

approach as Fettweis used in comparing his “visions” on a theoretical level, rather than empirically. In both cases, the reader is left wondering why this exercise seems so important. The discipline’s paradigms and theoretical traditions contain enough scholarship to allow a reconstruction that fits nearly any presentist need. Cosmopolitan power is therefore deemed consistent with the realist tradition, just as the obsolescence-of-major-war argument is made consistent with constructivism.

Gallarotti does move beyond this exercise to provide several chapters of empirical illustrations. Chapter 4 examines Great Britain’s role in promoting free trade and the classical gold standard in the nineteenth century, as well as the role of the United States in promoting dollarization in the twentieth century. These are meant to be cases of “soft empowerment,” whereby the endearing example set by Great Britain and the United States serve as models to be emulated by other states. This chapter seems to gloss over important differences between interest and legitimacy as motivating factors, as Alexander Wendt (1999), drawing upon Hedley Bull, notes in his *Social Theory of International Politics*. States internalize norms and adjust their behavior at varying levels: At the most shallow level, they do so for fear of coercion as in a Hobbesian (realist) world; at an intermediate level, they do so out of their own interest as in a Lockean (liberal) world; and finally, at the most profound level, they do so because the norms are seen as legitimate as in a Kantian (constructivist) world. Most of the discussion about soft empowerment in Chapter 4 is actually interest based, rather than legitimacy based, as the terms “endearment” leading “emulation” used by Gallarotti would seem to suggest. Fettweis similarly conflates the distinction between interest- and legitimacy-based internalization in his analysis.

The Chapter 5 case study of hard disempowerment predictably focuses on the George W. Bush era, when the naked use of force and abandonment of soft-power strategies ultimately produced counterproductive results for the United States. Chapter 6 returns to the contemporary US foreign policy environment and makes the case for soft empowerment. Paired together, these two chapters would be excellent for courses on US foreign policy and grand strategy, much like those in the Fettweis book. Gallarotti’s conclusion ultimately makes an abbreviated case for a new paradigm of cosmopolitan politics, or “Cosmopolitik.” Cosmopolitan power is by design a combination of power sources described in the existing paradigms, and so it is not entirely clear how Cosmopolitik will differentiate itself, given the limited description. This book’s theoretical aims on building a theory of power were not quite achieved as promised, and so the establishment of a new paradigm only adds unnecessary hubris.

These two books illustrate some of the best and least desirable qualities in contemporary scholarship. The best qualities include the attempts to provide strong theoretic

foundations for the conceptual arguments made by each author, as well as the empirical applications and recommendations for grand strategy and foreign policy. The least desirable quality is the continued devotion to the “isms”—a point reiterated by David Lake in his recent International Studies Association presidential address. The obsolescence-of-major-war and cosmopolitan power concepts do not need a reconstructed foundation in a grand theoretical tradition when they can stand on their own with middle-range theoretical constructs. Despite similar detours through the “isms,” both books offer interesting explications and applications of tried-and-true concepts in international relations.

The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking of War from Antiquity to the Present. By Beatrice Heuser. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2010. 594p. \$99.00 cloth, \$37.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592712002514

— Michael Mousseau, *Koç University*

Mainstream realist and liberal approaches to the study of war generally start with the assumption that war is rational, and to make these models work in theory, add the supplementary assumption that all states have identical, albeit competing, foreign policy goals. Since goals are treated as a constant, there is little room for political strategy per se, yielding a clear-cut division of labor: Politicians start wars; generals fight them.

The Evolution of Strategy paints a very different picture of the linkage between political aims and military strategy (henceforth Strategy). With overviews of notable arguments and expert opinions on Strategy, most of which are from 1500 C.E. onward in Europe, Beatrice Heuser demonstrates that military strategy cannot be divorced from political goals, and that both goals and military strategy are closely linked with contemporary economic, social, and cultural affairs. In this way, the division of labor in war starting and war fighting is not intrinsic, but rather a cultural phenomenon associated with the emergence of the modern state, the bureaucratization of war, and the rise of militarism in late-nineteenth-century Europe.

The author begins by noting that before 1500 C.E. in Europe, there was little thinking on Strategy, in part because most wars were fought for glory or hereditary succession; thus, external political aims were lacking, and victory was often left in the hands of God. War was identified as abnormal in premodern Roman and later Catholic just-war theory, and therefore just-war theory should have engendered considerations of Strategy on how to avoid it, but there is little documented evidence of any such thinking.

Instead, we see the emergence of Strategy—thinking about war as the rational pursuit of political goals—as a modern phenomenon, developing in Europe during

its cultural transformation toward Max Weber's famous rationalization, beginning in the sixteenth century. Machiavelli offered the original articulation of the realist balance of power, but by treating war as normal and political goals as constant, this view leaves little room for political strategy per se. It was Karl von Clausewitz who is often credited today with the notion of war as the pursuit of political goals, but the nexus between war aims and war conduct was actually commonplace by the time Clausewitz put it to paper in the early nineteenth century (pp. 10–13).

The major influence on Strategy in late modern Europe was the Napoleonic Wars, which popularized the quest for victory and the decisive battle. While the quest for victory as a concept is often attributed to Clausewitz's analysis of Napoleon's success, in fact Clausewitz was very careful to match military strategy with political goals, which can often mean substituting negotiation for victory. Similarly, the popularity of Napoleon's notion of decisive battle, while famously analyzed by Clausewitz, is best explained by the cult of the offensive that also emerged as a result of the Napoleonic Wars.

Also emerging from those wars was the Strategy of total war aimed at harnessing an entire nation's strength, an idea that originates with Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Guibert. While realists and others who assume war to be a normal outcome of interstate relations might also consider total war as normal, Heuser links the rise of total war with the increasing popularity of nationalist and social Darwinist ideologies in late modern Europe. It was these worldviews that, in conjunction with the naval blockades and the development of air power in World War I, led directly to the targeting of civilians and the atrocities and genocide of World War II. Technology is not the prime mover in Strategy: The Occidentals forgot how to build Roman fortresses, and the Europeans had few qualms about killing non-Europeans. Rather, it is culture and ideology that drive technology and Strategy, and thus the Thirty Years War was about as proportionally deadly for civilians as was World War II.

The world wars of the twentieth century put an end to the Napoleon paradigm and the quest for victory, largely as a result of war weariness, the waning of Western nationalism and militarism, the advent of asymmetric wars, and the advance of humanitarianism. After World War I the French adopted a defensive strategy, and with the Cold War the United States dropped the quest for victory and instead adopted strategies of defense and deterrence, an outcome only partly explained by the development of nuclear weaponry. Counterinsurgency is a contest over hearts and minds, thus making persuasion, rather than coercion, the heart of Western success in asymmetric wars. At the same time, war lost its legitimacy in the West, where it is accepted now only for humanitarian ends or as an option of last resort.

Despite the title, *The Evolution of Strategy* is about Strategy in the West; there is little in it about Strategic reflections elsewhere. This could be a result of only modest thinking on Strategy in other parts of the world, however, which would be consistent with the implicit linkage of Strategy with modernization. More problematic is the turn taken in the final chapters of the book, which sometimes fade into opinion. The author argues that the asymmetric wars of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras were motivated in the West primarily by imperial ends, with racist overtones: a view that lacks adequate support and which contradicts the theme of the new humanitarian culture in the West. This contradiction seems to be solved in part with the added claim that America is not a part of the Western humanitarian and antiwar "postmodern" culture, but this too lacks adequate documentation or explanation, and substantial research that indicates otherwise is not addressed. Nor is there any discussion in this regard of America's hegemonic position and the possibility of European free riding in the maintenance of global peace and justice, a surprising omission in a book on Strategy. It is also unfortunate that, at times, specific unconventional claims are made without support, the most curious one being that the US Cold War defensive Strategy of containment was really the offensive Strategy of rollback (pp. 372, 445). Containment is conventionally understood as the US Strategy throughout the Cold War, at least in Eurasia where it mattered most in averting another total war, yet the author frustratingly makes the contrary assertion without explanation, an assertion that also seems to contradict her other claim that the US adopted Strategies of defense and deterrence during the Cold War.

Nevertheless, the heart of this book is its coverage of thinking on Strategy in early- and late-modern Europe, and in this regard there is a lot of value to be found, including coverage of controversies in naval (maritime), air, and nuclear Strategy, in asymmetric wars, and in various linkages among them and with these and contemporary cultural and political conditions. For instance, in France republicans and socialists tended to favor a citizen army and conscription, as opposed to conservatives who feared an armed population; similarly, the former tended to be "materialists" (who believed that modern technology was changing the way wars were fought), whereas the latter tended to be "historicists" (who believed in eternal principles of warfare). The dominance of the latter in the military elite doomed France in both world wars. In contrast, the British, relatively secure across the Channel, did not have to deal with these issues and could muddle through with mostly maritime Strategy, with interservice rivalries playing a greater role. *The Evolution of Strategy* is a worthwhile read for its extensive coverage of thinking on Strategy in early- and late-modern Europe, and for the convincing picture painted of the nexus between the causes of war with how they are fought.