INR 4335-A001: Coercion in International Politics

Instructor: Thomas M. Dolan
Class Meetings: MTWH 12:00 PM-1:40 PM, Classroom Building 1, Room 0103
Credit: 3 units
Office Hours: 2:00-3:00 Tuesdays and Thursdays at Philips 302 (or by appointment)
Instructor E-mail: Thomas.dolan@ucf.edu

Iran now seems like it is trying to secure nuclear weapons. The United States and a number of other countries would prefer they not do so. What can they do about it? Are they likely to succeed or fail? What will determine who succeeds? States, and the men and women who people them, want many things—among them money, land, oil, peace, freedom, and security. Sometimes getting them requires convincing others to give them up. The means by which they do so—by bargaining, by diplomacy, by threats of force or economic punishment—are the subject of theoretical, practical, empirical, and normative examination in this course.

Course Goals

1. Students will acquire a sound understanding of the means by which states pursue their interests using diplomacy, persuasion, and force.
2. Students will improve their ability to comprehend and communicate social scientific approaches to world events.

Please note that none of these goals involve the advancement of anyone's political or policy opinions (including those of the instructor). While I encourage political activity and the fulfillment of one's citizenship duties outside of the classroom, a political science course is not a proper forum for the airing of one's personal politics.

Course Design

This course involves a combination of class sessions involving both lecture and discussion, directed readings, papers, exams, and opportunities for informal discussion during office hours. Each part serves a purpose, be it information transmission and retention, promoting rigorous analysis, or encouraging the development of new ideas. Failing to engage with all parts will diminish the return on your efforts. For this reason, pre-class preparation is essential for this course. Students are expected to have read and considered the assigned material prior to the course, and be prepared to discuss it in class. Questions are placed beneath each reading to help focus your attention to what the instructor believes are the most important points. Please remember that that the material of the course is delivered in *both* texts and in-class discussion, which means that the texts contain valuable ideas and information which may not be specifically addressed in class, and discussions and lectures will go beyond the readings. You are responsible for understanding both, so please be sure to raise questions about things you are unsure about.

Assignments:

Class Preparation and Participation: *10%*

Your active participation in class is necessary if this class is to be a successful learning experience. This means you must come in having read the assignments and join in the class-room discussion of them, making evident that you have read and thought about them. While attendance is not graded as such, excessive truancy can affect this grade, since you are unable to participate when absent.

3 Page Paper: *15%,* Due 26 May

- Topics distributed first day of class.

Midterm: *20%,* 31 May
In-class; multiple choice and essay.

Course Paper: *25%,* Due 16 June
(7 Pages) Analyze a state's strategy in a dispute: what was the plan going in, how well was it pursued, and did it ultimately lead to goal achievement? Be sure to use theoretical concepts and findings from the course in classifying the strategy and in explaining its success and failure. Also, note the extent to which this example might help refine the theory.

Final Exam: *30%.* **Thursday 23 June**
In the classroom. Cumulative. Multiple choice and essay.

Assignments are to be turned in by class time on the day they are due. They should be in hardcopy unless unforeseen circumstances prevent printing them in or handing them in a timely manner. For every 24 hours that pass thereafter, 5% of credit is lost, to a maximum of 40% lost.
Exams are to be sat at the date and time specified, unless prior approval has been given or a doctor's excuse is submitted at the next attended class meeting. Exams should generally be taken within 1 week of the general administration of the exam.

Grades
Grades are assigned to both individual pieces of work and cumulatively. The grade scale I use for both is below (note that "g" refers to the numerical grade you receive). I do not usually curve grades, but reserve the right to do so if I deem it necessary. All material is graded on its own terms, rather than through comparison with other students' work. For the cumulative grades, I do not round: what you get is what you get.

100>g≥93: A	90>g≥88: B+	80>g≥78: C+	70>g≥68: D+	60>g: E
	88>g≥83: B	78>g≥73: C	68>g≥63: D	
93>g≥90: A-	83>g≥80: B	73>g≥70: C-	63>g≥60: D	

As reflected in the UCF creed, integrity and scholarship are core values that should guide our conduct and decisions as members of the UCF community. Plagiarism and cheating contradict these values, and so are very serious academic offenses. Penalties can include a failing grade in an assignment or in the course, or suspension or expulsion from the university. Students are expected to familiarize themselves with and follow the University's Rules of Conduct (see http://www.osc.sdes.ucf.edu/).

Plagiarism and Cheating of any kind on an examination, quiz, or assignment will result at least in an "F" for that assignment (and may, depending on the severity of the case, lead to an "F" for the entire course) and may be subject to appropriate referral to the Office of Student Conduct for further action. See the UCF Golden Rule for further information. I will assume for this course that you will adhere to the academic creed of this University and will maintain the highest standards of academic integrity. In other words, don't cheat by giving answers to others or taking them from anyone else. I will also adhere to the highest standards of academic integrity, so please do not ask me to change (or expect me to change) your grade illegitimately or to bend or break rules for one person that will not apply to everyone.

Changes to the Syllabus:

In the event that there is a need for there to be any changes to the syllabus, an e-mail will be sent to all students' knights-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar), and will be mentioned in class meetings. Changes become effective immediately after their mention in class, or the sending of the e-mail, whichever comes last.

Cancellation of Class: In the event that the instructor needs to cancel class, an e-mail will be sent to all students' knights-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar) prior to class time.

Readings

You should purchase Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence*, (Yale University Press, 1966). It is available in the bookstore and from a variety of online vendors. The remainder of the readings (or links to them) are available on-line at the webcourses@ucf website.

Course Schedule

Section A: Themes and Concepts

16 May
Power and Statesmanship
David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (1985) Princeton University Press, pp. 8-24

17 May
Strategy and Bargaining
Thomas Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict* (1960), Chapter 1, "The Retarded Science of International Strategy.'
Recommended:
Thomas Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, Chapters 2-3.
Luttwak, E. (2001) *Strategy: The Logic of Peace and War* (Revised and Enlarged edition). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Betts, R. (2000) "Is Strategy an Illusion? *International Security*.

18 May
Reputation, Positive Inducements, Persuasion, Negotiation, and Soft Power
Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*. Chapters XIV-XXI.
available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm
Miroslav Nincic, "Getting What you Want: Positive Sanctions in International Relations," *International Security*, 2010, 35:1.
Selection from Joseph Nye, *Soft Power, 2004.*
Recommended:
Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue: Communicative Argument in World Politics," *International Organization*, (2000) 54:1.
Mary Sarotte, "Perpetuating US Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to 'Bribe the Soviets Out" and Move NATO In," *International Security*, 2010, 35: 1.

19 May

Coercion : Definitions, Methods, and Problems

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 1966. pp. 1-125

Recommended:

James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, (1994) 88:3.

James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 1997. 41:1.

23 May

Alliances and Coercion

Victor Cha, "Powerplay Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia," *International Security*, 34:3, Winter 2009/2010

Recommended:

Paul Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *American Political Science Review*, (1988) 82:2.

Glen Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, 35:4, 1984.

24 May

Nuclear Weapons and Coercion

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, "The Diplomacy of Ultimate Survival," pp. 190-204; "The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm," pp. pp. 227 ('The Mischievous Influence of Haste)-234 ('Vulnerability and Deterrence')

Selection from Jacques Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Sumit Ganguly and Harrison Wagner, "India and Pakistan: Bargaining In the Shadow of Nuclear War," *Journal of Strategic Studies,* 27:3, (2004), pp. 479-507.

Recommended:

Nina Tannenwald, "Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization* 53 (Summer 1999), 433-68.

Kenneth Waltz, "More May Be Better," in K. Waltz and S. Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2002.

Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation," *International Security*, 2010, 35: 2.

John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security*. (1988) 13:2.

<u>Section B: Methods</u>

<u>Method 1: Diplomacy</u>

25 May

Diplomacy and Negotiation

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society.* 1978, "Diplomacy"

Joseph Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*. (2008) March.

Selection from Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes*.

Recommended:

Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice. Oxford University Press, 2010.

Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, "Diplomacy."

26 May—*3 Page Paper Due*
Coercive diplomacy
Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, *The US and Coercive Diplomacy*, "What Do We Know?" 2003
Alex Thompson, "Coercion Through IO's: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission," *International Organization*, (2006) 60:1.
Recommended:
Kenneth Shultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review*, (1998) 92:4.
Alex George, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. 1971.
Selection from Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II*, Vintage Books, 2006/2007.
Selection from Simon Serfaty, *Architects of Delusion*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008,

<u>Method 2: Economic Sanctions</u>

31 May: Quiz

1 June
Do Economic Sanctions Work?
Rose Gottemoeller, "The Evolution of Sanctions in Theory and Practice," *Survival*, (2007), 49:4.
David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft,* "What is Economic Statecraft?"
John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 78, No. 3 (May/June 1999), start p. 48.
Recommended:
Irfan Nooruddin, "Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy," *International Interactions*, 2002.
Daniel Drezner, "Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion," *International Studies Quarterly*, (1998) 42: 4.
Daniel Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *International Organization*, 2003.
Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90–136.
M. Alexander and J. Kieger, Limiting Arms, Enforcing Limits: International Inspections and the Challenges of Compellance in Germany Post-1919 and Iraq post-1991, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29:2

2 June
Making sanctions more effective
Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?" *World Politics*, (2002) 54:3.
Daniel Drezner, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive? *International Organization*, (2000) 54: 1.
Recommended:
Lisa Martin, *Coercive Cooperation*, Princeton University Press, 1992.
George Lopez and David COrtright, "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2004.

6 June
Legalized Coercion: the WTO
Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, "The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization" *The Journal of Legal Studies,* Vol. 31, No. S1,

Method 3: The Use of Force

Conventional War

7 June
What is War?
Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, The Idiom of Military Action,"
Carl von Clausewitz, *On War.* Book 1.
Geoffrey Blainey, (1973) *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press. "Dreams and Delusions"
Recommended:
Fearon, J. (1995) "Rationalist Expectations for War," *International Organization*. 49:3, pp. 379-414.
Selection from John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*. Vintage Books, 1993.
Johnston, D. (2004) *Overconfidence and War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

8 June
Fighting Conventional Wars
Reading from Mearsheimer, J. (1984) *Conventional Deterrence*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Part II, "Theory of Naval War," available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm
Recommended:
Stephen Biddle, *Military Power.* Princeton University Press, 2004.
Thin Red Line, Fox 2000 Pictures, 1998
Patton. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 1970.
Owen Cote, *The Third Battle: Innovation in the Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines*. Newport: Paper #16, US Naval War College Press, 2003.
Das Boot. Bavaria Film, 1982. Watch it in German with the subtitles, it's better than the English dubbing. The German idioms are, shall we say, 'colorful.'

9 June
Air War
Reading from Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare*, Princeton University Press, 2002.
Pape, R. (2004) "The True Worth of Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*. March, p. 116.
Ashley J. Tellis, "China's Military Space Strategy," *Survival*, Volume 49, Issue 3 September 2007, pages 41 – 72
Recommended:
Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 1996.
Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter, "When Does Aerial Bombing Work? Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917–1999," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 45, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 147–173
Alexander Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War," *International Security* (2006) 30:4

Unconventional Force

13 June
Guerilla War
Mao, *On Guerilla Warfare*.

14 June

Counter-Insurgency

Selection from Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*. Johns Hopkins UP, 1986.

Alexander Downes, "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Civil Wars*, (2007) 9:4

Recommended:

US Army Counter-insurgency handbook, chapter 2. http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf [note: this links to the whole manual, which is a large file (>13MB)]

Lawrence, T. E. (1920) "Evolution of a Revolt"

Lawrence, T.E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*

Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" *World Politics,* 1975.

Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Presido Press, 1982.

The Battle of Algiers, movie, 1965

John Mueller, "The Search for the 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam," *International Studies Quarterly,* (1980) 24: 4 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," *International Security*, 2001.

15 June

Terrorism

Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, 2003.*

Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ""The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security*, Summer 2006.

Recommended:

Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism," *International Security*, (2005) 30:3.

16 June—*7 Page Paper Due*

Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan

Stephen Biddle, Michael O'Hanlon, and Kenneth Pollack, "How to Leave a Stable Iraq," *Foreign Affairs,* September-October 2008.

Selection from Ahmed Hashim, *Adelphia Papers*.

Selection from eth Jones, *Graveyard of Empires*

20 June

Humanitarian Intervention

Barry Posen, "Military Responses to Humanitarian Disasters," *International Security*, 1996.*

Samantha Powers, "Why the US let the Rwanda Genocide Happen," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 2001.

Recommended:

Blackhawk Down, movie, 2002

Alexander De Waal. *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa.* Indiana University Press. 1997.

21 June

Covert Action

From Handbook of intelligence

Alexander Downes and Mary L Lilley, "Overt Peace, Covert War?" *Security Studies*, 2010, 19:2, 266-306.

Receommended:

Christopher Andrews and Valeri Mitrohkin, *Sword and the Shield*.

Christopher Andrews, *For the President's Eyes Only*.

Section3: Normative Issues

22 June

Just War Theory and the Ethics of Coercion

Selection from Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books

"Coercion" and "Consequentialism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/

23 June

Final Exam: Normal place, Normal time.