**Strategic Warning Analysis**

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**INR 6339- Strategic Warning Analysis**

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# Course Home Page

# INR 6339

# Strategic Warning Analysis

# Summer 2021

## Instructor Contact:

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## Overview

**Remember to Complete the Financial Aid Verification Assignment in the Assignments section of the course by May 21st. This is required if you are receiving financial assistance from the University, a UCF requirement of all students receiving financial aid.**

States, organizations and individuals continually worry about the prospect of being surprised by their adversaries and placed in a dire situation which can either spiral downward into disaster or be recovered only by strenuous efforts that might not prove totally successful. In this course the focus becomes “strategic warning analysis” as that plays out at various levels and contexts within society and between societies. Normally, we think of such analyses solely in terms of military and diplomatic surprises but the concepts and tools are employed for analysis in other realms including business, criminal justice and other social contexts.T

For example, the world is continually surprised by the incidence of acts of genocide occurring across the globe. In many contexts the occurrence of genocidal activities is readily explainable in abstract terms but the triggering events are often much more obscure and difficult to ferret out prior to the onslaught by the aggressors. Similarly, riots can break out in societies with no apparent forewarning although retrospective analysis often identifies causes or provides at least explanations. For example, a major multi day riot erupted in Los Angeles in 1992, the cause was an incident videotaped of an African American male and the subsequent acquittal of all involved police officers, http://timelines.latimes.com/los-angeles-riots/ (Links to an external site.). This was not a planned event but arose out frustrations that the police department was unable to resolve. This event had been preceded by an earlier riot in Watts that also initially grew out of a traffic stop, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-watts-riots-explainer-20150715-htmlstory.html (Links to an external site.). Both of these events show how difficult it is to forecast future events that are effectively nonlinear, meaning the proximate cause is unknown in advance.

To further illustrate the problem of warning, the events growing out of the killing of George Floyd went well beyond the expected, demonstrations broke out across the United States and even in other countries. The incident struck a chord with images of the officer ignoring the Mr. Floyd's cries for help, saying "I can not breathe." That triggered events not only in the locality where the incident occurred but with an intensity not expected elsewhere. https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html (Links to an external site.) From an analytical perspective, these events came with no warning especially given that other incidents generated only localized responses.

More generally, strategic warning analysis involves the use of various intelligence techniques both conceptual and concrete focused on identifying certain characteristics or factors which appear significantly related to future events including the possibility of attack without warning and include those features in the

situation which leave an actor vulnerable to such attacks. In theory, if forewarned, the target can respond effectively negating the attack. This process is fraught with error which is why normally most academic analysis is only of failures of intelligence actors to correctly and in real time identify specific threats and their likelihood. This failure bias is what makes strategic warning analysis so difficult. One rarely finds analyses focused on success rather than failure. Politically, failures or breakdowns in forewarning events often led to incumbent removal from their position. Those officials above these failures are often the facilitators of failure because their biases or simple ignorance mean warnings are not heard or recognized.

In the American context during the Cold War, the focus was obviously upon the possibility of a nuclear attack by other states at first being only the Soviet Union but later China was added to the list of potential threats. More recently, the threat possibilities have been expanded to consider what were formerly termed "rogue states" or "states of interest" including North Korea and Iran. Iraq and Syria earlier were on the list of rogue states but the Iraq invasion destroyed one and Israeli actions (an air strike on a reactor) nullified the other. Judging the likelihood of a North Korean attack against either the U.S. and/or its allies, South Korea and Japan, is difficult given the weird rationality of the North Korean view of the external world especially the United States. The danger for the U.S. is that the North Korean constant litany of dire threats will dull our senses when the threat comes closer to actualization. Simply ignoring North Korea further inflames their rhetoric with unknown future implications.

Much intellectual energy earlier was expended on the question of what were the markers indicating an eminent Soviet attack upon the continental United States. In principle, in the 1950s, the DEW line or the Distant Early Warning Line across northern North America provided sufficient notice that US nuclear forces would not be caught unaware and would be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviets. This was later replaced by satellite monitoring for missile launches. However, more broadly, the national leadership needed prior notice if it were to act to prevent such a nuclear holocaust from occurring. This meant that the intelligence community would have to do more than react after the fact of an attack or in the midst of an attack. This predictive aspect is what makes strategic warning analysis so difficult.

Failed predictions are prominent because they are failures, analysis of successes are scarcer in the literature. As President Kennedy said: "victory has 100 fathers, failure is an orphan." This was in response to a press question regarding the Bay of

Pigs debacle in 1961 when a CIA sponsored invasion of Cuba failed miserably. The focus here is not so much on failure but on why the intelligence community is unable to separate itself from the operators and provide an unbiased estimate of probable success or not? Intelligence operates at two distinct levels even though the two are intertwined. Strategic intelligence is considered to be that developed for senior level executives with a longer term perspective. Tactical intelligence is short term and more narrowly focused for officials working at the operational level. Analysis in practice moves between the two levels as for example at the Battle of Midway in 1942 when strategic intelligence identified Japan's strategy for securing their gains achieved after Pearl Harbor while tactical intelligence identified where the Japanese aircraft carriers were located relative to U.S. naval forces. That combination led to the destruction of the bulk of Japanese aircraft carriers, securing the United States from any probable attack and reversing the defeat endured earlier at Pearl Harbor. Midway signaled the limits of Japan's expansion, forcing them over to the defensive until the conclusion of the war in 1945.

Concern about potential strategic surprise relative to the United States and its engagement in the world can be seen in the 2015 report by the Defense Science Board. In that report, the focus was on the potential for strategic surprise across multiple areas of U.S. national security activity including:

Countering Nuclear Proliferation

Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense

Space Security

Undersea Warfare

Cyber

Communications and Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)

Counterintelligence

Logistics Resilience

All of these areas are ones in which the United States has had a leading role in their development and operationalization. "The study defined 'strategic surprise' as an event for which the United States is not adequately prepared and that may result in

very high cost. It was assumed that such an event will inevitably occur in today's complex and rapidly changing world." (DSB Summer Study on Strategic Surprise, February 2015, p. 1)The result if surprise is achieved becomes a state unable to protect either itself or critical allies. In this course, the focus is upon analyzing strategic warning analysis as a critical tool in accurately assessing the global and national threat environment with potential applications in other areas where surprising change can dramatically impact an actor's future decisions and even survival.

## Course Objectives:

The key objectives of the online course are as follows. By the end of the course, each student should have acquired:

(1) A knowledge of major approaches to and concepts within the study of intelligence analysis and an understanding of how these can be applied to the empirical world in the context of strategic warning analysis;

(2) The conceptual and methodological tools necessary to further advanced study and investigation;

(3) Skills in library use, information retrieval, and written exposition and argument, as well as an ability to analyze, interpret and synthesize complex theoretical and empirical materials within the study of international security.

## KEY SKILLS

The course seeks to develop or enhance the following key skills:

Communication: constructing clear and incisive written assignments, presenting ideas and arguments, exchanging interpretations, responding to challenges.

Improving own learning and performance: essay preparation, accepting and responding to criticism, developing one's own opinions on key issues.

Information technology: word processing, library searches, use of the internet.

Problem solving: conceptualization of issues, identification and evaluation of relevant evidence, analysis and synthesis of evidence.

Critical thinking: thoughtful and critical reading, exposing assumptions, marshalling empirical evidence, assessing the coherence of arguments.

## Required Texts:

Cynthia M. Grabo, *Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning* (this appears in several editions due to its earlier classified nature, an electronic copy is posted on the website on Module 1, this was the first part declassified and allowed public access. For that reason, the examples are older ones and reflect the particular interests of what later became the Defense Intelligence Agency). There exist later more complete editions - this version is sufficient for our purposes. You should be aware that Ms. Grabo's text was the foundational document used for training CIA analysts beginning in 1949. Complete later texts are still classified.

## Additional Suggested Materials:

Erik J. Dahl, *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor and 9/11 and Beyond*. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).

Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011). This is a report originally written under contract to the CIA.

Thomas Fingar - *Reducing Uncertainty* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). The classic exposition of how intelligence can identify a threat but be unable to precisely identify target and timing. Here, the focus was upon the noise within which critical information is embedded and possibly obscured.

Meir Finkel, *On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield* (Stanford: CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

Text materials will appear in several forms: textbooks to be accessed, materials found through the web, and articles obtainable through the UCF Library's online journal collection which is extensive. In addition, some items may come from the instructor as email attachments. Reading assignments are specified in the modules

along with other readings you are responsible for completing. Students are responsible for keeping current with reading assignments. Graduate education is built on the premise that one reads the basics but then goes on to read other materials even if not assigned. That provides breadth and depth to your understanding.

## Method of instruction

The course will be taught in an online environment. This means that good writing skills are essential for successfully completing the course. Also, students engaged in the course should be aware that the time constraints inherent in the course means one must keep current with the materials.

## Communicating within the Course

In this class our official mode of communication is through email located inside Canvas or to roger.handberg@ucf.edu. All communications between student and instructor and between student and student should be respectful and professional. It is the student's responsibility to check the course email tool frequently to keep current with any announcements. You must create a Knight's Email account at www.knightsemail.ucf.eduLinks to an external site. for separate official communications from the university or the instructor. Inquires about your grade or other aspects of the course can only be answered through the Knight's email system, not Yahoo, Gmail or other commercial vendors. This is a university policy required by federal law, one that the instructor is not authorized to ignore. If you are able, you can meet with the instructor during normal office hours or make an appointment for other times as necessary. Given the constraints of the pandemic environment< there is no expectation you meet personally with the instructor. If you have questions, email or call the instructor.

## Grade Structure:

Grades are determined through a variety of student activities including three assignments, a research paper proposal and a completed research paper. The overall weight assigned to each activity is shown below with a brief description provided for each facet. Due dates items are due is provided in the syllabus section of the course website or in the Assignments section of the course. A total of 1000 points will be assigned across the semester with each graded segment assigned a point value. Final grades will be recorded as A, B, C., etc. rather than incorporating pluses and minuses. Grades are posted through the course website and accessible

as soon as the materials are graded. The instructor alone grades all assignments, meaning it will take time.

Plagiarism and Cheating of any kind on an examination, quiz, or assignment will result at least in an "F" for that assignment (and **may** depending on the severity of the case, lead to an "F" for the entire course). Such actions will be also subject to appropriate referral to the Office of Student Conduct and the Graduate School for further action. See the UCF Golden Rule for further information, http://goldenrule.sdes.ucf.edu/Links to an external site.. I will assume for this course that you will adhere to the academic creed of this University and will maintain the highest standards of academic integrity. In other words, don't cheat by giving answers to others or taking them from anyone else. I will also adhere to the highest standards of academic integrity, so please do not ask me to change (or expect me to change) your grade illegitimately or to bend or break rules for one person that will not apply to everyone.

Preliminary Annotated Bibliography on Rise of ISIS – 10%

Paper proposal – 20%

Paper – 40%

Discussions – 30%

Discussions are included as part of the modules; you must participate in the discussions or lose the points. Topics and dates for participation are indicated in each module. The discussions are aimed at more deeply analyzing the situations and scenarios presented in the modules, effective participation will require that one read the materials assigned each module.

**NOTE: All submissions are to be done in MS Word format; otherwise, I am unable to open the document. This may lead to a delay in grading the materials while you resubmit the assignment. A second occurrence will result in a "zero" for the assignment. This restriction means no Word Perfect, MS Works or other word processing programs are accepted.**

## Course Assignments:

**Your topic for this term is to identify two crises in international politics, one with regards to the United States in which apparent surprise occurred or did it?: the rise of ISIS in 2013; and in another crisis (which you identify possibly**

**involving a different state) where your analysis indicates successful detection (or forewarning) took place, allowing the affected state to respond successfully. You are to identify this second situation, over the time period since the end of the Cold War, 1991, to present. The latter case may prove more difficult to identify so scan the globe for your topic, be prepared to defend your choice. Your task in the first case is to analyze the factors that led to ISIS's apparently sudden rise and expansion to cover much of Syria and Iraq, why was that expansion missed initially or was it? Once you have identified a successful warning situation (regardless of whether successful action was taken), analyze that for factors as to why successful detection occurred and how the national leadership at some level responded. In summary, your final paper will analyze two events comparatively, the rise of ISIS and the other being one you identify as occurring since 1991 until present.**

**Preliminary Annotated Bibliography on rise of ISIS, 15 references minimum (not including the textbooks or modules), only half can be solely web although library journal articles accessed through the Library website are not considered web only. Wikipedia is clearly not an acceptable reference; its use will lead to a failing grade for the assignment or course project. Remember the assignments must be submitted in Word format. Annotated means a 2 or 3 sentence summary of the the article plus evaluation of its credibility or not. Late assignments are graded down a letter grade a day until an F grade is reached. For assignment formatting, you must use the referencing system used by the American Political Science Review which is available on line through googling for the style sheet or MLS which is accessible through the UCF Library.**

## Course Project Proposal

**The course project proposal involves a prospectus of at least 1,000 words explaining what you are proposing including an expanded annotated bibliography. A proposal should include a clear identification of the specific situation, an assessment of doable resources, clear identification of what type of surprise was intended, what resources were available to the organization conducting the threat analysis, and outcome as can best be determined. Textbooks are not an acceptable reference, nor is Wikipedia, use will lead to points being deducted, equivalent to one letter grade. Provide a word count.**

## Course Project:

**Course projects must be a minimum of 3,000 words. You can incorporate part of your proposal in the analysis if suitably revised to provide flow to your argument, not just repeating the words. Analysis should be as fine grained as you are able to do using available resources. Late projects or assignments are graded down a letter grade a day until an F grade is reached. However, failure to complete a satisfactory course project will result in an "F" for the course regardless of the number of points earned in other portions of the course. Provide a word count.**

**Disability Access:**

The University of Central Florida is committed to providing reasonable accommodations for all persons with disabilities. This syllabus is available in alternate formats upon request. Students who need accommodations must be registered with Student Disability Services, Ferrell Commons Room 185, phone (407) 823-2371, TTY/TDD only phone (407) 823-2116, before requesting accommodations from the professor.

**University Writing Center:**

The University Writing Center (UWC) is a free resource for UCF undergraduates and graduates. At the UWC, a trained writing consultant will work individually with you on anything you're writing (in or out of class), at any point in the writing process from brainstorming to editing. Appointments are recommended, but not required. For more information or to make an appointment, visit the UWC website at http://www.uwc.ucf.edu, stop by MOD 608, or call 407.823.2197.

**Religious Observances**

Students are expected to notify their instructor in advance if they intend to miss class to observe a holy day of their religious faith. For a current schedule of major religious holidays, see the Faculty Center's main web page under "Calendars," and for additional information, contact the Office of Diversity Initiatives at 407-823-6479.

**ANNOUNCEMENTS**

Announcements will be posted through CANVAS on a regular basis. They will be sent to you directly through your preferred method of notification from CANVAS.

Please make certain to check them regularly, as they will contain any important information about upcoming projects or class concerns.

**DISCUSSION FORUMS**

Discussion Forums are a way for you to engage with each other about the course content. Each lesson module will have a question that links to a forum. You can also access each forum by clicking on the **DISCUSSIONS** button in the **course navigation links**. In order to get full credit for each discussion, you will need to post a thoughtful, well-written response to the question and respond to at least two of your classmates' answers. Failure to participate will result in loss of points toward your final grade. Grades will reflect your grasp of the readings, clear articulation of your position and thoughtful responses to others' postings.

## Selected Readings (additional readings are also identified in the modules):

**Module 1: What Does Strategic Warning Mean? May 17-21st, May 18thstart discussion, this will be the format for discussions, access readings assigned, start date for discussion with closing date. Once closing date has occurred, no additional responses will be accepted.**

Arthur S. Hulnick (2005) Indications and Warning for Homeland Security: Seeking a New Paradigm, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 18:4, 593-608, DOI: 10.1080/08850600500177101

John A. Gentry, "Intelligence Failure Reframed," *Political Science Quarterly* 123 (Summer 2008), 247-270. (available through UCF Library E-Journals)

Jack Davis, "Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?" (Washington, DC: CIA, Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, January 2003), Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 1 PDF Url : *ADA526588* (Links to an external site.)

**Module 2: Why History Repeats itself: Pearl Harbor and 9/11 May 22-29th, May 24th start discussion**

Steve Chan, ''The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning,'' *American Political Science Review* 73 (March 1979): 171–180.

James J. Wirtz, 'Intelligence to Please: The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War', Political Science Quarterly 106/2 (1991) pp.239–63.

Richard K. Betts, ''Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,'' *World Politics* 31 (October 1978): 61–89.

John Hollister Hedley, ''Learning From Intelligence Failures,'' *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 18 (July 2005): 435–450.

Amy K. Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy, 'Lessons We Don't Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them', *Homeland Security Affairs* 2/2 (July 2006), at 5http://www.hsaj.org/?home¼2.24.

Peter Gill (2020) Explaining Intelligence Failure: Rethinking the Recent Terrorist Attacks in Europe, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 33:1, 43-67, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2019.1663702

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2019.1663702 (Links to an external site.)

**Module 3: The Nature of the Problem May 29th– June 4th , June 1st start discussion**

Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002), copy appended to Module 1.

Amy B. Zegart, ''an Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reform Before 9/11,'' *Political Science Quarterly* 121 (Spring 2006)

Woodrow J. Kuhns, ''Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology'' in Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 80–100

**Module 4: Biases, Blind Spots & Failures of Imagination June 5th to June 12th, June 6thstart discussion**

Richards J. Heuer, Jr. "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J. Morgenthau (Jun., 1981), pp. 294-327.

HOWARD ADELMAN and ASTRI SUHRKE, "Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent the Genocide," 20 *Disasters* (December 1996), 295-304, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.1996.tb01045.x

Tom Kean, et al. *The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). If you have not already read and have time.

Michael M. Gunter, "The Iraqi Opposition and the Failure of U.S. Intelligence", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 12/2 (1999) pp.135–67

**Module 5: Technology as Enabler/Deceiver June 12th– June 19th, June 13thstart discussion**

Gentry, John A, "Doomed to Fail: America's Blind Faith in Military Technology," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2002). PDF Url : *ADA408230* (Links to an external site.)

Erik J. Dahl (2010) Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance, *Intelligence and National Security*, 25:6, 778-799, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2010.537876

Sir David Omand , Jamie Bartlett & Carl Miller (2012) Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), *Intelligence and National Security*, 27:6, 801-823, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2012.716965

Robert Dover (2020) SOCMINT: a shifting balance of opportunity, Intelligence and National Security, 35:2, 216-232, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2019.1694132

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1694132 (Links to an external site.)

**Module 6: Anticipating Surprise June 19th– June 28th. June 20thstart discussion**

Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002), should have read by now.

Hassol, S.J., J. Kasperson, and J. Katzenberger, eds. 1995, electronic edition 2008. *Anticipating Global Change Surprises*. Proc. of an Aspen Global Change Institute Workshop 31 July-13 August 1994, Elements of Change series, AGCI

Ben Anderson, "Security and the future: Anticipating the event of terror," *Geoforum* 41 (2010) 227–235.

John A. Gentry & Joseph S. Gordon (2018) U.S. Strategic Warning Intelligence: Situation and Prospects, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,

31:1, 19-53, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2017.1374149 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2017.1374149 (Links to an external site.)

**Module 7: Is Surprise Overrated? June 28th - July 2nd, June 29th start discussion**

Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, "Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise," in *Blindside*, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

Olga Gheorghe, Lavinia Groza, and Ioana Olaru,"Strategic Foresight in a Volatile Environment. Look Ahead and Look Around," Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference, Bucharest – 2014.

Richard K. Betts, "Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic Surprises," *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 329-343

Aleksandar Matovski (2020) Strategic Intelligence and International Crisis Behavior, Security Studies, 29:5, 964-990, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2020.1859128

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1859128 (Links to an external site.)

**Module 8: Conclusion: Can the obstacles be overcome? – July 2nd – July 6th; July 3rd start discussion**

Timothy R. Walton (2015) Lessons Learned from the CIA's Assessment of the Soviet Economy, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 28:3, 468-479, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2015.1022461

Peter D. Feaver and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq", *International Security* 30/3 (2005/06) pp.7–46.

Brett Peppler, Intelligence pathologies in terrorism analysis [online]. *Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008: 41-56.

John Buckley, "A Wheel Is Still a Wheel. The Role of Intelligence in an Evolving Threat Environment," in Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference, Bucharest - 2014

**Additional Readings: The Problem of Attack: Conventional, Terrorist,**

Author(s): David B. Montgomery and Charles B. Weinberg, "Toward Strategic Intelligence Systems," *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 41-52

Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability," *International Security* Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring, 1981), pp. 117-149

John-Michael Arnold, "Non-State-Led Strategic Surprise and U.S. Foreign Policy: A New Variant of an Old Problem," 8 *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, 1 (2013)

Arthur S. Hulnick (2005) Indications and Warning for Homeland Security: Seeking a New Paradigm, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 18:4, 593-608, DOI: 10.1080/08850600500177101

John A. Gentry (2010) Intelligence Learning and Adaptation: Lessons from Counterinsurgency Wars, *Intelligence and National Security*, 25:1, 50-75, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684521003588112 (Links to an external site.)

Phil Williams, ''Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation,'' *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 4, # 1, January 2005

Daniel Byman (2014) "The Intelligence War on Terrorism," *Intelligence and National Security*, 29:6, 837-863, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2013.851876

John P. Sullivan and James J. Wirtz, "Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 13-25.

# Syllabus

# INR 6339 Strategic Warning Analysis

# Summer 2021

| Module # | Module Name | Date Open | Date Close | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial Verification | Financial Verification Assignment | May 17th | May 21st | Complete assignment, remember required if you receive financial aid |
| Module 1 | What does strategic warning mean? | May 17th | May 21st | Discussion |
| Bibliography | Preliminary Annotated Bibliography (100 points) | May 17th | May 29th | Submit bibliography |
| Module 2 | Why history repeats itself: Pearl Harbor and 9/11 | May 21st | May 29th | Discussion |
| Module 3 | The nature of the problem | May 29th | June 4th | Discussion |
| Module 4 | Biases, blind spots & failures of imagination | June 5th | June 12th | Discussion |

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| **Course Project Proposal** | **Project Proposal (200 points)** | **May 25th** | **June 19th** | **Submit proposal** |
| **Module 5** | **Technology as enabler/deceiver** | **June 13th** | **June 19th** | **Discussion** |
| **Module 6** | **Anticipating surprise** | **June 19th** | **June 28th** | **Discussion** |
| **Module 7** | **Is surprise overrated?** | **June 28th** | **July 2nd** | **Discussion** |
| **Module 8** | **Can obstacles be overcome?** | **July 3rd** | **July 5th** | **No discussion** |
| **Course Project** | **Course project (400 points)** | **June 20th** | **July 5th** | **Submit course project** |