system. If the pre-

existing system is politicized, it must be reformed or rebuilt.

The UNMIK mission foresaw such issues for Kosovo. Concomitant with the revocation of autonomy for Kosovo, Yugoslavia had undertaken a “judicial cleansing” that led to a circumstance in which only 30 Albanians could be counted among the 756 judges and prosecutors in the province (Gwaltney, 2002). The International Crisis Group reported in 2002 on the public-safety situation confronting UNMIK and KFOR:

A climate of impunity reigned when UNMIK and KFOR arrived in Kosovo. Police lacked the strength to secure public safety; no judicial system existed to conduct trials, and no prisons could incarcerate criminals. ... UNMIK took these issues so seriously as to establish the Police and Justice Pillar (known as Pillar One) in May 2001 (2002, p. 9).

Captain Gwaltney (2002) writes that Task Force Falcon, the American element of KFOR in 1999, found it needed to “police criminal misconduct, provide judicial review for those arrested, and establish and run prisons” (p. 233). To help transition these tasks to an indigenous construct, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General established an emergency judicial system, appointing 30 judges and 12 prosecutors in 6 months.

Similarly, several years before in Haïti, the first of several Army civil affairs Ministerial Advisory Teams (MAT) addressed the justice triad, and its assessment formed the basis for USAID (United States Agency for International Development) programs and mentoring teams (Bingham, Rubini, & Cleary, 2001). A second MAT focused on the judiciary and facilitated coordination between the

Haitian Ministry of Justice and the U.S. Ambassador's interagency justice task force to support this sector of Haitian society. The relatively quick deployability of U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs elements allowed the country team access to subject-matter expertise more quickly than could be accomplished through other government agencies, addressing in effect for the judiciary the same kind of deployment gap that has been identified repeatedly for CivPol contingents.

Conclusion

The mandates under which U.N. CivPol operate have often been negotiated with gaps left to be worked out on site. This situation is not unusual in international diplomacy. One of the challenges of interpretation of deliberations and translation of documents is to capture in each language nuances of possible meaning rather than to choose terms that would preclude acceptance by the parties to the negotiation. Expansive meaning may facilitate acceptance of an agreement, but implementation may then require more negotiation. To avoid unacceptable risk to the peacekeepers, military staff often ensure that the tasks for the peacekeeping force are clearly understood and agreed on by all parties. In an environment in which the intervention force is prepared to impose its will by force of arms, it may issue a demarche to one side of a dispute. Such a threat must be credible and cause a potential opponent to consider that the risk of violating the intervention terms is too great to move against that force. Police mandates have been less well defined, and the interests of CivPol members often have been less defended

than those of the military. This gap is to be expected when the international community often has no idea which nations will provide CivPol forces and their leadership. But, the police function is a significant element in the transition from conflict to peace. Its interests must be represented if its mission is to succeed.

The military education system provides a wealth of information that addresses everything from tactical leadership to preparing to mobilize industry for high-intensity wars. Senior service colleges address grand strategy and the interaction of various elements of national power. Recent military publications have been addressing this range of functions and sectors in discussions of joint interagency task forces and their employment with military operations. Washington-area discussions, particularly among civilian leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, keep socializing the concept of legislation that would achieve for interagency coordination the same result that flowed from the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, through which the individual services overcame rivalries to operate together. There is discussion as well about the desirability of a National Security University that would draw candidates for senior leadership from across executive departments to facilitate future interagency coordination to achieve foreign-policy objectives.

Senior military leaders are now schooled in flexible-deterrent options, policy alternatives that can be used to avoid conflict, and in ending conflicts, as well as in indirect leadership, the anticipation of third-order effects of policy decisions, and the myriad influences on military campaigns. But, the most understudied aspect of national-security education must be the complex of diplomatic, economic, industrial, military, public-health, justice, and social issues

that must be addressed in concert to help a society emerge from war into peace. Peace is far more than the absence of war, and a bad peace is but a prescription for a subsequent war (Müller, 1999). Peace must be planned with the same care as we take to defeat an enemy in war. No single government agency can accomplish these tasks alone. Neither can the panoply of agencies accomplish them separately. They must coordinate their responses if they are to replace the causes of conflict with the infrastructure of opportunity.

REFERENCES

- Bailey, M., Maguire, R., & Pouliot, J. G. (1994). Haiti: Military-police partnership for public security. In H. Smith (Ed.), *International peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian experience* (pp. 215–252). Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy.
- Berkow, M. (1997). Practical issues in providing policing assistance abroad. *Civilian police and multinational peacekeeping—A workshop series: A role for democratic policing* (pp. 11–16). Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.
- Billinger, N. G. (1998). Report of the special Swedish commission on international police activities. In R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedzic, & E. M. Goldberg (Eds.), *Policing the new world disorder: Peace operations and public security* (pp. 459–507). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.
- Bingham, B., Rubini, L., & Cleary, M. J. (2001). U.S. Army civil affairs ministerial advisory teams deploy to Haiti. *Military Review*, 81, 53–63.
- Bogdanos, C. M. (2003). *Iraq museum investigation: 22Apr–8Sep03*. Retrieved June 27, 2007, from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2003/d20030922fr.pdf>.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). *An agenda for peace*. New York: United Nations.
- Broer, H., & Emery, M. (1997). Civilian police in U.N. peacekeeping operations. In R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedzic, & E. M. Goldberg (Eds.), *Policing the new world disorder: Peace operations and public security* (pp. 365–398). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.
- Brunstetter, S. (2003). Escaping history: The expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as a Leitmotif in German-Czech relations. In S. B. Vardy & T. H. Tooley (Eds.), *Ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe* (pp. 267–280). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Call, C. T. (1994). Institutional learning within ICITAP. In H. Smith (Ed.), *International peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian experience* (pp. 316–362). Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy.
- Cottam, M., & Marenin, O. (1989). Predicting the past: Reagan administration assistance to police forces in Central America. *Justice Quarterly*, 6, 598–599.
- Doyle, M. W. (1994). UNTAC—Sources of success and failure. In H. Smith (Ed.), *International peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian experience* (pp. 79–98). Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy.
- Dziedzic, M. J. (1999). *Protection for humanitarian relief operations*. Paper presented at the National Defense University Strategic Forum. Retrieved April 26, 2007, from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF168/forum168.htm>.
- Eaton, C. (1994). The role of police in institution building. In H. Smith (Ed.), *International peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian experience* (pp.

- 59–63). Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy.
- Field, K. C., & Perito, R. M. (2003). Creating a force for peace operations: Ensuring stability with justice. *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, 33, 77–87.
- Gray, A., & Manwaring, M. (1998). Panama: Operation just cause. In R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedzic, & E. M. Goldberg (Eds.), *Policing the new world disorder: Peace operations and public security* (pp. 41–68). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.
- Gwaltney, A. L., III. (2002). Law and order in Kosovo: A look at criminal justice during the first year of operation joint guardian. In L. Wentz (Ed.), *Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR experience* (pp. 233–268). Washington, D.C.: DoD Command and Control Research Program.
- Honzak, R. (2006). *A new KFOR: Changes for international security in Kosovo* (Strategy Research Project). Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.
- Huggins, M. K. (1998). *Political policing: The United States and Latin America*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- International Crisis Group. (2002). A Kosovo roadmap (II): Internal benchmarks (Balkans Report 131). Brussels: Author.
- International Crisis Group. (1999). *Violence in Kosovo: Who's killing whom?* (Europe Report 78). Brussels: Author.
- Jeszensky, G. (2003). From "Eastern Switzerland" to ethnic cleansing: Is the dream still relevant?. In S. B. Vardy & T. H. Tooley (Eds.), *Ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe* (pp. 11–30). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kelly, M. J. (1999). *Restoring and maintaining order in complex peace operations*. The Hague: Kluwer.
- Kelly, M. J. (1997). Legitimacy and the public security function. In R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedzic, & E. M. Goldberg (Eds.), *Policing the new world disorder: Peace operations and public security* (pp. 399–431). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.
- Kopper, C. (2003). The London Czech government and the origins of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. In S. B. Vardy & T. H. Tooley (Eds.), *Ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe* (pp. 255–266). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lord, C., Brinkerhoff, J. R., Carlton, P. W., Müller, K. E., & Quinn, D. (1993). *Civil affairs: Perspectives and prospects*. Washington, D.C. National Defense University.
- McClure, R. L., & Morton, O., II. (1999). Is the U.N. peacekeeping role in eclipse? *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, 47, 96–105.
- Mockaitis, T. R. (2004). *Civil-military cooperation in peace operations: The case of Kosovo*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.
- Müller, K. E. (1999). Toward a concept of strategic civil affairs. *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, 28, 80–98.
- Nadelmann, E. A. (1993). *The internationalization of U.S. criminal law enforcement*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Oakley, R. B., Dziedzic, M. J., & Goldberg, E. M. (Eds.). (1998). *Policing the new world disorder: Peace operations and public security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.
- Plunkett, M. (1994). The establishment of the rule of laws in post-conflict peacekeeping. In H. Smith (Ed.),

- International peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian experience* (pp. 65–78). Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy.
- Rostow, E. V. (1994). Is U.N. peacekeeping a growth industry?. *Joint Force Quarterly*, 4, 100–105.
- Sage, D. G. (2005). *Kosovo: The path to civil authority* (Strategy Research Project). Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.
- Schear, J. A., & Farris, K. (1997). Policing Cambodia: The public security dimensions of U.N. peace operations. In R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedzic, & E. M. Goldberg (Eds.), *Policing the new world disorder: Peace operations and public security* (pp. 69–102). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.
- Seybolt, T. B. (2007). *Humanitarian military intervention: The conditions for success and failure* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schmidl, E. A. (1997). Im Land der Skipetaren: Die internationale Friedensoperation in Albanien, 1913–1914. *Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift*, 35, 431–440.
- Schmidl, E. A. (1997). Police functions in peace operations: A historical overview. In R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedzic, & E. M. Goldberg (Eds.), *Policing the new world disorder: Peace operations and public security* (pp. 19–40). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.
- Thomas, L., & Spataro, S. (1994). Peacekeeping and policing in Somalia. In H. Smith (Ed.), *International peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian experience* (pp. 175–214). Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy.
- U.S. Department of State. United States Participation in International Police (CIVPOL) Missions. Washington, DC: Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2005. Fact Sheet. www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/47759.htm. Retrieved 26 April 2007.
- Woods, J. L. (1994). Mozambique: The CIVPOL operation. In H. Smith (Ed.), *International peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian experience* (pp. 143–174). Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy.
- Zayas, A. (2003). Anglo-American responsibility for the expulsion of the Germans. In S. B. Vardy & T. H. Tooley (Eds.), *Ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe* (pp. 239–255). New York: Columbia University Press.