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INR 6339- Strategic Warning Analysis
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Course Home Page
INR 6339
Strategic Warning Analysis
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Overview

States, organizations and individuals continually worry about the prospect of being surprised by their adversaries and placed in a dire situation which can either spiral downward into disaster or be recovered only by strenuous efforts that might not prove successful. In this course the focus becomes “strategic warning analysis” as that plays out at various levels and contexts within society and between societies. Normally, we think of such analyses solely in terms of military and diplomatic surprises but the concepts and tools are employed for analysis in other realms including business, criminal justice and other social contexts.

For example, the world is continually surprised by the incidence of acts of genocide occurring across the globe. In many contexts the occurrence of genocidal activities is readily explainable in abstract terms but the triggering events are often much more obscure and difficult to ferret out prior to the onslaught by the aggressors. Similarly, riots can break out in societies with no apparent forewarning although retrospective analysis often identifies causes or provides at least explanations. For example, a major multiday riot erupted in Los Angeles in 1992, the cause was an incident videotaped of an African American male and the subsequent acquittal of all involved police officers, http://timelines.latimes.com/los-angeles-riots/. This was not a

planned event but arose out frustrations that the police department was unable to cope. It had been preceded by an early riot in Watts that grew out of a traffic stop, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-watts-riots-explainer-20150715-htmlstory.html. Both of these events show how difficult it is to forecast future events that are effectively nonlinear, meaning the proximate cause is unknown in advance.

More generally, strategic warning analysis involves the use of intelligence techniques both conceptual and concrete focused on identifying certain characteristics or factors which appear significantly related to future events including the possibility of attack without warning and those features in the situation which leave an actor vulnerable to such attacks. This is process fraught with error which is why normally analysis is only of failures of intelligence actors to correctly and in real time identify specific threats and their likelihood.

In the American context during the Cold War, the focus was obviously upon the possibility of a nuclear attack by other states at first being only the Soviet Union but later China was added to the list of potential threats. More recently, the threat possibilities have been expanded to consider what were formerly termed “rogue states” or “states of interest” including North Korea and Iran. Iraq and Syria earlier were part of the list of rogue states but the Iraq invasion destroyed one and Israeli actions (an air strike on a reactor) nullified the other. Judging the likelihood of a North Korean attack against either the US and/or its allies, South Korea and Japan, is difficult given the weird rationality of the North Korean view of the external world especially the US. The danger for the US is that the North Korean constant litany of threats will dull our senses when the threat is closer to actualization.

Much intellectual energy earlier was expended on the question of what were the markers indicating an eminent Soviet attack upon the continental United States. In principle, in the 1950s, the DEW line or the Distant Early Warning Line would provide sufficient notice that US nuclear forces would not be caught unware and would be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviets, later replaced by satellite monitoring for missile launches. However, more broadly, the national leadership needed prior notice if it were to act to prevent such a nuclear holocaust from occurring. This meant that the intelligence community would have to do more than react after the fact of an attack or in the midst of an attack. This predictive aspect is what makes strategic warning analysis so difficult.

Failed predictions are prominent because they are failures, analysis of successes are scarcer in the literature. As President Kennedy said: “victory has 100 fathers, failure is an orphan.” This was in response to a question regarding the Bay of Pigs debacle in 1961 when a CIA sponsored invasion of Cuba failed miserably. The focus here is not so much on failure but on why the intelligence community was unable to separate itself

from the operators and provide an unbiased estimate of probable success or not? Intelligence operates at two distinct levels even though the two are intertwined. Strategic intelligence is considered to be that developed for senior level executives with a longer term perspective. Tactical intelligence is short term and more narrowly focused for officials working at the operational level. Analysis in practice may move between the two levels as for example at the Battle of Midway in 1942 where strategic intelligence identified Japan's strategy for securing their gains achieved after Pearl Harbor while tactical intelligence identified where the Japanese aircraft carriers were located relative to US naval forces. That combination led to the destruction of the bulk of Japanese aircraft carriers, securing the United States from any probable attack and reversing the defeat endured earlier at Pearl Harbor.

Concern about potential strategic surprise relative to the United States and its engagement in the world can be seen in the 2015 report by the Defense Science Board. In that report, the focus was on the potential for strategic surprise across multiple areas of US national security activity including:

Countering Nuclear Proliferation
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense
Space Security
Undersea Warfare
Cyber
Communications and Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
Counterintelligence
Logistics Resilience

All of these areas are ones in which the US has had a leading role in their development and operationalization. "The study defined 'strategic surprise' as an event for which the United States is not adequately prepared and that may result in very high cost. It was assumed that such an event will inevitably occur in today's complex and rapidly changing world." (DSB Summer Study on Strategic Surprise, February 2015, p. 1)The result if surprise is achieved becomes a state unable to protect either itself or critical allies. In this course, the focus is upon analyzing strategic warning analysis as a critical tool in accurately assessing the global and national threat environment with potential applications in other areas where surprising change can dramatically impact an actor's future.

Course Objectives:

The key objectives of the online course are as follows. By the end of the course, each student should have acquired:

(1) A knowledge of major approaches to and concepts within the study of intelligence analysis and an understanding of how these can be applied to the empirical world in the context of strategic warning analysis;
(2) The conceptual and methodological tools necessary to further advanced study and investigation;

(3) Skills in library use, information retrieval, and written exposition and argument, as well as an ability to analyze, interpret and synthesize complex theoretical and empirical materials within the study of international security.

KEY SKILLS

The course seeks to develop or enhance the following key skills:

Communication: constructing clear and incisive written assignments, presenting ideas and arguments, exchanging interpretations, responding to challenges.
Improving own learning and performance: essay preparation, accepting and responding to criticism, developing one's own opinions on key issues.
Information technology: word processing, library searches, use of the internet.
Problem solving: conceptualization of issues, identification and evaluation of relevant evidence, analysis and synthesis of evidence.
Critical thinking: thoughtful and critical reading, exposing assumptions, marshalling empirical evidence, assessing the coherence of arguments.

Required Texts:

Erik J. Dahl, *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor and 9/11 and Beyond*. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).

Thomas Fingar – *Reducing Uncertainty* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University :Press, 2011).

Cynthia M. Grabo, *Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning* (this appears in several editions due to its classified nature, an electronic copy is being sent to the class, this was the first part declassified and allowed public access. For that reason, the examples are older ones and reflect the particular interests of what later became the Defense Intelligence Agency).

Additional Suggested Materials:

Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011)

Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). The classic exposition of how intelligence can identify a threat but be unable to precisely identify target and timing.)

Text materials will appear in several forms: textbooks to be accessed, materials found through the web, and articles obtainable through the UCF Library's online journal collection which is extensive. In addition, some items may come from the instructor as email attachments. Reading assignments are specified in the modules along with other readings you are responsible for completing. Students are responsible for keeping current with reading assignments.

Method of instruction

The course will be taught in an online environment. This means that good writing skills are essential for successfully completing the course. Also, students engaged in the course should be aware that the time constraints inherent in the course means one must keep current with the materials.

Communicating within the Course

In this class our official mode of communication is through email located inside Canvas or to roger.handberg@ucf.edu. All communications between student and instructor and between student and student should be respectful and professional. It is the student's responsibility to check the course email tool frequently to keep current with any announcements. You must create a Knight's Email account at www.knightsemail.ucf.edu for separate official communications from the university or the instructor. Inquires about your grade or other aspects of the course can only be answered through the Knight's email system, not Yahoo, Gmail or other commercial vendors. This is a university policy required by federal law, one that the instructor is not authorized to ignore. If you are able, you can meet with the instructor during normal office hours or make an appointment for other times as necessary.

Grade Structure:

Grades are determined through a variety of student activities including three assignments, a research paper proposal and a completed research paper. The overall weight assigned to each activity is shown below with a brief description provided for each facet. Due dates items are due is provided in the syllabus section of the course website. A total of 1000 points will be assigned across the semester with each graded segment assigned a point value. Final grades will be recorded as A, B, C., etc. rather than incorporating pluses and minuses. Grades are posted through the course website and accessible as soon as the materials are graded.

Plagiarism and Cheating of any kind on an examination, quiz, or assignment will result at least in an "F" for that assignment (and **may** depending on the severity of the case, lead to an "F" for the entire course). Such actions will be also subject to

appropriate referral to the Office of Student Conduct and the Graduate School for further action. See the UCF Golden Rule for further information, http://goldenrule.sdes.ucf.edu/. I will assume for this course that you will adhere to the academic creed of this University and will maintain the highest standards of academic integrity. In other words, don't cheat by giving answers to others or taking them from anyone else. I will also adhere to the highest standards of academic integrity, so please do not ask me to change (or expect me to change) your grade illegitimately or to bend or break rules for one person that will not apply to everyone.

Preliminary Annotated Bibliography on Rise of ISIS – 10%
Paper proposal – 20%
Paper – 40%
Discussion – 30%

Discussions are included as part of the modules; you must participate in the discussions. Topics and dates for participation are indicated in each module. The discussions are aimed at more deeply analyzing the situations and scenarios presented in the modules, effective participation will require that one read the materials assigned each module.

NOTE: All submissions are to be done in MS Word format; otherwise, I am unable to open the document. This may lead to a delay in grading the materials while you resubmit the assignment. A second occurrence will result in a "zero" for the assignment. This restriction means no WordPerfect, MS Works or other word processing programs are accepted.

Course Assignments:

Your topic for this term is to identify two crises in international politics with regards to the United States in which in one case, apparent surprise occurred or did it, the rise of ISIS in 2013; and in another where your analysis indicates successful detection took place, allowing the US to respond successfully. You are to identify the second situation, either historical since the end of the Cold War, 1991, to present. The latter case may prove more difficult to identify so scan

the globe for your topic, be prepared to defend your choice. Your task is to analyze the factors that led to ISIS's apparently sudden rise and expansion to cover much of Syria and Iraq, why was that expansion missed or was it? Once you have identified a successful warning situation (regardless of whether successful action was taken), analyze that for factors as to why successful detection occurred and how the US leadership at some level responded.

Preliminary Annotated Bibliography on rise of ISIS, 15 references minimum (not including the textbooks or modules), only half can be solely web although library journal articles accessed through the Library website are not considered web only. Wikipedia is clearly not an acceptable reference; thirty points will be deducted for its use, a second use will lead to a failing grade for the assignment or course project. Remember assignments must be in Word format. Late assignments are graded down a letter grade a day until an F grade is reached. For assignment formatting, you must use the referencing system used by the American Political Science Review which is available on line through googling for the style sheet.

Course Project Proposal

The course project proposal involves a prospectus of at least 1,000 words explaining what is being proposed including an expanded annotated bibliography. A proposal should include a clear identification of the specific situation, an assessment of doable resources, clear identification of what type of surprise was intended, what resources were available to the organization conducting the threat analysis, and outcome as can best be determined. Textbooks are not an acceptable reference, nor is Wikipedia, use will lead to points being deducted, equivalent to one letter grade. Provide a word count.

Course Project:

Course projects must be a minimum of 3,000 words. Changing your topic after it is accepted must be done by the closing date of 15 June. Any changed topic subsequently must be approved by the instructor; otherwise, the changed topic will not be accepted. Other changes to the original topic in terms of scope

or focus but still the same general topic, for example, should be emailed to the instructor for his approval. Analysis should be as fine grained as you are able to do using available resources. NO CHANGES WILL BE ACCEPTED AFTER 15 June At 2300 HOURS. This is in order that sufficient time exists to complete your project. Late projects or assignments are graded down a letter grade a day until an F grade is reached. However, failure to complete a satisfactory project will result in an "F" for the course regardless of the number of points earned in other portions of the course.

Disability Access:

The University of Central Florida is committed to providing reasonable accommodations for all persons with disabilities. This syllabus is available in alternate formats upon request. Students who need accommodations must be registered with Student Disability Services, Ferrell Commons Room 185, phone (407) 823-2371, TTY/TDD only phone (407) 823-2116, before requesting accommodations from the professor.

University Writing Center:

The University Writing Center (UWC) is a free resource for UCF undergraduates and graduates. At the UWC, a trained writing consultant will work individually with you on anything you're writing (in or out of class), at any point in the writing process from brainstorming to editing. Appointments are recommended, but not required. For more information or to make an appointment, visit the UWC website at http://www.uwc.ucf.edu, stop by MOD 608, or call 407.823.2197.

Religious Observances

Students are expected to notify their instructor in advance if they intend to miss class to observe a holy day of their religious faith. For a current schedule of major religious holidays, see the Faculty Center's main web page under "Calendars," and for additional information, contact the Office of Diversity Initiatives at 407-823-6479.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Announcements will be posted in CANVAS on a regular basis. They will appear on your CANVAS dashboard when you log in and/or will be sent to you directly through your preferred method of notification from CANVAS. Please make certain to check them regularly, as they will contain any important information about upcoming projects or class concerns.

DISCUSSION FORUMS

Discussion Forums are a way for you to engage with each other about the course content. Each lesson module will have a question that links to a forum. You can also access each forum by clicking on the **DISCUSSIONS** button in the **course navigation links**. In order to get full credit for each discussion, you will need to post a thoughtful, well-written response to the question and respond to two of your classmates' answers. Failure to participate will result in loss of points toward your final grade.

Selected Readings (text readings are assigned in the modules):

Module 1: What Does Strategic Warning Mean? May 15-20th, May 18th start discussion

Dahl – *Intelligence and Surprise* Attack – Begin reading, will be part of Module 2 also

Arthur S. Hulnick (2005) Indications and Warning for Homeland Security:
Seeking a New Paradigm, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 18:4, 593-608, DOI: 10.1080/08850600500177101

John A. Gentry, "Intelligence Failure Reframed," *Political Science Quarterly* 123 (Summer 2008), 247-270.

Jack Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?" (Washington, DC: CIA, Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, January 2003), Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 1 PDF Url : ADA526588

Module 2: Why History Repeats itself: Pearl Harbor and 9/11 May 21-27th, May 23rd start discussion

Dahl – finish book.

Steve Chan, ''The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning,'' *American Political Science Review* 73 (March 1979): 171–180.

James J. Wirtz, ‘Intelligence to Please: The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War’, Political Science Quarterly 106/2 (1991) pp.239–63.

Richard K. Betts, ‘‘Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,’’ *World Politics* 31 (October 1978): 61–89.

John Hollister Hedley, ‘‘Learning From Intelligence Failures,’’ *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 18 (July 2005): 435–450.

Amy K. Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy, ‘Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them’, *Homeland Security Affairs* 2/2 (July 2006), at 5http://www.hsaj.org/?home¼2.24.

Module 3: The Nature of the Problem May 28th – June 3rd, May 30th start discussion

Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002), emailed to students

Fingar – Reducing Uncertainty

Amy B. Zegart, ‘‘an Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reform Before 9/11,’’ *Political Science Quarterly* 121 (Spring 2006)

Woodrow J. Kuhns, ‘‘Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology’’ in Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 80–100

Module 4: Biases, Blind Spots & Failures of Imagination June 4th to June 10th, June 7th start discussion

Richards J. Heuer, Jr. ”Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J. Morgenthau (Jun., 1981), pp. 294-327.

HOWARD ADELMAN and ASTRI SUHRKE, “Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent the Genocide,” 20 *Disasters* (December 1996), 295-304, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.1996.tb01045.x

Tom Kean, et al. *The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).

Michael M. Gunter, “The Iraqi Opposition and the Failure of U.S. Intelligence”, *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 12/2 (1999) pp.135–67

Module 5: Technology as Enabler/Deceiver June 11th – June 17th, June 14th start discussion

Gentry, John A, "Doomed to Fail: America's Blind Faith in Military Technology," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002). PDF Url : ADA408230

Erik J. Dahl (2010) Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance, *Intelligence and National Security*, 25:6, 778-799, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.537876

Sir David Omand , Jamie Bartlett & Carl Miller (2012) Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), *Intelligence and National Security*, 27:6, 801-823, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2012.716965

Module 6: Anticipating Surprise June 18th – June 24th . June 21st start discussion

Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002), emailed to students.

Hassol, S.J., J. Kasperson, and J. Katzenberger, eds. 1995, electronic edition 2008. *Anticipating Global Change Surprises*. Proc. of an Aspen Global Change Institute Workshop 31 July-13 August 1994, Elements of Change series, AGCI

Ben Anderson, "Security and the future: Anticipating the event of terror," *Geoforum* 41 (2010) 227–235.

Module 7: Is Surprise Overrated? June 25th – July 1st, June 29th start discussion

Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, "Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise," in *Blindside*, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

Olga Gheorghe, Lavinia Groza, and Ioana Olaru,"Strategic Foresight in a Volatile Environment. Look Ahead and Look Around," Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference, Bucharest – 2014.

Richard K. Betts, "Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic Surprises," *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 329-343

Meir Finkel, *On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield* (Stanford: CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

Module 8: Conclusion: Can the obstacles be overcome? – July 2nd – July 8th; July 5th start discussion

Timothy R. Walton (2015) Lessons Learned from the CIA's Assessment of the Soviet Economy, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 28:3, 468-479, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2015.1022461

Peter D. Feaver and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq", *International Security* 30/3 (2005/06) pp.7–46.

Brett Peppler, Intelligence pathologies in terrorism analysis [online]. Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008: 41-56.

John Buckley, "A Wheel Is Still a Wheel. The Role of Intelligence in an Evolving Threat Environment," in Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference, Bucharest - 2014

Additional Readings: The Problem of Attack: Conventional, Terrorist,

Author(s): David B. Montgomery and Charles B. Weinberg, "Toward Strategic Intelligence Systems," *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 41-52

Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability," *International Security* Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring, 1981), pp. 117-149

John-Michael Arnold, "Non-State-Led Strategic Surprise and U.S. Foreign Policy: A New Variant of an Old Problem," 8 *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, 1 (2013)

Arthur S. Hulnick (2005) Indications and Warning for Homeland Security: Seeking a New Paradigm, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 18:4, 593-608, DOI: 10.1080/08850600500177101

John A. Gentry (2010) Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars, *Intelligence and National Security*, 25:1, 50-75, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684521003588112

Phil Williams, ''Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation,'' *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 4, #1, January 2005

Daniel Byman (2014) "The Intelligence War on Terrorism," *Intelligence and National Security*, 29:6, 837-863, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2013.851876

John P. Sullivan and James J. Wirtz, "Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 13-25.