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Course Syllabus
American Security Policy
INR 6136
Summer 2015

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.**Overview:**

American security policy was once relatively simple in that most thought of it solely in terms of military threats against the United States either foreign or domestic. The Civil War ended most of the concern about internal threats although questions of law and order continued in many parts of the United States. By the 1880s, the U.S. was more conscious of its role in the world although isolationism remained a strong current in national politics but it now competed with those who felt the U.S. had a destiny in the world to match that of the great powers of Europe. However, the nation's physical isolation made such ventures unlikely although the United States had been active in various parts of the world when its interests were at stake including the pirates off the Barbary Coast of North Africa and the trade possibilities presented by the Western Pacific Rim (then known as the Far East even though it was west of the U.S.). U.S. natural resources and growing population guaranteed awareness of its military potential but most of the national energy went into the opening of the Western United States and exploitation of the resources found there.

The Spanish-American War in 1898 introduced the United States to the world as an imperial power – a posture heavily debated within American politics. By the end of the war, the U.S. had acquired an empire in the Pacific and the Caribbean. The result was U.S. colonies and engagement in the politics of the various regions. The U.S. agreed to leave the Philippines in 1945 while U.S. forces withdrew from Cuba as the war but remained in Puerto Rico under a changed status as a U.S. territory. World War One placed the U.S. despite its wishes on the frontlines of international security. After joining the Allies in the defeat of imperial Germany, the U.S. militarily largely withdrew back to the homeland. The U.S. remained internationally engaged on some issues such as naval treaties limiting the size of ships and fleets. The rise of aggressors in Europe and Asia saw the U.S. initially on the sideline for reasons of domestic politics and a

sense of disengagement from world problems. One unanswerable question is whether the U.S. would have declared war on Germany after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in the absence of a German attack. Instead, Nazi Germany declared war on the United States which resolved the question.

World War 2 did two things; it devastated most of the major powers and raised the U.S. to the peak of relative military power relative to all comers especially with its monopoly over nuclear weapons. On the ruins of Europe and Japan along with other damaged states such as China and the Soviet Union, the U.S. held most of the cards especially given the uncertainty about how many nuclear weapons the U.S. possessed after the two bombings of Japanese cities. In reality, effectively none but that information was closely held. During the war, the U.S. pushed for international forums to prevent the next world war – Europe was uncertain it could survive another such encounter. These organizations had the purpose of keeping the U.S. engaged in world problems rather than a retreat back to Fortress America. Technology rendered such isolationism untenable in terms of national security. Through a long series of events, the situation resulted in a developed world largely split between adherents of the Soviet Union or the United States with the less developed world a forum for competition as the European empires collapsed.

The resulting Cold War was the dominant international fact of life for nearly two generations. The terminology of a Cold War implied a struggle to the death but one in which the two super powers did not directly fight each other but rather operated through a series of surrogates. For the US, this played out in the Korea War, the Vietnam War, and a series of skirmishes in Asia, Africa and Central America. The fear was that direct super power conflict would escalate into nuclear conflict. Much effort both politically and intellectually went into maintaining a situation of continual conflict without raising the level of nuclear conflict.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991 led to the peaceful end of the Cold War – truly a unique event when a major empire collapses without a war ensuing or some other catastrophic event. The fall of the Soviet Union though has been characterized by the current Russia president as ‘The breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.’ Putin’s actual quote may be somewhat different but the message is clear that Russia suffered greatly and his mission is to recover from that debacle. What all this means is that a globalizing world is becoming more diverse in terms of the threats that the national security apparatus and political leadership must address in real time. Threats come in traditional forms in terms of military forces and other elements of national power but more importantly the threats from non-state actors have moved to the fore along with the extension of national security threats into the realm of organized crime which operates internationally

Thus, this course on U.S. security policy looks much different from what was taught when I started at UCF in 1972. There continues to be a military component but national security now encompasses explicitly areas that formerly were either not relevant or dealt with only by the private sector if they existed prior to the past 15 years. Nine-eleven changed Americans’ view of their personal security but what truly changed for the government and the military is how to respond to such threats especially as they morph into different areas. Ramping down the war in Afghanistan is placing the military in a strain because they now have to predict an environment that incorporates

traditional style military threats such as the Russians and the Chinese while the more nebulous threats posted by cyber criminals whose actions may be more devastating than the military threats. More states develop the capacity to engage in cyber war each day, raising the difficulty of threat identification and response in real time. Nuclear proliferation remains an agenda item while biological weapons grow more potentially deadly as the technologies proliferate across the globe. The margin between benign and horrific in some areas is razor thin. Restructuring the national security apparatus including the military services becomes a US priority with little certainty about what the future looks like. The situation in the Ukraine and the rise of ISIS demand attention while China continues its rise to what the Chinese see as their natural historical position as a world power.

Nations confront the necessity for conducting their foreign policies across a broad spectrum of issues by involving a variety of instruments. National security at the most general level means protecting the United States against all foreseeable threats not just military The spectrum of security threats ranges from economic coercion, cyber war to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including biological, chemical and nuclear, and climate change. The latter is considered a real problem by the military in terms of generating future conflicts among states for scarce resources such as water and imparting operations. Environmental security has become an official concern of the Department of Defense (DoD) for more than a decade predating the Obama administration.

One major tool available in all states but Costa Rica is the military itself; an institution organized to inflict violence on behalf of the state across a wide diversity of contexts ranging from internal defense to nuclear holocaust. However, militaries due to their tight organizational cohesion and discipline have also been found by many states to be very useful for other purposes. Thus, militaries are employed for a wide range of purposes; some far removed from the context of war such as conducting humanitarian operations or completing social and economic improvements within the society itself also known as military operations other than war (MOOTW), see http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/appendix_e.pdf. One historical example is West Point in its original configuration – the academy produced many of the engineers who built the dams and railroads that assisted United States growth economically and geographically. That was a deliberate decision by the academy's founders including President Thomas Jefferson who saw the possibilities of an institution that would meet both civilian and military needs.

In this course, we will explore these issues within the context of the United States. American security policy is a direct reflection of the desires and needs of the specific society it protects, a fact which makes it different from those goals sought by other societies but at the same time very similar. The differences relate to the individual societies and the values they represent. Because of its enormous coercive power, important issues exist regarding who controls the military and their likely obedience to the lawful authority. For many societies, the military becomes an independent political actor fully capable and willing to intervene in national politics. Military coups are part of the national politics such as in Turkey where the military previously intervened to protect what they saw as the secular nature of the state or in Egypt where the military intervened in July 2013 to overthrow a democratically elected government.

American traditions, however, emphasize civilian control over the military, an issue that becomes more complicated as military technologies become more exotic, expensive and powerful. The separation between the military and the society it defends can prove to be a source of national weakness if the gap grows too wide. For example, General Douglas McArthur was ordered to return to the United States from Korea in 1951 by President Harry Truman in a test of the civilian leadership's capacity to require military obedience. There were some who argued General McArthur should resist what they saw as a "temporary political authority," temporary or not, in the American context obedience to a lawful order was the expectation which McArthur fulfilled despite those calls for deliberate disobedience. McArthur's willingness to comply reinforced an essential part of American military and political tradition unlike a number of states which fear possible military intervention into national politics and their refusal to obey civilian government directives.

As an instrument of American security policy, the American military has to adapt to changing domestic and international contexts, which either accentuate or depreciate the military's value within the society. Historically, American society has been very hostile to the military; seeing military service as a burden sometimes necessary but not the expected or desired norm. In our discussions, we will trace out the changes encountered by the military over the past century, a period during which the United States entered fully onto the world stage despite strong desires to remain aloof from such entanglements (i.e., isolationism). This meant for example that the United States military did not shrink down to insignificance as it had after every previous war up until World War II. The Soviet threats was considered of such importance that the American military after WWII was rapidly expanded to first fight the Korea War starting in 1950 and then contend with the Soviet threat globally. With the Cold War's end in 1991, the military fully entered into a period of dramatic change in which the Soviet Union disappeared and the United States ascended to the status of the world's dominant military power.

This unipolar status remains more tenuous than one might expect given the possibility of an ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The outcome of a RMA is by definition difficult to predict because the effect can be to destroy the technological dominance of the existing militaries. The United States is attempting to navigate between the shoals of excessive reliance upon obsolete technologies and the fantasies of super weapons that do not in fact work and may leave the United States more vulnerable than previously. That voyage takes us into the twenty first century and the brave new world of space operations and cyberwar. American security policy has entered a period of dramatic change in which old road markers are gone and the new are not yet in place. The threats are more diverse than ever as globalization takes form.

Course Goals: 1) Students will learn relevant perspectives and the analytic tools needed to understand American security policy, its historical and ideological foundations, policy processes and challenges. 2) Students will further their knowledge of key facts relevant to the study of American security policy. 3) Students will improve their writing, research and analytic skills.

Design of the Course:

This course has a website in Canvas assigned, it is to be used for completing a required assignment regarding Verification of Attendance (mandatory for those receiving financial aid) and the course syllabus, there are no modules per se to be completed although the reading list may change during the course in terms of adding materials of interest, all of which will be within the additional supplementary readings and not required.

Within the course are two major components: a set of readings that will be discussed and analyzed in class meetings and a research project process. Through the readings and discussions, students will be introduced to the major issues running through American security policy. This requires a close reading of the materials assigned in preparation for the class and dialogue during class. Each class will begin with a summary of the issues or questions being considered followed by discussion of the materials and other items that arise during the discussion. Discussion will be a challenge given the size of the class at the time this syllabus is being written

Grade Structure:

Grades are a product of several activities; most are based on your writing and analysis of different aspects of American security policy. Remember time frames are compressed this term so falling behind is not a viable option.

100 points - class discussion, article presentation, and attendance
200 points –First Cut Strategic Threat Analysis immediate – due June 2nd
200 points – Second Cut Strategic Threat Analysis General – due June 23rd
500 points –Third Cut Strategic Threat Analysis Specific – due July 14th

Late assignments are graded down ten percent a day.

Grades in the course will be A, B, C, etc. with no plus or minus grades.

Academic Integrity:

Plagiarism and Cheating of any kind on an assignment will result at least in an "F" for that assignment (and may, depending on the severity of the case, lead to an "F" for the entire course) and offenders may be subject to appropriate referral to the Office of Student Conduct for further action. See the UCF Golden Rule for further information. I will assume for this course that you will adhere to the academic creed of this University and will maintain the highest standards of academic integrity. In other words, don't cheat by giving papers to others or taking them from anyone else. I will also adhere to the highest standards of academic integrity, so please do not ask me to change (or expect me to change) your grade illegitimately or to bend or break rules for one person that will not apply to everyone.

NOTE: All submissions must be done in MS Word format; otherwise, I am unable to open the document. This may lead to a delay in grading the materials while you resubmit the assignment. A second occurrence will result in a “zero” for the assignment. This restriction means no WordPerfect, MS Works or other word processing programs are accepted.

Readings and Textbook:

So, the course will be moving fast – the readings only can hint at what is out there in terms of literature. We will deal with the academic literature but there are other sources in the news media that may be relevant to your analysis. We have only 9 weeks total to scratch the surface. A series of articles and monographs provides the framework and content within which we will work. There is no text assigned for this course.

Under each topic, additional required readings will be identified while others are listed as supplementary and identified for those further interested in a specific issue.

Communicating within the Course

In this class our official mode of communication outside class (or meetings) is through email. For questions about specific class items or other information, you can contact me by email at roger.handberg@ ucf.edu. All communication between student and instructor and between student and student should be respectful and professional. You must also create and use a Knight's Email account at www.knightsemail.ucf.edu for separate official communications from the university. Under university policy, the instructor is prohibited from communicating official information about student performance except through Knight's email (the email system is free).

Project Requirements including due dates:

The topic to be researched here is the threat environment the United States confronts over the short term first (the next five years) and then the long term (ten to twenty years out). The project will be completed in three stages labeled First Cut, Second Cut, and Final Cut. **The First Cut (due June 2nd) involves an analysis of the three (3) most critical national security threats confronting the US over the next five years. You are to rank the threats in terms of severity of the challenge posed and then the probability of occurrence. Your analysis will be a minimum of 1200 words with at least ten references that you have read. Your analysis must be detailed, succinct and to the point. You turn in the First Cut through the course website.** You must use the referencing system employed by the American Political Science Review which you can Google (the guide appears in a number of locations). References can be a selection of documents, reports, academic articles and books, and relevant news items (few of these). This First Cut is where you identify general threats and begin the task of honing in on the important threats that must be addressed.

The Second Cut (due June 23rd) paper broadens out in terms of time frame to ten to twenty years out from this date. You now analyze the five (5) most critical security threats in this longer time frame. Do not simply regurgitate your previous analysis with a few modifications and additions. The Second Cut will be a minimum of 2000 words with at least 20 references germane to the analysis.

The Third Cut (due July 14th) builds upon the two previous analyses, you are to identify and analyze the most critical (1) national security threat the US faces over the next ten years. Your analysis must explain and justify your choice in terms of its credibility and likelihood. The second part of your analysis is to develop what the US strategic response should be to defeat or ameliorate this specific serious threat. The document will be a minimum of 4000 words with whatever references you feel support your analysis and recommendations.

Schedule

Week of:	**Topic:**
May 19	Course Introduction and Historical Context, Organizational Structure & Change – vertical and horizontal
May 26	Changing Tools, Volunteer Military, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Special Operations
June 2	Complications: Economic Challenges, Resource limitations,
June 9	Security Threats - Asia Pivot, Crimea, ISIS and Instability
June 16	Nonmilitary Threats & Vulnerabilities – Urbanization and poverty globally
June 23	Security Threats – Technology Driven, Weaponized Space, Cyber War, Ballistic Missiles
June 30	Security Threats - Failed States, Terrorism & Crime, Piracy
July 7	Security Threats – Natural, Disease Vectors, Climate Change
July 14	Future Worlds

Required Readings:

Week 1, May 19th Course Introduction and Historical Context, Organizational Structure & Change – vertical and horizontal

Ben Fitzgerald and Michael Horowitz, "#creativedisruption Survey 1 Results," Center for New American Security (February 7, 2014), http://www.cnas.org/creativedisruption-survey-1-results?ct=t%28Third_Creative_Disruption_Survey_Results5_6_2014%29&mc_cid=d2cb7738b3&mc_eid=04d6139308#.U2opPlcvCM2

Ben Fitzgerald and Michael Horowitz, #CreativeDisruption Survey 2 Results," Center for New American Security (March 25, 2014), **http://www.cnas.org/creativedisruption-survey-2-results?ct=t%28Third_Creative_Disruption_Survey_Results5_6_2014%29&mc_cid=d2cb7738b3&mc_eid=04d6139308#.U2oqb1cvCM0**

Ben Fitzgerald and Michael Horowitz, "#CreativeDisruption Survey 3 Results," Center for New American Security (May 6, 2014), http://www.cnas.org/blog/creative-disruption-survey-3-results?ct=t%28Third_Creative_Disruption_Survey_Results5_6_2014%29&mc_cid=d2cb7738b3&mc_eid=04d6139308#.U2orVVcvCM0

Robert O. Work, Shawn Brimley, "20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age, Center for New American Security," January 22, 2014, **http://www.cnas.org/20YY-Preparing-War-in-Robotic-Age#.VVTsz2Nh9EM**

Bob Taradash, Clay Beers, Gordon Miller, Parker Wright**, "**Zone Defense: A Case for Distinct Service Roles and Missions**,"** January 23, 2014, **http://www.cnas.org/Zone-Defense-Roles-and-Missions#.VVTuomNh9EM**

Week 2, May 26th Changing Tools, Volunteer Military, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Special Operations

Jami K. Taylor, Richard M. Clerkin, Katherine M. Ngaruiya, and Anne-Lise Knox Velez, "An Exploratory Study of Public Service Motivation and the Institutional–Occupational Model of the Military," *Armed Forces & Society January 2015 41: 142-162, doi:10.1177/0095327X13489119*

Shawn T. Cochran, *"The Civil–Military Divide in Protracted Small War: An Alternative View of Military Leadership Preferences and War Termination," Armed Forces & Society January 2014 40: 71-95, doi:10.1177/0095327X12465418*

Heidi A. Urben, *"Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves?: Levels of Political Activism of Active Duty Army Officers," Armed Forces & Society July 2014 40: 568-591, doi:10.1177/0095327X12467774*

Dima P Adamsky (2008) Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 31:2, 257-294, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390801940443

Jacqueline Newmyer, "The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics," (2010), *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33:4, 483-504, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2010.489706

White House, *National Security Strategy 2010* or http://nssarchive.us/ for complete set of national strategy documents, another source of earlier NSS is http://history.defense.gov/docs_nss.shtml.

DOD, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* or http://history.defense.gov/docs_qdr.shtml for complete set of QDRs.

Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* (Winter 1996/1997), 5-53. UCF online journals

Week 3, June 2nd Complications: Economic Challenges, Resource limitations

Philippe Le Billon, "The Geopolitical economy of 'resource wars'," Geopolitics, (March 2004), 9: 1-28. DOI: 10.1080/14650040412331307812

David G. Victor, "What Resource Wars?" The National Interest, No. 92 (Nov./Dec. 2007), 48-55. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896095

Philippe Le Billon, "Geographies of War: Perspectives on 'Resource Wars'," Geography Compass (March 2007), 1: 163-182. DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2007.00010.x

Week 4, June 9th Security Threats - Asia Pivot, Crimea, ISIS and Instability

Daniel W. Drezner, "Military Primacy Doesn't Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think), *International Security*, (Summer 2013), Vol. 38, No. 1: 52–79.

Nuno P. Monteiro, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful," *International Security*, (Winter 2011/12), Vol. 36, No. 3: 9–40.

Scott W. Harold (2014) Is the Pivot Doomed? The Resilience of America's Strategic 'Rebalance', The Washington Quarterly, 37:4, 85-99, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002157

Ian Easton, "China's Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability," Project 249 Institute, September 26, 2013, http://www.project2049.net/.

Bruce Klingner (2014) North Korea Heading for the Abyss, The Washington Quarterly, 37:3, 169-182, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2014.978442

Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, "Far Eastern Promises," *Foreign Affairs* (April 19, 2014), http://www.cnas.org/content/far-eastern-promises#.U2owqlcvCM0
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Bruno Tertrais, "The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?" *The Washington Quarterly* (2012), 35, 3: 7-22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.703521

Week 5, June 16th Asymmetric Military Threats & Vulnerabilities – Urbanization and poverty globally

Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clark, Beth Grill, & Molly Dunigan, "Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies," (Rand, 2013), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z1.html

Week 6, June 23rd Security Threats – Technology Driven, Weaponized Space, Cyber War, Ballistic Missiles

Ashley J. Tillis, "China's Military Space Strategy," *Survival* (2007), 49: 41-72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330701564752

Stimson Center, Key Elements of Space Assurance - http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/key-elements-of-space-assurance-/#Maintaining (accessed May 5, 2014).

Lucas Kello, "The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft," *International Security* (Fall 2013), Vol. 38, No. 2: 7–40.

Erik Gartzke, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth," *International Security* (Fall 2013), Vol. 38, No. 2: 41–73.

James P. Farwell & Rafal Rohozinski (2011) Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 53:1, 23-40, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.555586

Thomas Rid (2012) Cyber War Will Not Take Place, Journal of Strategic Studies, 35:1, 5-32, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.6089

Richard Bijtlich, "Strategy, Not Speed: What Today's Digital Defenders Must Learn From Cybersecurity's Early Thinkers," Brooking Institution (May 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/05/07-strategy-not-speed-digital-defenders-early-cybersecurity-thinkers-bejtlich?rssid=security+and+intelligence&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+BrookingsRSS%2Fcenters%2Fsecurityandintelligence+%28Brookings+Centers+-+Center+for+21st+Century+Security+and+Intelligence%29

NATO, "Time line of Cyber Attacks," http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/Cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm

Joshua Masters "Nuclear Proliferation," *The Nonproliferation Review*, (2009),16:3, 347-361, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700903255045

Week 7, June 30th Security Threats - Failed States, Terrorism & Crime, Piracy

Anna Simons and David Tucker, "The Misleading Problem of Failed States: a 'socio-geography' of terrorism in the post-9/11 era," *Third World Quarterly*(2007), 28: 387-

Chelli Plummer, "Failed States and Connections to Terrorist Activity," International Criminal Justice Review (2012), 16: 416-449. http://icj.sagepub.com/content/22/4/416

Seth Kaplan, "identifying Truly Fragile States," *Washington Quarterly* (March 2014), 37: 49-63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.893173

Thomas M. Sanderson, "Transnational Terrorism and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines, "SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 24, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2004, pp. 49-61.

James A. Piazza, ""Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?" *International Studies Quarterly* (2008), 52, 469-488.

Stewart Patrick, "'Failed States' and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas," *International Studies Review* (2007), 9: 644-662.

Risa A. Brooks, "Muslim "Homegrown" Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?" *International Security* (Fall 2011), Vol. 36, No. 2: 7–47.

Ian Bellany, "Outflanking Missile Defences: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Nuclear Weapons and Terrorism," *Defense & Security Analysis* (2012), 28:1, 81-96, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2012.651381

Week 8, July 7th Security Threats – Natural, Disease Vectors, Climate Change

Ole Magnus Theisen, Helge Holtemann, and Halyard Buhauq, "Climate Wars? Assessing the Claim That Drought Breeds Conflict," *International Security* (Winter 2011/12), Vol. 36, No. 3: 79–106

Bruno Tertrais (2011) The Climate Wars Myth, *The Washington Quarterly*, 34:3, 17-29, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2011.587951 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2011.587951

Gregory D. Koblentz, "Regime Security: A New Theory for Understanding the Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 2013), 34:3, 501-525, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2013.842298

Jason Enia & Jeffrey Fields, "The Relative Efficacy of the Biological and Chemical Weapon Regimes," *The Nonproliferation Review*, (2014), 21:1, 43-64, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2014.880560

Week 9, July 14th Future Worlds:

Håvard Hegre, Joakim Karlsen, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Håvard Strand and Henrik Urdal, " Predicting Armed Conflict, 2010-2050, International Studies Quarterly (June 2013), 57: 250-270.

Lilia Shevtsova, "Vladimir Putin's new world order with the West," *Washington Post* (May 8, 2014), **http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/vladimir-putin-offers-the-west-a-faustian-bargain/2014/05/08/47acffb0-d604-11e3-95d3-3bcd77cd4e11_story.html?wpisrc=nl_popns**