INR 7337.0001 International Security

Instructor: Thomas M. Dolan, thomas.dolan@ucf.edu
Class Meetings: Wednesday 2:00-4:50 PM
Office Hours: MF 12:30-2:30 and by appointment
Credit: 3 Hours

This course is designed to introduce PhD students to the contemporary literature on international security. It focuses on the use of force by and against state by international actors. Although most of the literature addressed is contemporary social science, some older pieces of a more philosophical or historical character are also included. Alongside the core substance of the course, students will develop their skills in reviewing literature, crafting their own theoretical arguments, and doing research.

Goals:

- Students will become familiar with contemporary social science research on deterrence and diplomacy, war, strategy, military power, alliances, and related topics.
- Students will improve their ability to think theoretically and do theory driven research.
- Students will improve their ability to express theoretical arguments and empirical research findings.
- Students will improve their ability to use social science theory to better understand contemporary events.

Assignments
Each student will complete the following assignments:

2 Literature Reviews-10% each
Due 22 January and 19 February
(See details p. 8)
No More than 5 pages. Must refer to at least 15 peer reviewed sources.

2 Theoretical Arguments—10% each
Due 5 February and 28 February
(See details p. 8-9)
No more than 5 pages, unless there's a formal model with completed proof involved.

1 Research Paper--30%
Due 23 April
Rough Draft Due to readers by 12 April
Each student will produce a research study involving a brief literature review, clear theoretical statement, hypotheses, and a hypothesis test. Any appropriate methods (case study, interpretive methods, data analysis, experiment), properly applied, are acceptable. Paper should be no longer than 9,000 words, including bibliography. Students should identify a "target journal" and adopt the style used by the journal.

- An informal but sufficiently detailed research plan should be presented to (orally or in writing) and approved by the instructor no later than the end of March

Research Paper Presentation—5 %
23 April
Students will have 10 minutes (followed by 5 minutes of questions) to present their theory and findings.

2 Rough Draft Reviews—5% each
Due 16 April
Each student will review two other students' term paper rough drafts. Reviews should (1) summarize the argument of the paper and (2) identify weaknesses in the paper and make constructive suggestions for improvement.

Application Assignment—5%
Each week each student will apply the core argument or finding from a required reading to better explain an event or problem from contemporary international politics. Each student should prepare one paragraph (not more than ½ page double-spaced) stating how the argument explains something about the event that might not have been clear otherwise. The assignment will be graded as satisfactory (3 points)/partially satisfactory (2.5 points)/unsatisfactory (2 points)/not turned in (0 points). At the end of the semester, points will be totaled and divided by 36. Satisfactory papers will correctly articulate the theoretical argument, offer a clear insight into a contemporary event or problem, and be well written.

Participation—10%
Participation in seminar should be regular and demonstrate clear preparation.
*Points may be also deducted from this grade if the research paper rough draft submitted for review by a colleague is incomplete.

Grades
Grades in my Ph.D. course can be interpreted in the following way:

A 93 or better	High-quality professional work; ready to do work that could be published in the best journals
A- 90-92.99	Professional work; ready to do work that could be published in journals, but further development is necessary before the author is ready to publish in the best journals
B+ 88-89.99	Near professional quality work; further development needed before ready to produce journal publishable work
B 83-86.99	Quality is acceptable; considerable development is needed before the author will be ready to produce journal publishable work
B- 80-82.99	Quality is marginally acceptable
C 70-79.99	Quality is problematic
D 60-69.99	Quality is not acceptable for graduate work
F 59.99 or below	Fail

Miscellaneous Policies

Late Papers
Assignments are to be turned in by the day/time they are due. They should be in hardcopy unless leave to submit electronically is given by the instructor. For every 24 hours that pass thereafter, 5% of credit is lost, to a maximum of 40% lost. This policy does not apply to rough draft reviews, which **must** be turned in by the time they are due.

Academic Integrity
As reflected in the UCF creed, integrity and scholarship are core values that should guide our conduct and decisions as members of the UCF community. Plagiarism and cheating contradict these values, and so are very serious academic offenses. Penalties can include a failing grade in an assignment or in the course, or suspension or expulsion from the university. Students are expected to familiarize themselves with and follow the University's Rules of Conduct (see http://www.osc.sdes.ucf.edu/).

Plagiarism and Cheating of any kind on an examination, quiz, or assignment will result at least in an "F" for that assignment (and may, depending on the severity of the case, lead to an "F" for the entire course) and may be subject to appropriate referral to the Office of Student Conduct for further action. See the UCF Golden Rule for further information. I will assume for this course that you will adhere to the academic creed of this University and will maintain the highest standards of academic integrity. In other words, don't cheat by giving answers to others or taking them from anyone else. I will also adhere to the highest standards of academic integrity, so please do not ask me to change (or expect me to change) your grade illegitimately or to bend or break rules for one person that will not apply to everyone.

Accessibility
If anyone believes the design of this course poses barriers to effectively participating and/or demonstrating learning in this course, please meet with me (with or without a Student Disability Services (SDS) accommodation letter) to discuss reasonable options or adjustments. During our discussion, I may suggest the possibility/necessity of your contacting SDS (Ferrell Commons 185; 407-823-2371; sds@ucf.edu) to talk about academic accommodations. You are welcome to talk to me at any point in the semester about course design concerns, but it is always best if we can talk at least one week prior to the need for any modifications.

Changes to the Syllabus
In the event that there is a need for there to be any changes to the syllabus, an e-mail will be sent to all students' knights-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar), and will be mentioned in class meetings. Changes become effective immediately after their mention in class, or the sending of the e-mail.

Cancellation of Class
In the event that the instructor needs to cancel class, an e-mail will be sent to all students' knights-mail accounts (as maintained by the registrar) prior to class time.

Readings
Each student should obtain the following books:
Goemans, H. *War and Punishment*, Princeton,
Biddle, S. *Military Power*. Princeton.

Students are responsible for locating materials available online through the library on their own.
The remaining non-journal readings are available through class webcourses site.

Course Schedule

8 January: Introduction

Part 1: War

15 January: The Nature of the Use of Force in International Relations
Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, selection
Carl von Clausewitz, *On* War, Book 1, Chapters 1 and 2; 8:4-8
John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, selection
Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, selection
Recommended:
Jack Snyder, "Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War," *International Organization* 56:1, pp. 7-45.
Thomas Schelling, *On Conflict*
R. Harrison Wagner, *War and The State*
Alexander Downes and Mary L Lilley, "Overt Peace, Covert War?" *Security Studies*, 2010, 19:2, 266-306.

22 January: Strategy in War

Richard Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion? *International Security*. 2000.
Sun Tsu, *The Art of War*
John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Selection.
Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 1996. Selection.
Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Part II, "Theory of Naval War," available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm

Recommended:

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*
Luttwak, E. (2001) *Strategy: The Logic of Peace and War* (Revised and Enlarged edition). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 2013.
Liddell Hart, B. (1954) *Strategy*. New York: Praeger.
Jomini, A. H. *The Art of War*. W.P. Mendhall, trans.
D. Reiter and M. Horowitz, "When Does Aerial Bombing Work? Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45:2 (2001)
D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam III, The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985, *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 90, No. 2 (Jun., 1996)
Owen Cote, *The Third Battle: Innovation in the Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines*. Newport: Paper #16, US Naval War College Press, 2003.
Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, 1943
Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare*, Princeton University Press, 2002.

29 January: War Initiation

Fearon, J. (1995) "Rationalist Expectations for War," *International Organization*. 49:3, pp. 379-414.
Johnston, D. (2004) *Overconfidence and War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Selection.
Branislav Slantchev and Ahmer Tarar, "Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation for War," *American Journal of Political Science*, 2010.
Alastair Smith and Allan Stam, "Bargaining and the Nature of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2004.

Recommended:

Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press.
Peter Lieberman, "Punitiveness and US Elite Support for the 1991 Gulf War" *Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, #1* (February 2007), pp. 3-32.
Robert Powell, "War as A Commitment Problem," *International Organization*, 2006.
Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders, Is War Still *Ex Post* Inefficieent?" *American Political Science Review*, 2004.

5 February: Military Power

Biddle, S. *Military Power*. Princeton, 2004.
Kenneth Pollack, *Arabs at War*, selection

Recommended:

David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists," *American Political Science Review*, 1992
Alexander Downes, "How Smart and Tough are Democracies? *International Security*, Spring 2009
Dani Reiter and Allan Stam, "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1998

12 February: Constraints on the Practice of War

Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," *International Organization*, 1995.
Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Non-Use," *International Organization*, 53:3, 1999
James D. Morrow, "When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review*, 101: 3 (Aug., 2007)
Alexander Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War," *International Security*, 2006.
Thomas M. Dolan," Unthinkable and Tragic: The Psychology of Weapons Taboos in War," *International Organization*, Fall 2013

Recommended:

Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization*.
Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*
Hugo de Groot (aka Grotius), *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*
Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 1977.

19 February: War as a Process

Hein Goemans, *War and Punishment*, Princeton University Press, 2000
David Welch. *Painful Choices*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2005, Selection

Recommended:

Scott Gartner, S. (1997) *Strategic Assessment in War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Selection.
Stephen P. Rosen, (1991) *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military,* selection
Jonathan D. Caverley, The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam," *International* Security, 34, 3 (Winter, 2009/2010)
Elizabeth Stanley, "Ending the Korean War: The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace, *International Security*, 34:1 (Summer, 2009)
Ikle, F. (1971) *Every War Must End.*
Kecskmeti, P. (1958) *Strategic Surrender*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Slantchev, B. (2003). "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 621-632.
Patricia Sullivan, "War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2007.

26 February: When Does War Happen?

Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, selection.
Randy Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances*, Selection.
Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in International Politics*, 1981, selection.
Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse, "Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict," *International Organization* 2000.
Amy Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands," *Security Studies*, 2006.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "An Institutional Explanation for the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review*, 1999

Recommended

A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, University of Chicago, 1980.
Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy," *International Security*, 2010.
Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*
Dale Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War," *International Security*, 1996
Matthew Jackson and Massimo Morelli, "Strategic Militarization, Deterrence, and Wars," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2009.
Matthew Jackson and Massimo Morelli, "Political Bias and War," *American Economic Review*, 2007.
William Wohlforth, "Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, 2001

5 March: Spring Break

12 March: Deterrence and Diplomacy
James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests," *JCR*, 41:1.
Kenneth Shultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review* 92 (Dec. 1998), pp. 829-44.
Anne Sartori, "The Might of the Pen," *International Organization*, 2002.
Daryl Press, "The Credibility of Power," *International Security*, 2005.
Daniel Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *International Organization*, 2003.
Recommended
Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence,* 1966
Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 1974
Alexander Thompson, "Coercion Through IO's: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission," *International Organization*, 2006.
J. Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics,* Cornell, 1996.
Bratislav Slantchev, "Feigning Weakness," *International Organization*, 2010.
Alex Downes and Todd Sechser. 2012. "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *International Organization*. 66:3, 457-89.

19 March: Alliances
Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, 1984
Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression?" *American Journal of Political Science*. 47:3, 427-39
Brett V. Benson, 2011, Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their Relationship with Conflict, 1816–2000, *Journal of Politics* 73:4 1111-1127.
Leeds, B. A. and Savun, B. (2007), Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements? *Journal of Politics*, 69: 1118–1132.
Recommended:
Edward Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*, 1955
Leeds, Brett Ashley, Mattes, Michaela, Vogel, Jeremy S., 2009. "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments," American Journal of Political Science, 53:2, 461-476
Gregory D. Miller. 2012. The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances Before the First World War. Cornell University Press.
Long, Andrew and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2006. "Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements," Journal of Peace Research. 43:4, 433-451.

26 March: Unequal Alliances
Paul Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *American Political Science Review*, 1988.
Victor D. Cha. 2010. Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia, *International Security*, 34:3, 158-196
Srdjan Vucetic, 2011, *The Anglosphere*, Stanford University Press, selection.
David Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature," *International Security*, 2007.
Recommended:
Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 1981.

2 April: Nuclear Weapons

Jacque Hymans, *Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, selection.

Kenneth Waltz, "More May Be Better," in K. Waltz and S. Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2002.

Matthew Kroenig, "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve," *International Organization*, 2013

Todd Sechser and Matt Furhman, "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail," *International Organization*, 2013.

Kier Lieber and Daryl Press, "Why Terrorists Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists," *International Security*, 2013

Recommended:

Matthew Kroenig, "Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53: 2, April 2009: 161-180.

Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*

Sumit Ganguly and Harrison Wagner, "India and Pakistan: Bargaining In the Shadow of Nuclear War," *Journal of Strategic Studies,* 27:3, (2004), pp. 479-507.

Michael Horowitz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53:2 (April 2009), pp. 234-257.

Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation," *International Security*, 2010, 35: 2.

John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security*. (1988) 13:2.

9 April: International Terrorism

Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security*, Summer 2006.

J. Conrad, "Interstate Rivalry and Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 2011

Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, "Al Queda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 2010, 33:12.

Michael Freeman, "The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 2012.

Bryan Price, "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism," *International Security*, 2012.

Recommended

San Akca, Belgin (2009) 'Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?', Journal of Strategic Studies, 32: 4

Flanigan, Shawn Teresa (2008) 'Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31: 6

J. Kavanagh, "Selection, Availability, and Opportunity: The Conditional Effect of Poverty on Terrorist Group Participation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2011.

P. Neumann et al., "Locating Al Queada's Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 2011.

Gregory Miller, "Confronting Terrorisms: Group Motivation and Successful State Policies," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2007, 19:3.

16 April: Interventions and FIRCS

Barry Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," *International Security,* 1996.

Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten, "Forced to be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization," *International Security*, 2013.

Nigel Lo, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter, "Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914-2001," *International Organization,* 2008.

Recommended

Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?*, Princeton, 1996.

Mao, *On Guerilla Warfare*.

23 April (1 PM): Research Paper Presentations

Literature Review Instructions

Review literature about an empirical question. 4-5 pages. At least 15 peer reviewed sources.
A literature review should be first driven by the substantive nature of the question
Key skills:
+identify a research question addressed by the literature
+identify the state of the art of the literature
+categorize literature: what are the major theoretical approaches and groups of empirical findings
+identify problems in the literature: are there theoretical conflicts, or empirical conflicts? Do different approaches (qualitative or quantitative) or data sources or methods of measurement generate different claims? How strong are the findings, anyways?
+Provide an agenda: where should further research focus? How should it go about it? Can the major problem be solved?

Theoretical Argument Instructions

Craft a theoretical argument.
The nature of a theoretical argument is that it explains how, why, or when something happens (and by implication, how, why, or when, it does not)
*Note that why questions are often better turned into when questions, as an answer to a when question will always answer a why question but it will also force you to address the 'when not' question. Being able to explain non-occurrence is as important as being able to explain occurrence.
Theoretical arguments, unlike historical arguments, are not focused on explaining a single occurrence. Although there may be a very small number of instances, the theory should be applicable to any similar situation.
Theoretical arguments must be, in principle, testable. This means that purely speculative, 'try to predict the future' arguments have relatively little value. Implications of theories and theoretical arguments may help us try to figure out what may happen in the future, but it the only way to test a theory is to wait 20 years, it's a problem.
A theoretical argument should start with an intuition: what do you think is going on? What is the mechanism that generates (or fails to generate) the outcome of interest?
In crafting a theoretical argument, however, you need to move beyond a generalized intuition. You need to express precisely the logic of your argument. It need not be formal in the sense of being stated using mathematical language, but the logic must be precise, correct, and be able to identify precise and (broadly speaking) unique relationships between independent and dependent variable values (possibly by way of mediator or moderator variables).
An argument of this sort necessarily starts with a set of assumptions about what matters and what does not matter. This should be the starting point of your theoretical argument. While your assumptions need not reflect the reality of every single case, you should justify to your reader why they are reasonable starting points. Ideally, you should be able to point to others who have used these assumptions before.
Although this list should not be treated as exhaustive, the following things should often be included in your assumptions:
+the identify of the key actor/actors involved in its generation and the nature of that actor
+the nature of the process that leads to the phenomena/its absence: is it a single actor's decision? an evolutionary process? the outcome of competition between different actors, be they states, bureaucracies, or political actors? if it is the product of a competitive process, what determines the nature/outcome of that competitive process? (the same questions apply for cooperative processes.) Is it a two-level game? If it's the product of decision-making, what

characterizes the decision-making process: is it a rational process, a bounded rationality process, a psychology argument, etc.? What are the important inputs into that process?

Once you have identified your assumptions, generating theoretical predictions should simply be a matter of logical arrangement or re-arrangement. The more complicated the logical re-arrangement, the more useful mathematical formalization can be--though, again, it is not necessary.

As a rule, we should always try for simplicity and clarity in argument. We are trying to explain complicated phenomena, but not by describing them--we seek to identify the patterns in those phenomena, and make the complicated simpler. The most striking theoretical arguments explain lots of things in ways that had not been recognized before. That is to say, they identify a set of patterns that others had missed, and using a simple lens.

The last part of the assignment is the derivation of specific, testable hypotheses. These hypotheses can focus on the central thrust of your prediction, but, when doing so is difficult, they may also focus on subsidiary parts of the theory. Hypotheses should be relatively simple statements of relationships between observable variables. The explanation of the hypothesis can address unobserved variables, mechanisms, etc., but the hypothesis should only have the variables. As you present the testable hypotheses, you should

(1) demonstrate that they are clearly derivable from your hypotheses

(2) relate them to other hypotheses about your phenomena (if any other work has been done on it). If a different theoretical framework produces the exact same hypotheses, you need to justify the value of your approach by being able to explain things that the others aren't. Ideally, at least some of your hypotheses differ from existing hypotheses in the literature. The ability to predict new things, and do so correctly, is truly the strongest demonstration of the worth of a theory.