INR 4335-0001: Coercion in International Politics

Instructor: Thomas M. Dolan
Class Meetings: Tuesday-Thursday, 10:30-11:45 AM, CL1 0308
Credit: 3 units
Office Hours: 12:00-2:00 Tuesdays and Thursdays at Howard Philips 302 (or by appointment)
Instructor E-mail: Thomas.dolan@ucf.edu

Iran now seems like it is trying to secure nuclear weapons. The United States and a number of other countries would prefer they not do so. What can they do about it? Are they likely to succeed or fail? What will determine who succeeds? States, and the men and women who people them, want many things—among them money, land, oil, peace, freedom, and security. Sometimes getting them requires convincing others to give them up. The means by which they do so—by bargaining, by diplomacy, by threats of force or economic punishment—are the subject of theoretical, practical, empirical, and normative examination in this course.

Course Goals

1. Students will acquire a sound understanding of the means by which states pursue their interests using diplomacy, persuasion, and force.
2. Students will improve their ability to comprehend and communicate social scientific approaches to world events.

Please note that none of these goals involve the advancement of anyone's political or policy opinions (including those of the instructor). While I encourage political activity and the fulfillment of one's citizenship duties outside of the classroom, a political science course is not a proper forum for the airing of one's personal politics.

Course Design

This course involves a combination of class sessions involving both lecture and discussion, directed readings, papers, exams, and opportunities for informal discussion during office hours. Each part serves a purpose, be it information transmission and retention, promoting rigorous analysis, or encouraging the development of new ideas. Failing to engage with all parts will diminish the return on your efforts. For this reason, pre-class preparation is essential for this course. Students are expected to have read and considered the assigned material prior to the course, and be prepared to discuss it in class. Please remember that that the material of the course is delivered in *both* texts and in-class discussion, which means that the texts contain valuable ideas and information which may not be specifically addressed in class, and discussions and lectures will go beyond the readings. You are responsible for understanding both, so please be sure to raise questions about things you are unsure about.

Assignments:

Class Preparation and Participation: *10%*

Your active participation in class is necessary if this class is to be a successful learning experience. This means you must come in having read the assignments and join in the class-room discussion of them, making evident that you have read and thought about them. While attendance is not graded as such, excessive truancy can affect this grade, since you are unable to participate when absent.

1 Page Papers: *15%,* Due 6 September, 18 September, 27 September, 9 October, 30 October, 27 November. Lowest grade dropped.

Midterm: *20%,* 11 October
In-class; multiple choice and essay.

Course Paper: *25%,* Due 15 November
(10-11 Pages) Analyze a state's strategy in a dispute: what was the plan going in, how well was it pursued, and did it ultimately lead to goal achievement? Be sure to use theoretical concepts and findings from the course in classifying the strategy and in explaining its success and failure. Also, note the extent to which this example might help refine the theory.

Final Exam: *30%.* **Tuesday, 11 December**
In the classroom. Cumulative. Multiple choice and essay.

Assignments are to be turned in by class time on the day they are due. They should be in hardcopy unless unforeseen circumstances prevent printing them in or handing them in a timely manner. For every 24 hours that pass thereafter, 5% of credit is lost, to a maximum of 40% lost.
Exams are to be sat at the date and time specified, unless prior approval has been given or a doctor's excuse is submitted at the next attended class meeting. Exams should generally be taken within 1 week of the general administration of the exam.

Grades
Grades are assigned to both individual pieces of work and cumulatively. The grade scale I use for both is below (note that "g" refers to the numerical grade you receive). I do not usually curve grades, but reserve the right to do so if I deem it necessary. All material is graded on its own terms, rather than through comparison with other students' work. For the cumulative grades, I do not round: what you get is what you get.

100>g≥93: A	90>g≥88: B+	80>g≥78: C+	70>g≥68: D+	60>g: E
	88>g≥83: B	78>g≥73: C	68>g≥63: D	
93>g≥90: A-	83>g≥80: B	73>g≥70: C-	63>g≥60: D	

As reflected in the UCF creed, integrity and scholarship are core values that should guide our conduct and decisions as members of the UCF community. Plagiarism and cheating contradict these values, and so are very serious academic offenses. Penalties can include a failing grade in an assignment or in the course, or suspension or expulsion from the university. Students are expected to familiarize themselves with and follow the University's Rules of Conduct (see http://www.osc.sdes.ucf.edu/).

Plagiarism and Cheating of any kind on an examination, quiz, or assignment will result at least in an "F" for that assignment (and may, depending on the severity of the case, lead to an "F" for the entire course) and may be subject to appropriate referral to the Office of Student Conduct for further action. See the UCF Golden Rule for further information. I will assume for this course that you will adhere to the academic creed of this University and will maintain the highest standards of academic integrity. In other words, don't cheat by giving answers to others or taking them from anyone else. I will also adhere to the highest standards of academic integrity, so please do not ask me to change (or expect me to change) your grade illegitimately or to bend or break rules for one person that will not apply to everyone.

Disabilities Accommodations
The University of Central Florida is committed to providing reasonable accommodations for all persons with disabilities. This syllabus is available in alternate formats upon request. Students with disabilities who need accommodations in this course must contact the professor at the beginning of the semester to discuss needed accommodations. No accommodations will be provided until the student has met with the professor to request accommodations. Students who need accommodations must be registered with Student Disability Services, Ferrell Commons Room 132, phone (407) 823-2371, TTY/TDD only phone (407) 823-2116, before requesting accommodations from the professor.

Changes to the Syllabus:
In the event that there is a need for there to be any changes to the syllabus, an e-mail will be sent to all students' knights-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar), and will be mentioned in class meetings. Changes become effective immediately after their mention in class, or the sending of the e-mail, whichever comes last.

Cancellation of Class: In the event that the instructor needs to cancel class, an e-mail will be sent to all students' knights-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar) prior to class time.

Readings
You should purchase Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence*, (Yale University Press, 1966). It is available in the bookstore and from a variety of online vendors. The remainder of the readings (or links to them) are available on-line at the webcourses@ucf website.

Course Schedule:

Section A: Themes and Concepts

21 August
Power and Statesmanship
David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (1985) Princeton University Press, pp. 8-24

23 August
Ancient Approaches
Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*. Chapters XIV-XXI. *http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm*
Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17405/17405-h/17405-h.htm

28 August
Strategy and Bargaining
Thomas Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, Chapters 2-3.
Recommended:
Luttwak, E. (2001) *Strategy: The Logic of Peace and War* (Revised and Enlarged edition). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Betts, R. (2000) "Is Strategy an Illusion? *International Security*.

30 August
Positive Inducements, Persuasion, and Soft Power
Miroslav Nincic, "Getting What you Want: Positive Sanctions in International Relations," *International Security*, 2010, 35:1.
Selection from Joseph Nye, *Soft Power, 2004.*
Recommended:
Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue: Communicative Argument in World Politics," *International Organization*, (2000) 54:1.
Mary Sarotte, "Perpetuating US Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to 'Bribe the Soviets Out" and Move NATO In," *International Security*, 2010, 35: 1.

4 **and 6** September 1 PAGE PAPER DUE
Coercion : Definitions, Methods, and Problems
Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 1966. pp. 1-125
Recommended:
James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, (1994) 88:3.
James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 1997. 41:1.

6 September
(see 4 September assignments)

11 September
Alliances and Coercion
Victor Cha, "Powerplay Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia," *International Security*, 34:3, Winter 2009/2010
Recommended:
Paul Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *American Political Science Review*, (1988) 82:2.
Glen Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, 35:4, 1984.

13 September
Nuclear Weapons and Coercion
Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, "The Diplomacy of Ultimate Survival," pp. 190-204; "The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm," pp. 227 ('The Mischievous Influence of Haste)-234 ('Vulnerability and Deterrence')
Recommended:
Selection from Jacques Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Sumit Ganguly and Harrison Wagner, "India and Pakistan: Bargaining In the Shadow of Nuclear War," *Journal of Strategic Studies,* 27:3, (2004), pp. 479-507.
Nina Tannenwald, "Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization* 53 (Summer 1999), 433-68.
Kenneth Waltz, "More May Be Better," in K. Waltz and S. Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2002.
Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation," *International Security*, 2010, 35: 2.
John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security*. (1988) 13:2.

Section B: Methods

Method 1: Diplomacy

18 September 1 PAGE PAPER DUE

Diplomacy

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society.* 1978, "Diplomacy"

Joseph Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*. (2008) March.

Recommended:

Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice. Oxford University Press, 2010.

Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, "Diplomacy."

20 September

Negotiation

Selection from Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes*.

25 September

Coercive diplomacy

Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, *The US and Coercive Diplomacy*, "What Do We Know?" 2003

Alex Thompson, "Coercion Through IO's: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission," *International Organization*, (2006) 60:1.

Recommended:

Kenneth Shultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review*, (1998) 92:4.

Alex George, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. 1971.

Selection from Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II*, Vintage Books, 2006/2007.

Selection from Simon Serfaty, *Architects of Delusion*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008,

Method 2: Economic Sanctions

27 September 1 PAGE PAPER DUE

Economic Sanctions

David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft,* "What is Economic Statecraft?"

John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 78, No. 3 (May/June 1999), start p. 48.

2 October

Do Economic Sanctions Work?

Daniel Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *International Organization*, 2003.

Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90–111.

Recommended:

M. Alexander and J. Kieger, Limiting Arms, Enforcing Limits: International Inspections and the Challenges of Compellance in Germany Post-1919 and Iraq post-1991, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29:2

Irfan Nooruddin, "Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy," *International Interactions*, 2002.

Daniel Drezner, "Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion," *International Studies Quarterly*, (1998) 42: 4.

4 October
Making sanctions more effective
Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?" *World Politics*, (2002) 54:3.
Daniel Drezner, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive? *International Organization*, (2000) 54: 1.
Recommended:
Lisa Martin, *Coercive Cooperation*, Princeton University Press, 1992.
George Lopez and David COrtright, "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2004.

9 October 1 PAGE PAPER DUE
Regulated Economic Coercion: the WTO
Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, "The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization" *The Journal of Legal Studies,* Vol. 31, No. S1,

11 October: **EXAM**

Method 3: The Use of Force

16 October
What is War?
Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, The Idiom of Military Action,"
Carl von Clausewitz, *On War.* Book 1.
Geoffrey Blainey, (1973) *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press. "Dreams and Delusions"
Recommended:
Fearon, J. (1995) "Rationalist Expectations for War," *International Organization*. 49:3, pp. 379-414.
Selection from John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*. Vintage Books, 1993.
Johnston, D. (2004) *Overconfidence and War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

18 October
Ground War
Selection from Mearsheimer, J. (1984) *Conventional Deterrence*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Recommended:
Stephen Biddle, *Military Power.* Princeton University Press, 2004.
Thin Red Line, Fox 2000 Pictures, 1998
Patton. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 1970.

23 October
War At Sea
Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Part II, "Theory of Naval War," available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm
Recommended:
Owen Cote, *The Third Battle: Innovation in the Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines*. Newport: Paper #16, US Naval War College Press, 2003.
Das Boot. Bavaria Film, 1982. Watch it in German with the subtitles, it's better than the English dubbing. The German idioms are, shall we say, 'colorful.'

25 October
War in the Air
Reading from Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare*, Princeton University Press, 2002.
Pape, R. (2004) "The True Worth of Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*. March, p. 116.
Recommended:
Ashley J. Tellis, "China's Military Space Strategy," *Survival*, Volume 49, Issue 3 September 2007, pages 41 – 72
Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 1996.
Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter, "When Does Aerial Bombing Work? Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917–1999," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 45, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 147–173
Alexander Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War," *International Security* (2006) 30:4
Twelve O'clock High. Twentieth Century Fox, 1949.

Unconventional Force

30 October 1 PAGE PAPER DUE
Guerilla War
Mao, *On Guerilla Warfare*.

1 November
Counter-Insurgency
Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars." International Organization, 63:1 (Winter 2009), 67-106.
Alexander Downes, "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Civil Wars*, (2007) 9:4
Recommended:
"Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53:3 (June 2009), 331-362
US Army Counter-insurgency handbook, chapter 2. *http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf* [note: this links to the whole manual, which is a large file (>13MB)]
Lawrence, T. E. (1920) "Evolution of a Revolt"
Lawrence, T.E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*
Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" *World Politics,* 1975.
Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Presido Press, 1982.
The Battle of Algiers, movie, 1965
John Mueller, "The Search for the 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam," *International Studies Quarterly,* (1980) 24: 4 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," *International Security*, 2001.
Selection from Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*. Johns Hopkins UP, 1986.

6 November
Violence in Civil Wars
Selection from Stathis Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*, Cambridge, 2004
Recommended
Jeremy Weinstein and M Humphreys, "Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War" *American Political Science Review* (August 2006).

8 November
Terrorism
Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, 2003.*
Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ""The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security*, Summer 2006.

13 November
Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq
Stephen Biddle, Michael O'Hanlon, and Kenneth Pollack, "How to Leave a Stable Iraq," *Foreign Affairs,* September-October 2008.
Selection from Ahmed Hashim, *Adelphia Papers*.

15 November 10 PAGE PAPER DUE
Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan
Selection from Seth Jones, *Graveyard of Empires*
TBA

20 November
Humanitarian Intervention
Barry Posen, "Military Responses to Humanitarian Disasters," *International Security*, 1996.*
Samantha Powers, "Why the US let the Rwanda Genocide Happen," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 2001.
Recommended:
Blackhawk Down, movie, 2002
Alexander De Waal. *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa.* Indiana University Press. 1997.

22 November: Thanksgiving

27 November 1 PAGE PAPER DUE
Covert Action
William J. Daugherty, "Covert Action: Strengths and Weaknesses," in Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, Chapter 37.
Alexander Downes and Mary L Lilley, "Overt Peace, Covert War?" *Security Studies*, 2010, 19:2, 266-306.
Receommended:
Christopher Andrews and Valeri Mitrohkin, *Sword and the Shield*.
Christopher Andrews, *For the President's Eyes Only*.

29 November
Just War Theory and the Ethics of Coercion
Selection from Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books
"Coercion" and "Consequentialism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/

Final Exam: Tuesday, 11 December, 10 AM